APRIL 15 IS A CRITICAL DATE!!! IT IS THE DAY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES ON THE CONTRACT TO RENEW PEACEKEEPING TROUPS (MONUC) IN THE
CONGO. Please send letters IMMEDIATELY to support the extension of
the UN contract to retain peace keeping forces in the Congo for two more years. The women and children of the Congo need protection!!!!
Sending three letters only takes 10 minutes. Go to -- www.firstpresevanston.org -- click on the picture of the Congolese women and fax or email the letters found there.
PLEASE ENCOURAGE THE ORGANIZATIONS THAT YOU REPRESENT TO SEND LETTERS TOO.
(From Janet Sullivan, Congo Coalition)
Wednesday, February 28, 2007
Update from Southern Africa Resource Watch
The new government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has produced its plan of action for 2007-2011. It has also put out a short plan of action for this year which will run from March 2007 to December 2007. In this short plan of action which is called “Government Contract” the actions of government in the extractive Industries will focus on:
- the implementation of the EITI (this has certainly reduced the doubt we had about the commitment of the new government to implement the initiative);
- the publication of important documents and analysis of all contracts in the extractive industry;
- the renegotiation of dubious contracts;
- reform of all national extractive companies;
- the elaboration and adoption of adequate and transparent procedures in dealing with new mining contracts (exploration or exploitation);
- conclusion and publication of the judicial evaluation currently taking place on logging concessions with the view to cancelling the dubious ones.
- building the capacity of the Congolese office in charge of the environment to be able to apply concrete actions to protect the environment.
This is certainly good news for the DRC. We need to monitor that government does respect its commitment.
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
Global Witness Press Release - En Français
Date d’embargo : 21 février 2007, 00h01 GMT
Global Witness enjoint le gouvernement britannique de demander des comptes à la société Afrimex pour avoir alimenté le conflit
en République démocratique du Congo
Global Witness, une organisation non gouvernementale basée à Londres, a déposé une plainte contre la société britannique Afrimex auprès du Point de contact national, dans le cadre des nouvelles procédures renforcées mises en place par le gouvernement et portant sur l’examen des infractions aux Principes directeurs de l’OCDE à l’intention des entreprises multinationales.
Global Witness est convaincu que le commerce des minerais pratiqué par Afrimex a directement contribué au brutal conflit et aux violations massives des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo (RDC).
« La réaction du gouvernement britannique à cette plainte permettra de vérifier qu’il a réellement l’intention de demander des comptes aux sociétés britanniques », explique le directeur de Global Witness, Patrick Alley. « Les sociétés sont tenues de respecter les Principes directeurs de l’OCDE, mais la responsabilité finale du contrôle d’application des Principes revient au gouvernement. »
La plainte déposée par l’ONG affirme que la société Afrimex, qui s’est livrée au commerce du coltan et de la cassitérite (minerai d’étain) pendant toute la durée du conflit en RDC depuis 1996, a versé des impôts au Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), un groupe rebelle armé connu pour ses graves violations des droits de l’homme, responsable de massacres de civils, d’actes de torture et de violences sexuelles. Au cours du conflit, le RCD-Goma contrôlait de grandes parties des provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu, dans l’est de la RDC, où se trouvent des mines de coltan et de cassitérite.
La plainte dénonce également les risques mortels auxquels sont exposés les mineurs de cassitérite et le recours au travail forcé et à la main-d’œuvre enfantine. « L’ouverture d’une enquête qui révèlera si la société Afrimex s’est en partie approvisionnée auprès de ces mines est tout à fait justifiée », déclare Patrick Alley.
La société Afrimex a régulièrement refusé de reconnaître l’impact négatif de ses activités en RDC, malgré les enquêtes menées par les ONG, par un Groupe d’experts de l’ONU et par le Comité du développement international du Parlement britannique. Le directeur d’Afrimex a admis avoir versé des impôts au RCD-Goma et ignorer l’usage qui était fait de ces versements.
« L’argent versé par Afrimex au RCD-Goma a perpétué le conflit et, en accroissant la puissance des rebelles, leur a permis d’infliger des sévices extrêmes à la population civile », affirme Patrick Alley. « Il existe de nombreuses preuves des violations massives des droits de l’homme commises par le RCD-Goma, mais Afrimex a choisi de fermer les yeux sur celles-ci. »
Le texte complet de la plainte déposée par Global Witness peut être consulté sur http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/507/fr/plainte_contre_afrimex_uk_ltd_dans_le_cadre_de_la_.
Pour plus d’informations, veuillez contacter :
Remarque à l’attention des rédacteurs :
Global Witness est une organisation non gouvernementale indépendante dont la mission est d’enquêter et de faire campagne sur les liens entre l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, les conflits et la corruption.
Toutes les publications de Global Witness sont disponibles sur le site www.globalwitness.org
Global Witness Press Release - Afrimex
Global Witness calls upon the
The London-based non-governmental organisation Global Witness has submitted a complaint against British company Afrimex to the UK National Contact Point under the government’s new, strengthened procedures for considering breaches of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
Global Witness believes that Afrimex’s trade in minerals contributed directly to the brutal conflict and large-scale human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
“The UK Government’s response to this complaint will be a test of its seriousness in holding British companies to account,” said Global Witness Director
The complaint describes how Afrimex, which traded in the minerals coltan and cassiterite (tin ore) throughout the conflict in the DRC from 1996 onwards, made tax payments to the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), an armed rebel group with a well-documented record of carrying out grave human rights abuses, including massacres of civilians, torture and sexual violence. During the conflict, the RCD-Goma controlled large parts of the eastern provinces of North and
The complaint also highlights the life-threatening conditions in cassiterite mines and the use of forced labour and child labour. “There are reasonable grounds to investigate whether Afrimex sourced some of its products from such mines,” said Patrick Alley.
Afrimex has persistently failed to recognise the negative impact of its activities in the DRC, despite scrutiny by non-governmental organisations, a UN Panel of Experts, and the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee. Afrimex’s director has admitted that the company made tax payments to the RCD-Goma and that it did not know how this money was used.
“Afrimex’s payments to the RCD-Goma perpetuated the conflict and strengthened the rebels’ capacity to inflict extreme suffering on the civilian population,” said Patrick Alley. “There was abundant evidence of widespread human rights abuses by the RCD-Goma, which Afrimex chose to ignore.”
The full text of Global Witness’s complaint is available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/507/en/complaint_against_afrimex_uk_ltd_under_the_specifi.
For more information, please contact:
Note to editors:
Global Witness is an independent non-governmental organisation which investigates and campaigns on the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption.
All Global Witness’s publications can be found at www.globalwitness.org
Security Sector Reform in the Congo - ICG report
Source: International Crisis Group (ICG)
Date: 13 Feb 2007
Security sector reform in the Congo
Africa Report N°104
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No issue is more important than security sector reform in determining the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s prospects for peace and development. Two particular challenges loom large: the security services must be able to maintain order during the national elections scheduled for April 2006 and reduce the country’s staggering mortality rate from the conflict – still well over 30,000 every month. On the military side, far more must be done to create an effective, unified army with a single chain of command, rather than simply demobilising militias and giving ex-combatants payout packages. International attention to police reform has been much less than that given to military restructuring: the limited efforts have had some important successes but suffer from a patchwork approach that largely neglects the countryside. Establishing a secure environment is not possible without a thorough security assessment that takes into account the country’s risks, needs, capabilities and financial means. A realistic plan is needed that defines the role of the security forces and reconciles their needs and means for a sustainable future.
Reform of the army is far behind schedule. Eighteen integrated brigades were supposed to be created before elections but only six have been deployed, some of which are as much a security hazard as a source of stability, since they are often unpaid and prey on the local population. The police are supposed to be responsible for election security but are no match for local militias in many parts of the country.
Security sector reform continues to be a neglected stepchild both financially and in terms of strategic planning. While donors have already contributed more than $2 billion to the Congo, including generous amounts for demobilisation of ex-combatants, only a small fraction has been dedicated to improving the status and management of the armed forces and the police. While it is understandable that many donors are reluctant to engage with what have often been unsavoury elements, these forces are critical for stability. The current incentive structure to encourage reform is seriously distorted. Fighters are offered allowances totalling $410 to leave the military but a salary of only $10 a month if they choose army service, and even this too often never gets to them. Coordination of international efforts is also inadequate, though the European Union’s police (EUPOL) and military (EUSEC) missions have begun to stimulate improvements.
The army remains weak and could again collapse quickly if faced with a serious threat. Although most former belligerents now form the transitional government and formally support the new army, they and their ex-soldiers sometimes ignore orders from the military hierarchy that they consider to be in conflict with the interests of their respective factions. Indeed, the reluctance to move forward with reform in many security structures is a deliberate strategy on the part of the leaders who fought the 1998-2002 war to preserve their ability to respond with force if the elections do not turn out to their satisfaction.
This report gives special attention to the European Union and its member states’ contributions on security sector reform as part of an ongoing examination of the EU’s growing global role in conflict prevention.
RECOMMENDATIONS
On police training and reform
To Donors and the United Nations:
1. Agree on a long-term common training program and use the new police reflection group (groupe de réflexion) to:
(a) improve liaison between donors and Congolese institutions, notably the National Police, immediately and harmonise training programs;
(b) conduct a systematic review of the police before elections to evaluate the most important threats to human security; and
(c) match needs with resources in a comprehensive long-term strategy, including creation of a national gendarmerie.
2. Accompany training on human rights codes and conduct with greater emphasis on the practical operational details of policing so that trainees receive a strong grounding in such basics as investigation, forensic evidence collection, interviewing and protecting witnesses and children (especially in sexual violence cases), handling crime scenes, and helping prosecutors build cases.
3. Make completion of a proper accounting of available police manpower a priority.
4. Condition further donor aid on an increase in police salaries and separation of payment of those salaries from the chain of command along the lines of the model now being used for the army as a means to combat corruption and promote loyalty to the force.
To the Congolese Authorities:
5. Establish specially trained and equipped squads to combat the high prevalence of violent sex crimes and create safe rooms for children and survivors of sexual violence in police stations.
6. Recruit proactively and promote women with the ultimate aim of establishing much greater parity in the police service.
On army training and reform
To the Congolese Authorities:
7. Integrate and simplify, in consultation with donors, the national command and decision-making structures so as to improve coordination between the various reform programs and reduce opportunities to stall the process.
8. Conduct, in consultation with donors, a systematic review of the army that evaluates security threats and seeks to match needs and resources in a comprehensive long-term strategy.
9. Reduce the army’s target size from 100,000-125,000 to a more realistic and sustainable 60,000-70,000.
10. Reduce the Presidential Guard dramatically from 12,000-15,000 to 600-800 troops and integrate the remainder into the regular army structure.
11. Move as quickly as possible in the parliament after the April 2006 elections to establish an appropriate defence oversight committee and require the government to detail fully its proposed defence spending in the annual budget.
To Donors and the United Nations:
12. Expand the EU plan to separate salary payment from the chain of command with salary increases and improved living conditions for rank and file soldiers, conditioning further aid to the military on prompt implementation.
13. Establish an International Military Assistance and Training Team (IMATT), including the European Union’s military mission (EUSEC) and participation from such major donors as the EU, Angola and South Africa, as a means of coordinating security sector reform and advisory programs and to:
(a) take a hands-on approach by having technical advisers oversee the payroll and accompany training and subsequent operations of deployed units;
(b) help establish standards and train Congolese trainers; and
(c) oversee rehabilitation of the army’s training camps and enhance its logistical capabilities.
14. Increase donor investment in army integration to match support for the demobilisation process, using funds in particular for equipment, housing, health care and school fees for soldiers’ children, starting with the integrated brigades.
To the European Union:
15. Consult immediately with the Congolese authorities and the UN and deploy additional forces, for example the new EU gendarmerie, to secure Lubumbashi and pacify northern and central Katanga.
16. Continue to adopt a constructive and flexible approach toward the need to increase investment in reform of the military sector, consistent with ODA eligibility under OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines, as the Commission did recently in justifying its financing of the refurbishment of army integration centres.
To the UN Security Council:
17. Follow-up more aggressively in the Congo Sanctions Committee cases where the panel of experts has identified regional violators of the arms embargo and implement targeted sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans to help the elected government acquire a monopoly of force in the country.
To the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC):
18. Review the conditions and guidelines of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility in the DAC to satisfy any concerns donors may have about the propriety of engaging more proactively in security sector reform.
Nairobi/Brussels, 13 February 2006
Full_Report (pdf* format - 154.7 Kbytes)
If the link above does not work, please try:
Friday, February 16, 2007
UNHCR seeks $62 Million for Congolese refugees, internally displaced
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Date: 13 Feb 2007
UNHCR seeks $62 million for Congolese refugees, internally displaced
GENEVA - The UN refugee agency announced today that it is seeking a total of $62 million for programmes aimed at helping hundreds of thousands of people displaced within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well as Congolese refugees in neighbouring countries.
UNHCR is seeking $47 million to support the return and reintegration this year of some 98,500 Congolese refugees to their homeland. It is also asking donors for a further $15 million to provide protection and assistance during the same period for an estimated 1.1 million internally displaced people (IDP) in the African nation.
The agency hopes for a prompt and adequate response to its appeals from the donor community. The two supplementary appeals * one for IDPs and one for refugees -- cite important developments in the DRC last year, including the inauguration of President Joseph Kabila in December after the country's first democratic elections in four decades. This has raised hopes that Congolese living in exile and those displaced internally will soon be able to return to their homes.
Since October 2004, some 89,000 Congolese refugees have repatriated * mostly to Equateur, South Kivu and Katanga provinces. In addition, nearly half a million IDPs went back to their places of origin last year.
"We have to seize the chance and build on the positive developments, stability and number of returns achieved last year," said UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres. "The international community has a unique opportunity here -- if we can maintain the momentum and show Congolese that they are not alone. Timely funding is crucial for the successful repatriation and reintegration of Congolese refugees, as well as to anchor those who have already come home."
More than 400,000 Congolese still live in exile, virtually all of them in nine neighbouring countries. They live in camps or designated areas and most have no resources to return on their own. Some have spent decades in exile, waiting for lasting peace to return.
The $47 million that UNHCR is seeking, in addition to the regular annual budget, will cover voluntary repatriation programmes for Congolese refugees from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Republic of Congo and Zambia.
UNHCR's main objectives are to ensure the voluntary nature of returns and to organise these movements in a safe and dignified manner. The refugee agency will also support the reintegration of returnees and facilitate their access to shelter as well as basic services such as health and education.
The number of IDPs in DRC fell by about a third last year, but there are still an estimated 1.1 million people displaced within the country. UNHCR's appeal for $15 million for IDPs is aimed at helping these people, most of whom live with relatives or host families.
In the appeal, UNHCR projects that as many as 950,000 of the IDPs could return to their homes in 2007. However, hundreds of thousands of Congolese were newly displaced last year due to localised outbreaks of fighting and this remains a major concern for UNHCR. There is still an environment of widespread impunity in parts of the country, and the human rights of the displaced are often violated.
The extra funds will allow UNHCR to establish protection-monitoring mechanisms in the areas of displacement and return, and to conduct early warning and prevention activities. Security permitting, UNHCR will support the establishment of mechanisms to settle land and property disputes, providing humanitarian assistance to IDP returnees and promoting inter-ethnic coexistence.
There are considerable challenges for UNHCR and its humanitarian and development partners in achieving these objectives. Parts of the DRC, particularly in the east, remain volatile. The country is among the poorest in the world. Life expectancy is low, the rule of law is very weak and social and economic conditions are extremely difficult.
In addition, HIV/AIDS is a big problem and is exacerbated by the widespread lack of basic health and education services. Meanwhile, the poor communications and transportation networks in such a huge country make the work of UNHCR and its partners even more difficult.
Oxfam Briefing Paper 97
EMBARGOED UNTIL 09:00 HRS GMT Monday 12th February 2007
A Fragile Future
Why scaling down MONUC too soon could spell disaster for the Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and
opportunities of rebuilding a nation from the ground up. The
presence of United Nations peacekeepers (MONUC) has
significantly reduced fighting and organised violence, and must
be maintained with an appropriate troop strength and mandate
to guarantee peace and long-term stability.
MONUC should not scale down its activities until the Congolese
security forces – and in particular the army – stop posing a
threat to their own populations and instead begin providing
security and protection to the Congolese people.
Summary
In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early 2007,
despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the correct policy
choices are made in the next few months.
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) has supported the Congolese government in the political
transition process. It deserves the praise it has received for assisting DRC
with its successful elections and other recent achievements.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the crucial
role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC. Through its
military presence and operations MONUC has been able to restore stability
to large parts of the war-torn country, thereby reducing incidents of
organised violence against civilians and increasing humanitarian access and
economic activities.
There is little doubt that, without a substantial and effective MONUC
presence, this relative stabilisation of the security situation could quickly
unravel and threaten the wider region as well. MONUC officials,
humanitarian actors, and civilians who have been affected by violence are
warning the international community of the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences that a premature scaling back of MONUC presence could
induce. ‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain community leaders in Ituri, eastern
DRC. ‘It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us. Not yet.’
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of approximately
130,000) have already been integrated into a new national army, it has
become clear that the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo) is in no position to defend itself – or any civilian in
its care – against militia warlords, foreign rebels, local defence forces, or any
other armed actors. Attacks on government forces in North Kivu in
November 2006 have served as a timely reminder that, without full support
from MONUC, the Congolese army is completely incapable of preventing
attempts to seize major population centres such as Goma.
Underpaid, underfed, ill-equipped and badly led, FARDC soldiers in all of the
eastern provinces remain the single biggest cause of insecurity in DRC,
responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all human-rights abuses
against civilians. Similar accusations of abuse are also levelled against other
arms of the security forces (including police) and ‘demobilised’ excombatants
who continue to rely on violence as a means of survival.
In essence, most of the security forces that are meant to be protecting the
civilian populations from the numerous threats still present in DRC are
unable, or unwilling, to do so.
The new Congolese government has cited reform of the security sector as
one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a desire to support
the government in this process, particularly with co-ordination, training, and
advice. A strong MONUC commitment to the security-sector reform (SSR)
should be considered a vital element of any post-transition mandate, and
any exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be linked to progress
indicators on SSR processes, most importantly the military, police, and
judicial sectors.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by its
security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised combatants,
MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence to protect civilians
from immediate threats and creating a stable environment in which longerterm
reforms can take place.
The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and extraordinary
efforts of the Congolese citizens to lead their country into a new era are not
rewarded with a ‘cut and run’ attitude of immediate disengagement by the
international community. Instead, the Security Council must make it a priority
with the key member states, such as the USA, to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the protection of
the civilian population from appalling levels of insecurity and abuse.
Maintain the robust use of force to protect civilians but use the
mandate review to take measures to improve MONUC’s operational
effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to demonstrable
progress on security-sector reform, beginning with a clear reduction
in the levels of abuses committed by the security forces themselves,
and a basic ability of military, police, and judicial sectors to defend
the population from external and internal threats.
• Ensure that existing MONUC military presence prioritises the
protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a clearer
definition of protection, more operational guidance, and better tools
to translate the concept of protection into concrete action on the
ground.
• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full support to
the newly created democratic processes and institutions, and the
protection and promotion of human rights. Offer strategic and
operational support to the new sovereign government in combating
the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal arms trade.
The Congolese people deserve no less than a clear signal that their massive
sacrifices have been worth the effort, and that the international community
will work together with their new government to make a better future in DRC
possible.
1 Introduction
In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic
elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early
2007, despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the
correct policy choices are made in the next few months.
Over the past few years, DRC has transformed itself from a
completely divided country (where travel between the eastern and
western parts was impossible) to a nation united by a cautious but
fervent sense of hope.
Yet, despite the incredible progress that has been made on some
fronts, DRC faces a number of daunting challenges, most notably
dealing with regular outbreaks of violence in the east, and the
constant fear of renewed national instability.
Across many parts of the country – and especially in Ituri, the Kivus,
and Katanga – Congolese people are still confronted every day with
the threat of violence, extortion, rape, torture, or murder at the hands
of hundreds of thousands of armed combatants.
An estimated four million civilians have died as a result of conflict
since August 1998, the most devastating death toll in any armed
conflict since World War Two.1 There are clear indications that these
trends are reversible,2 but such progress will require strong political
and financial commitments from both the new DRC government and
the international community.
2 MONUC’s impact to date
In 1999 – when the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) first arrived in DRC – even
optimists would have been hard pressed to predict the recent success
of the Congolese elections.
MONUC deserves the praise it has received for the assistance it has
offered the Congolese government in the political transition process.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the
crucial role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC.
Having evolved significantly over the years, MONUC’s current
mandate (defined in 37 separate UN Security Council resolutions) has
often been described as a patchwork of wide-ranging – and
sometimes competing – political, military, and humanitarian
objectives. While humanitarian actors feel that MONUC’s
responsibility to protect civilians from violence3 has not always been
prioritised as highly as other elements of the mandate, and MONUC
has failed to perform in some areas (including an initial failure to
prevent incidents of abuse by a small number of its own
peacekeepers4), there is no doubt that MONUC has been able to
restore stability to large parts of the war-torn country.
In all of DRC’s provinces, MONUC has gained control over and
secured major towns and cities. In addition, MONUC’s military
presence and logistical capacity has significantly increased
humanitarian access (and also economic opportunities) to previously
insecure or remote rural areas (for example along the Rwindi–
Rutshuru road in North Kivu, the Bunia–Kasenyi road in Ituri and
the main Bunia–Beni and Bunia–Mahagi commercial routes).
The presence of MONUC troops has reduced incidents of organised
violence against the civilian populations. Especially in Ituri,
MONUC’s operations against militia groups (for example around
Mahagi)5 have succeeded in disarming the majority of combatants6
and allowing large parts of the population to return to their normal
lives. ‘When MONUC arrived, the militias left’, explained displaced
people in Djugu.7 Though MONUC’s performance has been criticised
in some parts of the country (see Section 5), the Ituri example has
shown that a consistent application of MONUC’s robust mandate can
contribute to improvements in the security situation.
The fact that people today walk along the street without fear in towns
like Bunia, which in 2003 witnessed several violent massacres of
civilians, is a simple but powerful indicator of the impact of
MONUC’s presence.
In areas where the security situation has stabilised, MONUC has
begun playing a role in helping displaced people return to their
villages of origin. MONUC patrols in places such as Malumbi or
Tshushubo (North Kivu) have given the population enough
confidence to leave their temporary camps and begin rebuilding their
lives in the villages.
On the whole, MONUC’s presence has been effective in improving
security in those areas where troops have been deployed. Proactive
efforts to protect civilians from violence have at times been
inconsistent or patchy, but there have also been a number of
successes (see Section 5).
3 ‘Not yet’ – the price of scaling down
One of the easiest ways of measuring MONUC’s impact is perhaps to
ask what would happen if it were not present in DRC.
‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain village chiefs and displaced
people in the lakeside villages of Tchomia and Kasenyi. ‘We would
leave tomorrow. It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us without
MONUC. Not yet.
Unfortunately, the sentiment is echoed not just in areas that are still
dominated by rebel or militia groups. It is also heard regularly in
those parts of the country that are under the control of the Congolese
army.
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of
approximately 130,000) have already undergone the ‘brassage’
process of being integrated into a new national army, it has become
clear that FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du
Congo) are in no position to defend themselves – or any civilian in
their care – against any kind of external threat or attack. ‘Brassage is
just a word. It means nothing when translated into reality’, admits a
FARDC commander in Beni.
It is well-known that FARDC soldiers in all of the eastern provinces
flee from the enemy when attacked, regularly discarding their
uniforms and hiding among the civilian populations. Command and
control functions are in some cases non-existent, with commanders
unaware of their troops’ movements or operations. ‘Some of these
guys can’t even shoot a gun’, explained a MONUC peacekeeper that
regularly carries out joint patrols with FARDC soldiers.
In the absence of a capable FARDC, it has often fallen to MONUC
soldiers to defend strategic areas. The recent example of dissident
general Laurent Nkunda’s attempted attack on the eastern city of
Goma illustrated the army’s reliance on MONUC. ‘MONUC’s Indian
Battalion was the only thing standing between Nkunda and Goma.
Without MONUC, Goma would have fallen’, concluded one UN
official in Goma.
Military experts (both foreign and Congolese) agree that FARDC
troops offer little protection against foreign or Congolese insurgent
groups who continue to harass and terrorise civilians. Such groups
include warlord militias, the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de
Libération du Rwanda) - presumed to be the remnants of the
Interahamwe or the Mai Mai – the name for Local Defence Forces.
In addition to their failure to protect civilians against external threats,
FARDC troops are themselves considered to be the major cause of
insecurity in DRC. MONUC’s human-rights monitors hold FARDC
soldiers responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all
human-rights abuses against civilians. FARDC soldiers regularly
extort or loot from the civilian populations, and commit violent
crimes such as arbitrary killings and rape. Similar accusations of
abuse are also levelled against non-organised armed actors, including
‘demobilised’ ex-combatants who continue to rely on violence as a
means of survival. The high incidence of crimes and abuses against
the civilian population in DRC has been made possible due to a
general climate of impunity and a complete lack of law and order.
Civilians are looking to MONUC to support their new government in
combating these problems, and ensuring that a relatively stable
environment will continue to allow humanitarian assistance to flow
to those in need. One of the ways in which MONUC has been doing –
and should continue to do – this is by supporting the new Congolese
government with its efforts to reform the security sector, especially
with regard to military, police, and judicial sectors.
4 No security without reform
In 2005, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made it clear that
‘the establishment of an integrated and professional army and police
force is a key element of the exit strategy for MONUC’. In other
words, UN member states should not withdraw MONUC – whose
deployment has been an expression of their responsibility to protect
civilians in DRC, until the new government establishes a functional
and accountable national army and police force.
The examples above illustrate the army’s current lack of capacity to
provide even the most basic physical security. Reasons for this
appear to be well-known, yet at the same time hard to tackle.
International advisers report extremely low rates of formal military
education among all brigades, and troops in the field are
notoriously ill-equipped to perform in any kind of battle. One of the
newly integrated brigades, for example, has been given just 24 handheld
radios (and no spare batteries) to share between approximately
3,500 people for communications during combat. Bullets are in
similarly short supply.
Troops also lack motivation (and – not fearing any prosecution from
a weak judicial system – begin to prey on local populations) because
they are underpaid and underfed, and living with their families in
conditions of extreme poverty and hardship.
Current monthly salaries consist of a miserly $25, and the complete
lack of soldiers’ welfare and health care routinely results in 15–20
deaths in each brigade per month. The abject state of neglect in
which soldiers and their families find themselves was aptly
illustrated by the 4th Integrated Brigade who arrived in Ituri in 2005
spreading infectious diseases such as cholera and fever to the local
populations in its path.
Other military actors are even less functional than the ground forces.
The Congolese Air Force is considered ‘structurally obsolete and in a
state of life-threatening dilapidation […], air or land combat capacity
is zero’. Little training has been carried out for air crew, technical, or
command elements since the Mobutu period.
The remaining branches of the security sector, including police,
judicial, and civilian agencies are as ill-equipped as the army to carry
out their work properly.
Courts and magistrates are in short supply. Only one prison (out of
a total of 145) in DRC actually has a budget for feeding its inmates.
And even though DRC has 258 registered airstrips, only 50 of them
are monitored by air-traffic controllers. There is no radar
surveillance system or navigational guidance system for aircraft in
DRC, and air-force communication systems do not function to any
satisfactory level.
The new Congolese government has cited security sector reform
(SSR) as one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a
desire to support the government in this process, particularly with
co-ordination, training, and advice. MONUC’s recently established
SSR cell acknowledges that any exit strategy for UN peacekeepers
8 A Fragile Future, Oxfam Briefing Paper, February 2007
will need to be closely linked to the progress on reform, most
importantly the military, police, and judicial sectors.
One of the challenges in this domain has been the fragmentation of
processes and initiatives. While the active involvement of several
bilateral donors in SSR processes is laudable, it is unlikely that small
or ad hoc projects (most of them limited to certain geographical areas
or specific units – ‘a few jeeps for two brigades in Ituri, a few pots of
paint for three new courthouses in Kinshasa’) will add up to an
impact that is equal to or greater than the sum of its parts.
The ultimate responsibility for the SSR process naturally rests with
the newly elected Congolese government, and external SSR actors are
currently looking to President Kabila to clearly signal his country’s
strategic and operational needs in this area. Donors and other actors
will need to ensure that their co-operation with the new government
does not suffer from the same fragmented approach as past
initiatives. A single actor (such as the European Union or MONUC)
should be appointed to take a clear lead on the co-ordination of
donor support to the SSR process. MONUC’s current involvement in
SSR processes (which includes hosting weekly SSR co-ordination
meetings) indicate that there is capacity to lead on day-to-day coordination
processes. It should be recognised, however, that the
temporary nature of MONUC’s mandate in DRC is unlikely to allow
for the kind of strategic and long-term co-ordination that can oversee
the entire lifespan of the SSR process (an undertaking military experts
estimate to take at least 15–20 years).
On the issue of building national capacity, donors should
acknowledge that MONUC’s presence in the field and its existing cooperation
with security forces make it a logical choice for initial
training schemes. For example, the proposed curriculum for a
MONUC-led basic military training programme (to be carried out in
all of FARDC’s integrated brigades) accurately reflects some of the
most pressing needs and priorities on the ground – both in terms of
basic military skills and the social welfare of soldiers and their
dependants. It should be noted, however, that MONUC’s proposed
45-day trainings are little more than initial steps in the training
process, and in themselves highly unlikely to allow FARDC to reach
operational capability immediately.
In addition to supporting co-ordination and training initiatives,
MONUC should increase its capacity to offer expert operational
advice to government actors leading SSR processes, in particular
regarding urgent but sensitive issues such as vetting of corrupt or
abusive officials in the army, police, and judicial systems.
Any realistic exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be
linked to progress indicators on SSR processes.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by
its security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised
combatants, MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence
to protect civilians from immediate threats and ensuring a stable
environment in which reforms can take place.
5 More effective protection of civilians
In March 2005, the UN Security Council reiterated its call to MONUC
to use ‘all necessary means within its capabilities and in the areas
where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of
force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, from any armed
group, foreign or Congolese’.
Experts have described MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate as ‘the most
assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians’.
Despite this, MONUC has sometimes been accused of behaving more
like a Chapter VI observer mission, using force only in self-defence
and doing little to physically protect civilians. ‘I don’t think they’re
allowed to open fire’, claims a Congolese NGO worker in Goma.
‘They did nothing to stop women getting raped in Bukavu and
Rutshuru. I’m scared they wouldn’t protect my daughters either if
there is more fighting here’. Reasons for such inaction are numerous
and often include a lack of resources and capacity, as well as the
prioritisation of more political aspects of the mandate over protection
objectives.
In addition, the concept of ‘civilian protection’ has often remained
vague and ill-defined, and peacekeepers are given very little
guidance on how they are expected to translate their mandate into
concrete tasks.
For MONUC to adequately carry out its ambitious mandate, forces
would benefit from a clearer understanding of the concept of
protection, more operational guidance, and better tools.
On a conceptual level, MONUC should consistently prioritise the
protection of civilians when considering how to counter ongoing and
well-known threats, for example the problem of dealing with
dissidents like Laurent Nkunda. MONUC’s inaction in the face of
Nkunda’s violent attacks on Bukavu in 2004, Rutshuru in 2005 or
Sake in 2006 is regularly cited by civilians in North and South Kivu as
an example of the international community failing to protect them
from violence. These incidents stand in marked contrast to MONUC
successes, such as the robust display of force MONUC battalions
launched when Nkunda attempted to seize the (perhaps strategically
more important) town of Goma in November 2006, or the way in
which MONUC has dealt with the threat of militia in Ituri.
In instances where MONUC has failed to deal with urgent protection
threats, populations have often expressed confusion and
resentment. A more consistent application of MONUC’s protection
mandate would do much to build confidence among these
populations.
Operationally – and more concretely – MONUC would also do well
to include clearer guidance on appropriate protection activities in
their military rules of engagement, for example troops’
responsibilities in preventing other actors (including the state’s own
security forces) from committing abuses against civilians.
Perhaps the single most important tool that MONUC can use to
protect civilians from threats is its sheer military presence. ‘When
MONUC is not around, when they are not doing patrols or going to
work as usual, people often don’t leave their houses. You have to
understand we still live in fear’, villagers around Lake Albert
explained. Specific steps that MONUC could take in this area are
outlined in the final recommendations in this paper.
It should be emphasised here that MONUC’s existing resources in
DRC are already overstretched. Any cut to current troop strength or
resources would therefore spell disaster for communities currently
benefiting from MONUC protection.
6 Beyond immediate security – a lasting peace?
Oxfam believes that by supporting the Congolese government in
reforming the security sector and consistently prioritising the
protection of civilians in military operations, MONUC could greatly
increase its impact on security in DRC. At the same time, it would be
naïve to assume that either measure will guarantee the Congo’s longterm
stability – a job that clearly rests with the DRC government
itself.
Following his success in the recent national elections that ended
DRC’s transitional period, President Joseph Kabila has assumed the
unique rights and responsibilities that are assigned to any leader of a
sovereign nation.
To achieve a lasting peace, the new Congolese government will need
to begin addressing long-standing problems of weak governance and
political and economic marginalisation, especially among young
people, who make up more than half of the Congo’s population.
Until the government is able to offer current or ex-combatants a true
alternative to militia life, their disgruntled citizens remain at high risk
of resorting to the rule of the gun.
In order to encourage long-term stability, MONUC will need to
support the Congolese government with the development of its new
democratic institutions and processes, and protect and promote
human rights. It should also assist the new Congolese government
with political processes such as searching for creative and sustainable
solutions to the threat posed by ‘foreign’ armed groups such as the
FDLR and ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces - National Army
for the Liberation of Uganda). Sensitive issues, including the presence
of Congolese fighters and the question of Congolese citizenship for
some of the foreign elements in these groups, should be discussed
without delay.
In addition, more resources will need to be made available by DRC
donors for civilian agencies (UN, government, and NGO) to
eventually replace national DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
Reintegration) programmes with long-term and broad-based
community-recovery programmes.
In order to tackle the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal
arms trade – both of which are likely to sustain conflict in DRC –
MONUC should continue, where appropriate, to offer strong support
to the government, in particular through providing analysis and
logistical support to monitoring activities. The existing mandate that
MONUC has been given in these areas must be matched with
appropriate resources and capacity if MONUC is to make any
progress in assisting the new government with tackling such difficult
problems.
The election of a new government should not be seen by the
international community as an excuse to extract itself from any of
these processes when it is clear that a limited or superficial response
to these problems will merely allow them to fester beneath the
surface and breed potential for future instability.
7 Conclusions and recommendations
The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and opportunities
of rebuilding a nation from the ground up.
In recent years, DRC has exceeded all expectations: in record time, it
has established basic democratic institutions (including a constitution
and democratic elections at both national and provincial levels). The
country’s macro-economic framework has recovered at least
partially, and economists expect investment expansion, particularly
in the country’s lucrative mining sector.
Yet, Congo’s impressive developments and even the successful
elections will mean nothing if a scaling down of efforts allows the
country to lapse back into full-blown violence. It is imperative that
the international community recognise that investing in stability will
also be more cost-effective than responding to the fall-out.
The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and
extraordinary efforts of the Congolese people to lead their country
into a new era are not blocked by an immediate disengagement and
withdrawal of interest from the international community. Instead, the
Security Council must make it a priority to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the
protection of the civilian population from appalling levels of
insecurity and abuse. Maintain the robust use of force to
protect civilians but use the mandate review to take measures
to improve MONUC’s operational effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to
demonstrable progress on security-sector reform, beginning
with a clear reduction in the levels of abuses committed by the
security forces themselves, and a basic ability of military,
police, and judicial sectors to defend the population from
external and internal threats.
• Ensure that the existing MONUC military presence prioritises
the protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a
clearer definition of protection, more operational guidance,
and better tools to translate the concept of protection into
concrete action on the ground. Oxfam believes that, in order
to maximise the limited resources at their disposal, MONUC’s
troops on the ground should focus especially on:
o Establishing overall security and humanitarian access
in areas where displaced populations are returning to
their villages of origin. It is imperative that MONUC
maintain close contact with humanitarian actors in
planning for such operations in order to avoid
instances of forced, politicised, or uninformed
returns.
o Carefully assessing the humanitarian impact of
planned joint MONUC–FARDC offensives and
refraining from carrying out operations that achieve
political objectives but have a disproportionately
negative impact on civilians (for example, clear risk of
militia reprisal killings against local populations or
unduly high levels of displacement).
o Instructing troops to apply the protection mandate in a
more consistent way. This includes the robust use of
force in line with the Chapter VII mandate, when the
protection needs require it, and proactive attempts to
prevent abuses such as looting and extortion. This
should involve encouraging the reporting of abuses
and where possible supporting their prosecution
through military justice mechanisms.
o Transmitting information about protection threats to
local humanitarian actors or the protection clusters
(which MONUC civilian staff co-chair) so that
appropriate solutions can be discussed. Protection
clusters have often been able to co-ordinate effective
humanitarian responses and mount joint advocacy
initiatives to address identified threats.
o Increasing humanitarian space for independent aid
agencies by putting a stop to self-promotional (and
sometimes inappropriate) ‘quick impact projects’ and
‘winning hearts and minds activities’, except where
these are directly linked to military co-operation (for
example, the rehabilitation of latrines or water sources
in military barracks or prisons).
• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full
support to the newly created democratic processes and
institutions, and the protection and promotion of human
rights. Offer strategic and operational support to the new
sovereign government in combating the illicit exploitation of
minerals and the illegal arms trade.
EMBARGOED UNTIL 09:00 HRS GMT Monday 12th February 2007
A Fragile Future
Why scaling down MONUC too soon could spell disaster for the Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and
opportunities of rebuilding a nation from the ground up. The
presence of United Nations peacekeepers (MONUC) has
significantly reduced fighting and organised violence, and must
be maintained with an appropriate troop strength and mandate
to guarantee peace and long-term stability.
MONUC should not scale down its activities until the Congolese
security forces – and in particular the army – stop posing a
threat to their own populations and instead begin providing
security and protection to the Congolese people.
Summary
In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early 2007,
despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the correct policy
choices are made in the next few months.
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) has supported the Congolese government in the political
transition process. It deserves the praise it has received for assisting DRC
with its successful elections and other recent achievements.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the crucial
role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC. Through its
military presence and operations MONUC has been able to restore stability
to large parts of the war-torn country, thereby reducing incidents of
organised violence against civilians and increasing humanitarian access and
economic activities.
There is little doubt that, without a substantial and effective MONUC
presence, this relative stabilisation of the security situation could quickly
unravel and threaten the wider region as well. MONUC officials,
humanitarian actors, and civilians who have been affected by violence are
warning the international community of the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences that a premature scaling back of MONUC presence could
induce. ‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain community leaders in Ituri, eastern
DRC. ‘It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us. Not yet.’
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of approximately
130,000) have already been integrated into a new national army, it has
become clear that the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo) is in no position to defend itself – or any civilian in
its care – against militia warlords, foreign rebels, local defence forces, or any
other armed actors. Attacks on government forces in North Kivu in
November 2006 have served as a timely reminder that, without full support
from MONUC, the Congolese army is completely incapable of preventing
attempts to seize major population centres such as Goma.
Underpaid, underfed, ill-equipped and badly led, FARDC soldiers in all of the
eastern provinces remain the single biggest cause of insecurity in DRC,
responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all human-rights abuses
against civilians. Similar accusations of abuse are also levelled against other
arms of the security forces (including police) and ‘demobilised’ excombatants
who continue to rely on violence as a means of survival.
In essence, most of the security forces that are meant to be protecting the
civilian populations from the numerous threats still present in DRC are
unable, or unwilling, to do so.
The new Congolese government has cited reform of the security sector as
one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a desire to support
the government in this process, particularly with co-ordination, training, and
advice. A strong MONUC commitment to the security-sector reform (SSR)
should be considered a vital element of any post-transition mandate, and
any exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be linked to progress
indicators on SSR processes, most importantly the military, police, and
judicial sectors.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by its
security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised combatants,
MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence to protect civilians
from immediate threats and creating a stable environment in which longerterm
reforms can take place.
The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and extraordinary
efforts of the Congolese citizens to lead their country into a new era are not
rewarded with a ‘cut and run’ attitude of immediate disengagement by the
international community. Instead, the Security Council must make it a priority
with the key member states, such as the USA, to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the protection of
the civilian population from appalling levels of insecurity and abuse.
Maintain the robust use of force to protect civilians but use the
mandate review to take measures to improve MONUC’s operational
effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to demonstrable
progress on security-sector reform, beginning with a clear reduction
in the levels of abuses committed by the security forces themselves,
and a basic ability of military, police, and judicial sectors to defend
the population from external and internal threats.
• Ensure that existing MONUC military presence prioritises the
protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a clearer
definition of protection, more operational guidance, and better tools
to translate the concept of protection into concrete action on the
ground.
• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full support to
the newly created democratic processes and institutions, and the
protection and promotion of human rights. Offer strategic and
operational support to the new sovereign government in combating
the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal arms trade.
The Congolese people deserve no less than a clear signal that their massive
sacrifices have been worth the effort, and that the international community
will work together with their new government to make a better future in DRC
possible.
1 Introduction
In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic
elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early
2007, despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the
correct policy choices are made in the next few months.
Over the past few years, DRC has transformed itself from a
completely divided country (where travel between the eastern and
western parts was impossible) to a nation united by a cautious but
fervent sense of hope.
Yet, despite the incredible progress that has been made on some
fronts, DRC faces a number of daunting challenges, most notably
dealing with regular outbreaks of violence in the east, and the
constant fear of renewed national instability.
Across many parts of the country – and especially in Ituri, the Kivus,
and Katanga – Congolese people are still confronted every day with
the threat of violence, extortion, rape, torture, or murder at the hands
of hundreds of thousands of armed combatants.
An estimated four million civilians have died as a result of conflict
since August 1998, the most devastating death toll in any armed
conflict since World War Two.1 There are clear indications that these
trends are reversible,2 but such progress will require strong political
and financial commitments from both the new DRC government and
the international community.
2 MONUC’s impact to date
In 1999 – when the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) first arrived in DRC – even
optimists would have been hard pressed to predict the recent success
of the Congolese elections.
MONUC deserves the praise it has received for the assistance it has
offered the Congolese government in the political transition process.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the
crucial role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC.
Having evolved significantly over the years, MONUC’s current
mandate (defined in 37 separate UN Security Council resolutions) has
often been described as a patchwork of wide-ranging – and
sometimes competing – political, military, and humanitarian
objectives. While humanitarian actors feel that MONUC’s
responsibility to protect civilians from violence3 has not always been
prioritised as highly as other elements of the mandate, and MONUC
has failed to perform in some areas (including an initial failure to
prevent incidents of abuse by a small number of its own
peacekeepers4), there is no doubt that MONUC has been able to
restore stability to large parts of the war-torn country.
In all of DRC’s provinces, MONUC has gained control over and
secured major towns and cities. In addition, MONUC’s military
presence and logistical capacity has significantly increased
humanitarian access (and also economic opportunities) to previously
insecure or remote rural areas (for example along the Rwindi–
Rutshuru road in North Kivu, the Bunia–Kasenyi road in Ituri and
the main Bunia–Beni and Bunia–Mahagi commercial routes).
The presence of MONUC troops has reduced incidents of organised
violence against the civilian populations. Especially in Ituri,
MONUC’s operations against militia groups (for example around
Mahagi)5 have succeeded in disarming the majority of combatants6
and allowing large parts of the population to return to their normal
lives. ‘When MONUC arrived, the militias left’, explained displaced
people in Djugu.7 Though MONUC’s performance has been criticised
in some parts of the country (see Section 5), the Ituri example has
shown that a consistent application of MONUC’s robust mandate can
contribute to improvements in the security situation.
The fact that people today walk along the street without fear in towns
like Bunia, which in 2003 witnessed several violent massacres of
civilians, is a simple but powerful indicator of the impact of
MONUC’s presence.
In areas where the security situation has stabilised, MONUC has
begun playing a role in helping displaced people return to their
villages of origin. MONUC patrols in places such as Malumbi or
Tshushubo (North Kivu) have given the population enough
confidence to leave their temporary camps and begin rebuilding their
lives in the villages.
On the whole, MONUC’s presence has been effective in improving
security in those areas where troops have been deployed. Proactive
efforts to protect civilians from violence have at times been
inconsistent or patchy, but there have also been a number of
successes (see Section 5).
3 ‘Not yet’ – the price of scaling down
One of the easiest ways of measuring MONUC’s impact is perhaps to
ask what would happen if it were not present in DRC.
‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain village chiefs and displaced
people in the lakeside villages of Tchomia and Kasenyi. ‘We would
leave tomorrow. It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us without
MONUC. Not yet.
Unfortunately, the sentiment is echoed not just in areas that are still
dominated by rebel or militia groups. It is also heard regularly in
those parts of the country that are under the control of the Congolese
army.
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of
approximately 130,000) have already undergone the ‘brassage’
process of being integrated into a new national army, it has become
clear that FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du
Congo) are in no position to defend themselves – or any civilian in
their care – against any kind of external threat or attack. ‘Brassage is
just a word. It means nothing when translated into reality’, admits a
FARDC commander in Beni.
It is well-known that FARDC soldiers in all of the eastern provinces
flee from the enemy when attacked, regularly discarding their
uniforms and hiding among the civilian populations. Command and
control functions are in some cases non-existent, with commanders
unaware of their troops’ movements or operations. ‘Some of these
guys can’t even shoot a gun’, explained a MONUC peacekeeper that
regularly carries out joint patrols with FARDC soldiers.
In the absence of a capable FARDC, it has often fallen to MONUC
soldiers to defend strategic areas. The recent example of dissident
general Laurent Nkunda’s attempted attack on the eastern city of
Goma illustrated the army’s reliance on MONUC. ‘MONUC’s Indian
Battalion was the only thing standing between Nkunda and Goma.
Without MONUC, Goma would have fallen’, concluded one UN
official in Goma.
Military experts (both foreign and Congolese) agree that FARDC
troops offer little protection against foreign or Congolese insurgent
groups who continue to harass and terrorise civilians. Such groups
include warlord militias, the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de
Libération du Rwanda) - presumed to be the remnants of the
Interahamwe or the Mai Mai – the name for Local Defence Forces.
In addition to their failure to protect civilians against external threats,
FARDC troops are themselves considered to be the major cause of
insecurity in DRC. MONUC’s human-rights monitors hold FARDC
soldiers responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all
human-rights abuses against civilians. FARDC soldiers regularly
extort or loot from the civilian populations, and commit violent
crimes such as arbitrary killings and rape. Similar accusations of
abuse are also levelled against non-organised armed actors, including
‘demobilised’ ex-combatants who continue to rely on violence as a
means of survival. The high incidence of crimes and abuses against
the civilian population in DRC has been made possible due to a
general climate of impunity and a complete lack of law and order.
Civilians are looking to MONUC to support their new government in
combating these problems, and ensuring that a relatively stable
environment will continue to allow humanitarian assistance to flow
to those in need. One of the ways in which MONUC has been doing –
and should continue to do – this is by supporting the new Congolese
government with its efforts to reform the security sector, especially
with regard to military, police, and judicial sectors.
4 No security without reform
In 2005, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made it clear that
‘the establishment of an integrated and professional army and police
force is a key element of the exit strategy for MONUC’. In other
words, UN member states should not withdraw MONUC – whose
deployment has been an expression of their responsibility to protect
civilians in DRC, until the new government establishes a functional
and accountable national army and police force.
The examples above illustrate the army’s current lack of capacity to
provide even the most basic physical security. Reasons for this
appear to be well-known, yet at the same time hard to tackle.
International advisers report extremely low rates of formal military
education among all brigades, and troops in the field are
notoriously ill-equipped to perform in any kind of battle. One of the
newly integrated brigades, for example, has been given just 24 handheld
radios (and no spare batteries) to share between approximately
3,500 people for communications during combat. Bullets are in
similarly short supply.
Troops also lack motivation (and – not fearing any prosecution from
a weak judicial system – begin to prey on local populations) because
they are underpaid and underfed, and living with their families in
conditions of extreme poverty and hardship.
Current monthly salaries consist of a miserly $25, and the complete
lack of soldiers’ welfare and health care routinely results in 15–20
deaths in each brigade per month. The abject state of neglect in
which soldiers and their families find themselves was aptly
illustrated by the 4th Integrated Brigade who arrived in Ituri in 2005
spreading infectious diseases such as cholera and fever to the local
populations in its path.
Other military actors are even less functional than the ground forces.
The Congolese Air Force is considered ‘structurally obsolete and in a
state of life-threatening dilapidation […], air or land combat capacity
is zero’. Little training has been carried out for air crew, technical, or
command elements since the Mobutu period.
The remaining branches of the security sector, including police,
judicial, and civilian agencies are as ill-equipped as the army to carry
out their work properly.
Courts and magistrates are in short supply. Only one prison (out of
a total of 145) in DRC actually has a budget for feeding its inmates.
And even though DRC has 258 registered airstrips, only 50 of them
are monitored by air-traffic controllers. There is no radar
surveillance system or navigational guidance system for aircraft in
DRC, and air-force communication systems do not function to any
satisfactory level.
The new Congolese government has cited security sector reform
(SSR) as one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a
desire to support the government in this process, particularly with
co-ordination, training, and advice. MONUC’s recently established
SSR cell acknowledges that any exit strategy for UN peacekeepers
8 A Fragile Future, Oxfam Briefing Paper, February 2007
will need to be closely linked to the progress on reform, most
importantly the military, police, and judicial sectors.
One of the challenges in this domain has been the fragmentation of
processes and initiatives. While the active involvement of several
bilateral donors in SSR processes is laudable, it is unlikely that small
or ad hoc projects (most of them limited to certain geographical areas
or specific units – ‘a few jeeps for two brigades in Ituri, a few pots of
paint for three new courthouses in Kinshasa’) will add up to an
impact that is equal to or greater than the sum of its parts.
The ultimate responsibility for the SSR process naturally rests with
the newly elected Congolese government, and external SSR actors are
currently looking to President Kabila to clearly signal his country’s
strategic and operational needs in this area. Donors and other actors
will need to ensure that their co-operation with the new government
does not suffer from the same fragmented approach as past
initiatives. A single actor (such as the European Union or MONUC)
should be appointed to take a clear lead on the co-ordination of
donor support to the SSR process. MONUC’s current involvement in
SSR processes (which includes hosting weekly SSR co-ordination
meetings) indicate that there is capacity to lead on day-to-day coordination
processes. It should be recognised, however, that the
temporary nature of MONUC’s mandate in DRC is unlikely to allow
for the kind of strategic and long-term co-ordination that can oversee
the entire lifespan of the SSR process (an undertaking military experts
estimate to take at least 15–20 years).
On the issue of building national capacity, donors should
acknowledge that MONUC’s presence in the field and its existing cooperation
with security forces make it a logical choice for initial
training schemes. For example, the proposed curriculum for a
MONUC-led basic military training programme (to be carried out in
all of FARDC’s integrated brigades) accurately reflects some of the
most pressing needs and priorities on the ground – both in terms of
basic military skills and the social welfare of soldiers and their
dependants. It should be noted, however, that MONUC’s proposed
45-day trainings are little more than initial steps in the training
process, and in themselves highly unlikely to allow FARDC to reach
operational capability immediately.
In addition to supporting co-ordination and training initiatives,
MONUC should increase its capacity to offer expert operational
advice to government actors leading SSR processes, in particular
regarding urgent but sensitive issues such as vetting of corrupt or
abusive officials in the army, police, and judicial systems.
Any realistic exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be
linked to progress indicators on SSR processes.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by
its security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised
combatants, MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence
to protect civilians from immediate threats and ensuring a stable
environment in which reforms can take place.
5 More effective protection of civilians
In March 2005, the UN Security Council reiterated its call to MONUC
to use ‘all necessary means within its capabilities and in the areas
where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of
force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, from any armed
group, foreign or Congolese’.
Experts have described MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate as ‘the most
assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians’.
Despite this, MONUC has sometimes been accused of behaving more
like a Chapter VI observer mission, using force only in self-defence
and doing little to physically protect civilians. ‘I don’t think they’re
allowed to open fire’, claims a Congolese NGO worker in Goma.
‘They did nothing to stop women getting raped in Bukavu and
Rutshuru. I’m scared they wouldn’t protect my daughters either if
there is more fighting here’. Reasons for such inaction are numerous
and often include a lack of resources and capacity, as well as the
prioritisation of more political aspects of the mandate over protection
objectives.
In addition, the concept of ‘civilian protection’ has often remained
vague and ill-defined, and peacekeepers are given very little
guidance on how they are expected to translate their mandate into
concrete tasks.
For MONUC to adequately carry out its ambitious mandate, forces
would benefit from a clearer understanding of the concept of
protection, more operational guidance, and better tools.
On a conceptual level, MONUC should consistently prioritise the
protection of civilians when considering how to counter ongoing and
well-known threats, for example the problem of dealing with
dissidents like Laurent Nkunda. MONUC’s inaction in the face of
Nkunda’s violent attacks on Bukavu in 2004, Rutshuru in 2005 or
Sake in 2006 is regularly cited by civilians in North and South Kivu as
an example of the international community failing to protect them
from violence. These incidents stand in marked contrast to MONUC
successes, such as the robust display of force MONUC battalions
launched when Nkunda attempted to seize the (perhaps strategically
more important) town of Goma in November 2006, or the way in
which MONUC has dealt with the threat of militia in Ituri.
In instances where MONUC has failed to deal with urgent protection
threats, populations have often expressed confusion and
resentment. A more consistent application of MONUC’s protection
mandate would do much to build confidence among these
populations.
Operationally – and more concretely – MONUC would also do well
to include clearer guidance on appropriate protection activities in
their military rules of engagement, for example troops’
responsibilities in preventing other actors (including the state’s own
security forces) from committing abuses against civilians.
Perhaps the single most important tool that MONUC can use to
protect civilians from threats is its sheer military presence. ‘When
MONUC is not around, when they are not doing patrols or going to
work as usual, people often don’t leave their houses. You have to
understand we still live in fear’, villagers around Lake Albert
explained. Specific steps that MONUC could take in this area are
outlined in the final recommendations in this paper.
It should be emphasised here that MONUC’s existing resources in
DRC are already overstretched. Any cut to current troop strength or
resources would therefore spell disaster for communities currently
benefiting from MONUC protection.
6 Beyond immediate security – a lasting peace?
Oxfam believes that by supporting the Congolese government in
reforming the security sector and consistently prioritising the
protection of civilians in military operations, MONUC could greatly
increase its impact on security in DRC. At the same time, it would be
naïve to assume that either measure will guarantee the Congo’s longterm
stability – a job that clearly rests with the DRC government
itself.
Following his success in the recent national elections that ended
DRC’s transitional period, President Joseph Kabila has assumed the
unique rights and responsibilities that are assigned to any leader of a
sovereign nation.
To achieve a lasting peace, the new Congolese government will need
to begin addressing long-standing problems of weak governance and
political and economic marginalisation, especially among young
people, who make up more than half of the Congo’s population.
Until the government is able to offer current or ex-combatants a true
alternative to militia life, their disgruntled citizens remain at high risk
of resorting to the rule of the gun.
In order to encourage long-term stability, MONUC will need to
support the Congolese government with the development of its new
democratic institutions and processes, and protect and promote
human rights. It should also assist the new Congolese government
with political processes such as searching for creative and sustainable
solutions to the threat posed by ‘foreign’ armed groups such as the
FDLR and ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces - National Army
for the Liberation of Uganda). Sensitive issues, including the presence
of Congolese fighters and the question of Congolese citizenship for
some of the foreign elements in these groups, should be discussed
without delay.
In addition, more resources will need to be made available by DRC
donors for civilian agencies (UN, government, and NGO) to
eventually replace national DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
Reintegration) programmes with long-term and broad-based
community-recovery programmes.
In order to tackle the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal
arms trade – both of which are likely to sustain conflict in DRC –
MONUC should continue, where appropriate, to offer strong support
to the government, in particular through providing analysis and
logistical support to monitoring activities. The existing mandate that
MONUC has been given in these areas must be matched with
appropriate resources and capacity if MONUC is to make any
progress in assisting the new government with tackling such difficult
problems.
The election of a new government should not be seen by the
international community as an excuse to extract itself from any of
these processes when it is clear that a limited or superficial response
to these problems will merely allow them to fester beneath the
surface and breed potential for future instability.
7 Conclusions and recommendations
The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and opportunities
of rebuilding a nation from the ground up.
In recent years, DRC has exceeded all expectations: in record time, it
has established basic democratic institutions (including a constitution
and democratic elections at both national and provincial levels). The
country’s macro-economic framework has recovered at least
partially, and economists expect investment expansion, particularly
in the country’s lucrative mining sector.
Yet, Congo’s impressive developments and even the successful
elections will mean nothing if a scaling down of efforts allows the
country to lapse back into full-blown violence. It is imperative that
the international community recognise that investing in stability will
also be more cost-effective than responding to the fall-out.
The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and
extraordinary efforts of the Congolese people to lead their country
into a new era are not blocked by an immediate disengagement and
withdrawal of interest from the international community. Instead, the
Security Council must make it a priority to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the
protection of the civilian population from appalling levels of
insecurity and abuse. Maintain the robust use of force to
protect civilians but use the mandate review to take measures
to improve MONUC’s operational effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to
demonstrable progress on security-sector reform, beginning
with a clear reduction in the levels of abuses committed by the
security forces themselves, and a basic ability of military,
police, and judicial sectors to defend the population from
external and internal threats.
• Ensure that the existing MONUC military presence prioritises
the protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a
clearer definition of protection, more operational guidance,
and better tools to translate the concept of protection into
concrete action on the ground. Oxfam believes that, in order
to maximise the limited resources at their disposal, MONUC’s
troops on the ground should focus especially on:
o Establishing overall security and humanitarian access
in areas where displaced populations are returning to
their villages of origin. It is imperative that MONUC
maintain close contact with humanitarian actors in
planning for such operations in order to avoid
instances of forced, politicised, or uninformed
returns.
o Carefully assessing the humanitarian impact of
planned joint MONUC–FARDC offensives and
refraining from carrying out operations that achieve
political objectives but have a disproportionately
negative impact on civilians (for example, clear risk of
militia reprisal killings against local populations or
unduly high levels of displacement).
o Instructing troops to apply the protection mandate in a
more consistent way. This includes the robust use of
force in line with the Chapter VII mandate, when the
protection needs require it, and proactive attempts to
prevent abuses such as looting and extortion. This
should involve encouraging the reporting of abuses
and where possible supporting their prosecution
through military justice mechanisms.
o Transmitting information about protection threats to
local humanitarian actors or the protection clusters
(which MONUC civilian staff co-chair) so that
appropriate solutions can be discussed. Protection
clusters have often been able to co-ordinate effective
humanitarian responses and mount joint advocacy
initiatives to address identified threats.
o Increasing humanitarian space for independent aid
agencies by putting a stop to self-promotional (and
sometimes inappropriate) ‘quick impact projects’ and
‘winning hearts and minds activities’, except where
these are directly linked to military co-operation (for
example, the rehabilitation of latrines or water sources
in military barracks or prisons).
• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full
support to the newly created democratic processes and
institutions, and the protection and promotion of human
rights. Offer strategic and operational support to the new
sovereign government in combating the illicit exploitation of
minerals and the illegal arms trade.
UN Press release - MONUC's mandate extended to April 15
As Security Council extends DR Congo mission, Ban Ki-moon focuses on mining reform
15 February 2007 – Highlighting that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to pose “a threat to international peace and security in the region,” the Security Council today extended the UN mission in the impoverished African country for another two months.
The extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was due to expire today, came as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on Congolese authorities to focus on security sector reform and tighten up legislation covering business practices relating to diamond and other mining because too much of the profits of these industries are going to fund armed conflict.
In its unanimously adopted resolution, the Council, citing the fact that DRC continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region, extended the mandate until 15 April.
Separately, Mr. Ban makes his remarks in his latest report at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2007/68 on the DRC looking at whether or not sanctions should be imposed on the country as a way of cleaning up the mining industry. However, given the uncertainty of whether sanctions would work against such practices, as well as that in December the country swore in its first democratically elected President, the Secretary-General recommends against imposing them.
“While sanctions may inconvenience their targets, the general effect will be to diminish only marginally the general practices they are designed to curtail. In most of the eastern
He also points to a more general concern about possible UN sanctions against the DRC. “Imposing United Nations sanctions now may be perceived as punitive, whether they target State actors or not and whether they are intended to reflect on the capacity of the State to manage its affairs or not,” he says. “This might be another reason why United Nations sanctions may not be advisable at the present time.”
Instead, Mr. Ban urges the Government to reform the security sector and fight corruption, but particularly to tighten up on investors in the natural resource sector by making sure they adhere to regulations. He calls for the private sector to set better business standards itself, while also recommending setting up a cross-border commission to prevent corruption at the frontier.
“The question remains: what is likely to bring more order to the production and marketing of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources in a way that will allow greater security for the artisanal miners, less exposure to extortion by armed groups and the assurance of more revenues for the State and its public services?” he writes.
The Government must first and foremost institute security sector reform and improve trust and transparency by monitoring and fighting corrupt practices and taking effective action against violators, the report stresses.
The Secretary-General’s report was itself based on recommendations made by the so-called Group of Experts who visited the DRC late last year to look at the whole issue of sanctions, during which they found that while linkages still remain between armed groups and the exploitation of natural resources, the situation has become ever more complex.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/sc8955.doc.htm
Security Council
5630th Meeting (AM)
Security Council extends mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 15 April,
Unanimously adopting resolution 1742 (2007)
Requests Secretary-General’s Recommendations
On Possible Adjustments to Mandate, Capacities
The Security Council this morning extended the mandate and personnel strength of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which was to expire today, until 15 April.
Unanimously adopting resolution 1742 (2007) and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, as soon as possible and not later than 15 March, on his consultations with the Congolese authorities and to submit recommendations on adjustments the Council might consider making to the mandate and capacities of MONUC.
The meeting started at 11:30 a.m. and adjourned at 11:35 a.m.
Resolution
The full text of resolution 1742 (2002) reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling its resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the
“Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the
“Recalling the support it provided, in particular through the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), for the process of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition, signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, and for the elections that represented the culmination of that process,
“Reaffirming its commitment to continue to contribute to the consolidation of peace and stability in the
“Underlining its attachment to the continuation of a regular political dialogue with the Congolese authorities, and recalling the importance it attaches to the consultations undertaken with them by the Secretary-General on possible adjustments to be made to the mandate and capacities of MONUC during this period,
“Taking note of the letter addressed to its President on 15 January 2007 by the Permanent Representative of the
“Noting that the situation in the
“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1. Decides to extend the mandate and personnel strength of MONUC, as set out in its resolutions 1565 (2004), 1592 (2005), 1596 (2005), 1621 (2005), 1635 (2005) and 1736 (2006), until 15 April 2007;
“2. Requests the Secretary-General to report, as soon as possible and not later than 15 March 2007, on his consultations with the Congolese authorities and to submit recommendations on adjustments the Council may consider making to the mandate and capacities of MONUC;
“3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”
Thursday, February 08, 2007
COMPTE – RENDU (RESUME) DE LA REUNION DES ONG MEMBRES/COALITION POUR METTRE FIN A L’UTILISATION D’ENFANTS SOLDATS AU NORD-KIVU, 13 JANVIER 2007.
COMPTE – RENDU (RESUME) DE LA REUNION DES ONG MEMBRES/COALITION POUR METTRE FIN A L’UTILISATION D’ENFANTS SOLDATS AU NORD-KIVU, 13 JANVIER 2007.
1. La réunion a été ouverte par Mme Domitile RUSIMBUKA, Chef de DIVAS Nord-Kivu, se réjouissant que ce soit la première réunion 2007 des ONG de protection des droits de l’enfant. Elle a, à cette occasion, rappelé aux ONG l’adage selon lequel «l’union fait la force » (donc l’avantage de la Coalition) et a invité les ONG au sérieux dans leur travail ainsi qu’au changement des mentalités vis-à-vis du changement politique en cours dans le pays afin de mieux participer aux initiatives de prévention contre le recrutement d’enfants et au DDR enfants dans le Nord-Kivu à problèmes,
2. Les participants ont succinctement présenté leurs ONG respectives (Dénomination, Responsable et ses coordonnées téléphoniques et E-mail, principaux domaines d’intervention en matière de prévention et de DDR enfants, zones d’intervention, partenaires d’appui financier), après rappel du rôle de réseautage de la Coalition et de l’importance de la cartographie des interventions des ONG membres de la Coalition. 13 Associations (tableau des participants en annexe) y ont participé. Elles sont toutes du Petit Nord-Kivu (excluant le Grand Nord-Kivu : Béni, Butembo, Lubero, …). Selon le Point Focal de la Coalition du Nord-Kivu, 25 Associations ont été invitées, mais la réunion a coïncidé avec une autre tenue par SC-UK sur la réunification familiale des ESFGA en collaboration avec UNICEF. SC (UK), UNICEF et MONUC/CP se sont bien excusées à cause de cela,
3. La restitution, sur base du Rapport final Coalition, de la réunion internationale de Bujumbura du 28 novembre 2006 a été faite, en insistant sur ce qui concerne directement la RDC. Après, il y a eu une série des questions dont le but était de mieux en savoir plus. Les participants ont apprécié toutes les recommandations formulées en rapport avec la RDC et solliciter un suivi effectif pour leur mise en application de la part de la Coordination Nationale. Ils ont émis le souhait de voir photocopier ce rapport et le distribuer à chaque ONG membre. Les participants ont, enfin, réagi négativement à la déclaration des Délégués du Rwanda à Bujumbura selon laquelle seuls les Groupes rebelles rwandais en RDC utilisent des enfants soldats (il y en a encore au Rwanda),
4. Les participants ont discuté de l’exécution prioritaire des activités de la Coalition financée par le Secrétariat à Londres, à savoir la formation des sensibilisateurs des officiers FARDC, la construction des panneaux avec message de sensibilisation publique sur le DDR enfants et la lutte contre l’impunité à ce sujet et la formation des officiers FARDC à travers les Centres de brassage de Rumangabo à Rutshuru. Le Coordonnateur National a promis l’appui en livrets sur les droits de l’enfant pour la sensibilisation et la formation des Officiers FARDC. Elle a également invité le Point Focal à travailler dès le début de la semaine prochaine pour l’exécution effective de ces activités,
5. Une évaluation d’ensemble de la situation de recrutement (et de re-recrutement) et d’utilisation d’enfants soldats dans le Nord-Kivu a eu lieu : la situation est mauvaise dans l’ensemble comme à l’époque de la rébellion RCD/Goma :
· Territoire de Masisi
Un groupe armé maï – maï commandé par le Lieutenant Colonel CHOMA CHOMA (en arrestation actuelle au sein de la 8ème Région Militaire ?) continue le recrutement d’enfants soldats. Dans les localités de Kichanga, Mushaki, Karuba et Ngungu dénommées « Ceinture de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE », celui-ci continue le recrutement d’enfants et leur utilisation comme soldats (aux fronts) sous toutes les formes. Dans les localités de Nyabiondo et Masisi Centre, le Commandant Claude du Groupe Laurent NKUNDABATWARE pratique également le re-recrutement d’enfants soldats démobilisés.
· Territoire de Rutshuru
Chaque fois que Laurent NKUNDABATWARE attaque un village, il le fait avec la présence d’enfants soldats dans ses rangs et les groupes maï – maï opposés trouvent également les arguments pour convaincre les familles et les enfants à se faire recruter pour résister contre l’invasion de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE. Et le recrutement d’enfants dans ce territoire se fait à base de tribus d’où appartiennent tel ou tel groupe armé opposé dans le conflit et prend la forme d’auto – défense communautaire (ADC).
Le commandant maï – maï du Groupe Jacqueson (en arrestation actuellement à Beni ?) au nom de Nyamirima pratique actuellement le recrutement des enfants.
· Territoire de Walikale
Aucune Association/ONG y intervenant n’était présente mais le recrutement d’enfants est signalé, pratiqué par le Colonel maï – maï Samy.
· Territoire de Kalehe - Nord
Le 4ème Bataillon de la 14ème Brigade FARDC du Colonel RUGAYI, remplaçant du Major Mulomba (celui-ci a fait défection et rejoint le Groupe Laurent NKUNDABATWARE avec enfants soldats contre les FARDC) pratique également le re-recrutement des ESFGA dans les localités de Numbi, Shanje et Nyabibwe.
· Ville de Goma
Le Groupe Armé Laurent NKUNDABATWARE pratique le recrutement et le re-recrutement d’enfants, comme soldats, en utilisant d’autres enfants dans la ville de Goma. Des ESFGA déjà réunifiés en familles sont repris et envoyés aux côtés des nouveaux enfants recrutés (en tenue civile) pour venir sensibiliser des enfants (ESFGA ou non) à rejoindre les rangs de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE (avec une promesse de $US 50 par mois !). Ainsi certains Centres de formation professionnelle des ESFGA se retrouvent progressivement vidés de ces derniers. Par ailleurs, le suivi social des ESFGA en familles révèlent l’absence de plusieurs ESFGA, partis rejoindre les rangs de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE en Territoires.
Par ailleurs, il a été signalé un mouvement de recrutement d’enfants par Laurent NKUNDABATWARE à travers le Rwanda voisin. Au Sud de Lubero, dans le Grand Nord, il a été signalé également le recrutement d’enfants par le groupe maï-maï de Jacqueson.
Malgré cette situation de recrutement, la démobilisation de certains enfants soldats a continué en la fin d’année 2006 : 65 EAFGA ont été libérés dans le Centre de brassage FARDC de Rumangabo (depuis le 21 novembre 2006) alors que dans le Camp de Nyaleke (Centre de brassage), 216 EAFGA ont bénéficié de la démobilisation (le 04 décembre 2006).
Les ONG du Nord-Kivu pensent que les difficultés d’appui à la réinsertion scolaire ou socio-professionnelle individuelle, des ESFGA, à leur suivi familial et communautaire, à la sensibilisation communautaire contre le recrutement et sur le DDR enfants ainsi (et surtout) la survenue de nouveaux conflits armés de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE, seraient à l’origine de la recrudescence du recrutement d’enfants. Un autre facteur non négligeable donné est le recrutement d’enfants pour augmenter les effectifs de combattants avant d’aller au Centre de brassage et obtenir le grade de Major ou Colonel, … sans oublier des intentions de certains ESFGA se faisant re-recruter pour tenter de bénéficier des avantages de la CONADER aux adultes combattants démobilisés en se faisant démobiliser par le Centre de brassage (25 $US par mois, après avoir touché chacun 110 $US). Les ONG du Nord-Kivu se sont également inquiétés des négociations en cours entre Rebelles Laurent NKUNDABATWARE et FARDC pour remplacer le processus de brassage par celui de mixage des armées (difficulté d’assurer le DDR enfants dans ce cas !).
Devant cette situation, les ONG du Nord-Kivu ont formulé certaines recommandations :
- Dénoncer publiquement la situation en utilisant les médias internationaux et locaux et les autres voies disponibles au niveau national et international,
- Renforcer le système de monitoring par la collecte des informations très précises à communiquer aux partenaires susceptibles d’exercer une pression aux échellons supérieurs (Secrétariat de la Coalition/Londres, MONUC/CP, UNICEF, Amnesty International, …),
- Observer des mesures de sécurité et de protection des Défenseurs des droits des enfants, car les Animateurs craignent de leur sécurité dans le contact avec tel ou tel groupe armé recruteur ou utilisateur d’enfants dans le Nord-Kivu.
6. Un Comité de renforcement du Point Focal de la Coalition pour le Petit Nord-Kivu a été mis en place par désignation et approbation de toutes les ONG représentées. Il s’agit de :
- SOS Grands-Lacs : Président
- PAMI, CAJED, CADERCO, SC-UK, CERAO, FESCO (Membres).
Ce comité de coordination a été chargé urgemment de :
- mettre en place et communiquer son mode de fonctionnement simple et souple sur base des lignes directrices de la Coalition,
- élaborer un calendrier de rencontres du Comité de coordination et des réunions mensuelles des ONG membres (il devra également compléter la cartographie de celles-ci),
- élaborer un plan d’action provincial de la Coalition Nord-Kivu (à compléter par celui du Grand-Nord),
- travailler, à partir du 15 janvier, pour l’exécution effective des activités déjà financées par le Secrétariat International de la Coalition (voir Point 4),
- maintenir une collaboration étroite avec les Partenaires (UNICEF, MONUC/CP, SC-UK, Amnesty International, …).
7. Dans les divers, le Coordinateur National de la Coalition RDC a donné les communications suivantes aux ONG :
- Une réunion nationale pour élaborer ou adopter le plan national de la Coalition RDC et élire un nouveau Coordinateur National (a annoncé sa mise en retraite) autour du 12 février 2007 (et en faire une campagne de sensibilisation contre le recrutement),
- Un poste de Permanent pour la Coalition RDC sera annoncé et appuyé financièrement par le Secrétariat International de la Coalition en 2007 et la Coalition RDC devra être enregistré officiellement en RDC,
- Des conseils ont été prodigués sur le travail en réseau, la gestion institutionnelle, la communication à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur du Réseau, la collaboration Sud-Sud, etc.
- Des opportunités d’appui financier à exploiter en 2007 pour les programmes des ONG ou de la Coalition auprès de UNICEF, MONUC/CP, Fonds pour les Droits Humains Mondiaux (FDHM), Amnesty International, Secrétariat International Coalition, CICR, etc.
- Un rappel des explications et des adresses utiles de la Coalition, son mandat et les lignes directrices afin de mieux la connaître et participer à la diffusion de son travail, etc.
8. La réunion a également recommandé à la Coordination Nationale de la Coalition de :
- organiser une réunion dans le Grand-Nord (Beni – Butembo) avec les ONG, d’où une mission conjointe DIVAS, Coordinateur National, Coordinateur Provincial à effectuer en sollicitant l’appui logistique (transport) de la MONUC,
- renforcer les ONG du Nord-Kivu en documentation (nécessité de photocopier certains rapports sur les enfants soldats, Amnesty International, Coalition, …).
App. MURHABAZI NAMEGABE
Coordinateur National Coalition
pour mettre fin à l’utilisation d’enfants soldats en RDC.-
COORDINATION DE LA COALITION POUR METTRE FIN A L’UTILISATION D’ENFANTS SOLDATS EN R.D.CONGO
PRESENTATION DES ONG DU PETIT NORD-KIVU (REUNION DU 13 JANVIER 2007).
| N° | Dénomination / Association | Responsable / Association | Coordonnées de contact (n° téléphone, E-mail) | Principal domaine d’intervention | Zone d’intervention (Territoire, ville) | Partenaire financier |
| 01 | RODO, Réseau des unions pour le développement des opprimés | Nicole KASONGO MESU | 0997740449 modeskajm@yaho.fr 0998600075 | * Réinsertion socio-économique par professionnalisation, * Plaidoyer et sensibilisation des autorités et population sur les EAFGAs | Ville du Nord-Kivu | Organisation des Nations Unies, UNICEF, PNUD et autres locales |
| 02 | Programme de lutte contre l’extrême pauvreté et la misère : PAMI,asbl | Mr Joachim FIKIRI | 0816904013 ; 0808488533 ongdpami@yahoo.fr | -Plaidoyer et sensibilisation -RDTR -Réinsertion socio- économique et communautaire des ex-EAFGA | *Ville de Goma *Territoire de Nyiragongo : Rusayo, Mudja, Mongi, Buvira, Kibumba, Buhumba | Save the Children, UNICEF |
| 03 | Centre DORIKA (Centre d’encadrement pour l’autopromotion intégrale) | Innocent MUHINDO PENDAKAZI | 0997702941 pendakazidorika@yahoo.fr | - Prévention de recrutement des enfants dans les groupes et forces armés - Suivi de réinsertion socio-économique - Sensibilisation par la Radio DORIKA FM | En territoire de Rutshuru - Cité de Kiwanja - Cité de Nyamilima - Rutshuru centre - Bunagana - Ville de Goma | - Watchlist - AJWS - Constellation / France - UNICEF - MONUC et autres 2006 |
| 04 | Centre d’Appui pour le Développement Rural et Communautaire « CADERCO », asbl | Mr Ir Phidias WETEMWAMI | Tél. 0997788820 ; 0997746931 ; 0811515416 E-mail : phidiascaderco@yahoo.fr | -Recherche et réunification des ESFGAs - IDTR - Plaidoyer et médiation et médiation des ESFGAs - Sensibilisation de la communauté et des autorités politico – administratives, militaires et locales - Réinsertion socio- économique et communautaires des ESFGAs - Réinsertion scolaire des ESFGAs et OEV - Suivi et prévention des re-recrutements | Territoire de Masisi : Axe-bord du lac de Sake à Nyabibwe, Axe montagneux, Bitanga, Masisi centre, Bihambwe, Nyabiondo, Mahanga, Kandja, Katoyi. Territoire de Kalehe : Minova, Nyabibwe, Numbi, Mpumbi, Bwisha, Chebunda, Kaloba et Murambi. Territoire de Walikale : Kashebere, Mpofi, Mutongo, .., | UNICEF |
| 05 | Association des Guides du Congo « AGC » | Mme Séverine MUGHOLE | Tél. : 0997725231 ; 0997286144 ; 0997295113 E-mail : asguiden_k@yahoo.fr | - Sensibilisation dans les points d’écoute - Réinsertion socio-économique des ex-EAFGA-Fille | Q. Kasika, Av. Géomètre, n° Goma | * Save the Children, * UNICEF |
| 06 | FESCO/ASNK : Fédération des Scouts du Congo / Association des Scouts du Nord-Kivu | - Jean-le-Bon KASEREKA KIRERE - Pour le projet Protection de l’Enfance-Joseph PALUKU MUNGOSSY | Tél. : 0997734529 ; 0997794770 ; E-mail : fescoutnordkivu@yahoo.fr | - Réinsertion socio-économique - Plaidoyer et sensibilisation | - Ville de Goma - Territoire de Rutshuru (Bwisha) et de Lubero | Save the Children |
| 07 | MIDEFEHOPOS (Mouvement International des Droits de l’Enfant, de la Femme, de l’Homme, veufs et de leur promotion sociale) | Isidore KALIMIRA | Tél. : 0997181996 | - Encadrement des enfants de la rue, vulnérables dans un centre - Sensibilisation des enfants de la rue pour la réunification ou la réinsertion familiale - Réinsertion familiale des enfants de la rue, des enfants non-accompagnés - Plaidoyer des enfants de la rue, - Remise à niveau des enfants de la rue, vulnérables et en situation difficile | - Ville de Goma - Territoire de Masisi (Nord-Kivu, Masisi centre - Territoire de Kalehe / Kasheke/Sud-Kivu, Minova/ Sud-Kivu, Bueremana, Territoire de Masisi / Nord-Kivu | UNICEF |
| 08 | CICR / GOMA | Prosper SEBIHIRE, Responsable Agence | Tél. : 0813783413 | - Tracing des parents - Rétablissement des liens familiaux - Réunification familial - Entretien post RF - Suivi des EAFGA dans les CTO de Goma | Toutes les provinces sauf le Nord-Kivu | |
| 09 | CAJED (Concert d’Actions pour Jeunes et Enfants Défavorisés) | Gilbert MUNDA | Tél. : 0997748197 E-mail : cajed2002@yahoo.ca | DDR (CTO, Réinsertion socio-économique, professionnelle des ex-EAFGA, Accompagnement psycho-social des ESFGA) | Ville de Goma, Rutshuru (Bwisha) Masisi (Basholi, Mokoto, Kitshanga, Mweso, Muheto) | UNICEF |
| 10 | UPADERI : Union Paysanne pour le Développement Rural Intégré | Faustin NTIBATEGERA | Tél. : 0997702700 E-mail : upaderi@yahoo.fr | - Plaidoyer et sensibilisation à la prévention au non recrutement, - Recherche et réunification familiale, - Suivi à la réinsertion socio-économique des ex-EAFGA et ENA, - Accompagnement des clubs des filles et comités / Parlement des enfants | Territoire de Masisi : Axes Karubangungu, Matanda, Kibabi, Katoyi, Bihambwe, Masisi centre, Kilorirwe, Nyakarida, Muheto, Ufamandu, | - Save the Children, octobre 2006 - CONCERN 2006 - PNUD/COMREC, novembre 2006 |
| 11 | CFAJR « Centre de Formation Artisanale des Jeunes de la Rue » | Urbain BAHANI | Tél. : 09942009940 E-mail : baurbain@yahoo.fr | - Suivi à la réinsertion socio-économique des ESFGA, - Formation professionnelle pour la prévention du recrutement, - Education formelle pour les enfants non accompagnés, victimes des conflits, orphelins et vulnérables, - AGR et agriculture | - Territoire de Masisi, - Ville de Goma | - NCA/ETN, - Save the Children, - PNUD/UNOPS, - PAM, - UNICEF |
| 12 | SOS Grands – Lacs | Albert KASUMBA | Tél. : 0998399803 | - Accompagnement transitoire des ESFGA - Plaidoyer - Réinsertion socio – économique des ESFGA et Enfants vulnérables | - Goma - Masisi - Rutshuru - Kalehe (Bord du lac) | - UNICEF - Bureau Zone de Est PAM |
| 13 | CERAO | BALISI Martin | Tél. : 0811668584 ; 0813052188 ; E-mail : ceraolukas@yahoo.fr | - Réinsertion socio-économique par professionnalisation - DDR | - Ville de Goma - Beni - Nyabiondo | CRN |
| 14 | DIVAS : Gouvernement (Partenaire Etatique) | Rusimbuka Domitilla | Tél. : 0998600072 ; 0808501075 E-mail : rusimbukad@yahoo.fr | - DDR - Plaidoyer - Sensibilisation - Encadrement des enfants en situation difficile - Suivi de la réinsertion en générale | Toute la province | - UNICEF - PNUD - SC - PAM - CICR - CICR et autres |
| 15 | A suivre (la cartographie) | | | | | |
Security Council February 2007 DRC Forecast Report
Expected Council Action • Key Recent Developments • Options • Key Issues • Council Dynamics • UN Documents • Other Relevant Facts
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to agree to the request by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to delay its substantive review of the mandate of the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC), which expires on 15 February. How long this technical extension might be is still under discussion. The DRC government is still finalising its cabinet appointments and has argued that it needs more time to prepare its position on MONUC's future role.
As a result, the Secretary-General's report on MONUC's post-transition role is also likely to be delayed.
An Arria formula meeting on the
On sanctions, the Group of Experts' midterm report, including recommendations on economic measures, is now expected for February. While the report was presented to the Sanctions Committee in December, discussions in the Sanctions Committee were postponed to January. The Secretary-General's report on the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact of economic sanctions requested in resolution 1698 is expected in February. No Council action on economic sanctions is expected in February, but movement on targeted sanctions is possible.
top • full forecast
Key Recent Developments
On 9 January, the Council held consultations on the DRC. It was briefed by Under Secretaries-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Ibrahim Gambari. Guéhenno underlined major challenges still being confronted in implementing the transitional agenda such as governance and security sector reform. He warned that "early [international] disengagement following elections elsewhere resulted in the resumption of conflict a few years later, requiring a new, costlier international intervention". The forthcoming local elections in the latter part of 2007 were stressed as a critical example of the need for continuing international engagement.
In late December, President Joseph Kabila's alliance secured all key positions in the executive and the legislative branches of the new government. (Antoine Gizenga was appointed prime minister of the DRC and congressmen from Kabila's alliance secured all the chairmanships of National Assembly committees.) The new senate was elected on 19 January with the majority also going to Kabila's alliance. However, former presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba did secure a seat. Kabila's strong control of the executive and the legislative branch (in addition to six out of nine provincial governorships elected on 27 January) suggests that the opposition may struggle to function as a significant political force.
On his first official trip to the DRC, the Secretary-General visited
Despite the political and electoral progress, violence resumed in eastern DRC, particularly involving forces loyal to former general Laurent Nkunda, who is on the DRC travel ban and assets-freeze list. With Rwandan mediation and MONUC assistance, agreement was reached on 18 January to integrate Nkunda's militia into the army. There were reports that options on Nkunda's future were being discussed, including exile. In early January, there were clashes involving militia loyal to Peter Karim, who in December had agreed to demobilise his militia and join the DRC army as a colonel. There were also reports of widespread abuse, including looting and raping, during riots that involved Congolese army troops complaining of unpaid salaries and mistreatment.
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Options
A technical rollover of MONUC's mandate seems likely and, at this stage, no other options are likely to be considered. Renewal for six to eight weeks seems a possible option.
top • full forecast
Key Issues
The key underlying issue is how best to assist the DRC to consolidate its state authority, reform the security sector, improve governance and begin the process of economic development. Council members are aware that success will involve a comprehensive, integrated strategy that avoids hasty cutbacks.
The immediate issue for now, however, is how long a delay in addressing the long term issues is reasonable. It seems that most members are comfortable with a technical rollover that allows sufficient time for consultations with the new government but does not send the wrong signals by postponing for too long a decision on MONUC's future.
A practical issue is whether to renew the temporary additional contingents for MONUC authorised in resolutions 1621, 1635 and 1736. In this regard, the fact that the electoral process will not be finalised until the local elections are complete is a relevant factor. On the other hand, the ever-present
In this post-transition context, an important issue will also be how best to proceed with sanctions, particularly economic measures. This is another issue in which the views of the new government will be sought. (As experience with
A related issue is whether to move on with the lists of targeted sanctions envisaged in resolutions 1649 and 1698. (Members have formally received proposed names from the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.)
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Council Dynamics
There seems to be consensus within the Council that there should be a technical rollover for MONUC.
Positions on MONUC's future are unlikely to emerge until the Secretary-General's recommendations and the new government's position become clear. Most Council members already anticipate strong support for maintaining MONUC's size, at least in the short run. Most members also seem concerned about the need to avoid a repeat of the
There is not much enthusiasm among Council members for economic measures, especially in the post-election environment. Most did not support the Group of Experts' recommendations (which seem to have included sanctions on the basis of violations of Congolese law), feeling that the Group did not consult sufficiently with the government and went beyond the Council's original request in resolution 1698. Most instead are sympathetic to the view that improving resources control should be the responsibility of the Congolese government. However, because of the potential impact of natural resources on security issues, there is likely to be an interest in continuing to monitor developments and asking the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed.
Some are open to increasing the list of individuals subject to targeted sanctions, particularly as envisaged by resolution 1698 against individuals responsible for recruiting child combatants.
top • full forecast
UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
* S/RES/1736 (22 December 2006) re-hatted ONUB troops as MONUC.
* S/RES/1711 (29 September 2006) extended MONUC until 15 February.
* S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006) strengthened sanctions, expressed the intention to consider measures over natural resources, and renewed the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 July 2007.
* S/RES/1649 (21 December 2005) strengthened sanctions in the DRC and requested the report on foreign armed groups.
* S/RES/1635 (28 October 2005) and 1621 (6 September 2006) authorised temporary increases in MONUC's strength for the elections.
* S/RES/1565 (1 October 2004) revised MONUC's mandate set forth in S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003) and 1291(24 February 2000).
Selected Secretary-General's Reports
* S/2006/759 (21 September 2006) was the latest MONUC report.
* S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was a report on foreign armed groups in the DRC.
Other Relevant Documents
*
S/2007/17 (15 January 2007) was a DRC government letter requesting the rollover of MONUC's mandate.
* S/2006/525 (18 July 2006) was the latest report of the Group of Experts.
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Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of
William Lacy Swing (US)
Size, Composition and Cost of
* Authorised strength: 17,221 military and 1,316 police
* Strength as of 31 December 2006: 17,390 military and 1,075 police
* Main troop contributors:
* Cost: 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 US$ 1.138 billion
Duration
30 November 1999 to present, mandate expires on 15 February 2007
Policy Recommendation from Refugees International
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
The Security Council Must Take Steps to Protect Civilians
Despite progress made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) over the past few years, much of it thanks to the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, civilians continue to die from attacks and abuse. As the Security Council debates MONUC's new mandate, protecting those most at risk must be the priority.
For a country with as many strikes against it as the Democratic Republic of the Congo - no state authority, ethnic animosities, abundant natural resources, and hungry neighbors - the transformation of the past four years has been remarkable: a newly-elected government is in place; armed groups are ever more constrained; Congo's erstwhile occupier, Rwanda, has made peace overtures; and thousands of displaced have returned home.
Much of the success dates from 2003, when the Security Council gave MONUC, its struggling mission in the country, an invigorated mandate and the troops to execute it. Now, with the national elections over and a government installed, MONUC's mandate is again under review. It will officially expire on February 15, but the new Congolese government has requested time for consultations, extending the debate by a few months.
MONUC's mandate is critical because pockets of extreme insecurity and need persist in the eastern part of the country, and even the usually calm west has not been immune from election-related violence. For example, in Ituri District, a team from Refugees International found in July 2006 that years of conflict had given way to peace in the northern territory of Djugu; in November, the area slipped back into chaos as a warlord made a last stand on the Ugandan border against MONUC and the national army (the FARDC), and civilians once again found themselves fleeing their newly rebuilt homes. In Irumu Territory, in the southern part of Ituri, battles have raged for more than a year with insurgents that had been defeated by MONUC, then regrouped in Kampala, the Ugandan capital, and crossed back into the DRC to fight again. In North Kivu Province, around the town of Goma, advances by the dissident warlord Laurent Nkunda caused thousands to flee last November before he received a pardon from the government and promised to integrate his troops with the national army.
Civilians bear the brunt of these campaigns; families get caught in the crossfire or suffer reprisals from one group or the other. FARDC troops continue to extort food and labor, and rape and sexually assault women and children, to such a degree that villages still flee in fear of them. And in a country with its fair share of atrocities, reports emerging from the forest near Bukavu, in South Kivu Province, are an echo of the dark days of the war. The tactics used seem designed "to sow intentionally terror in the population," recounts a humanitarian assessment of the area: armed men loosely associated with the remnants of the Hutu force responsible for the Rwandan genocide, the FDLR, kidnap groups of villagers and take them back into the cover of the Kahuzi-Biega National Park. They rape the women and torture the men, releasing any left alive after receiving their ransom. Whole villages stand empty now, testament to the success of fear.
MONUC is well poised to address these challenges, with the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world and the infrastructure and experience to make use of it. A temporary increase in troop levels through 2007 would have a decisive impact, allowing MONUC to move against armed groups across the east, cut off their supplies, and force their surrender. Such an increase is unlikely, however, in a year that will see a high demand for peacekeepers. After Security Council members considered reducing MONUC's troop strength as a post-elections cost-saving measure, it now seems that current levels are assured for the next several months. The Council must guard against any reduction that does not correspond with verifiable indicators such as a reduction in attacks on civilians, the resolution of local conflict, and prosecution for perpetrators of abuse.
While much debate has centered on MONUC's role in reforming the FARDC and encouraging good governance, the Security Council must sharpen the mission's mandate to focus clearly on protecting civilians: stopping attacks and abuse, widening access to humanitarian assistance, and helping people return home. In April 2006, MONUC had a quiet but notable success in its deployment of just 100 troops to protect civilians in central Katanga. This modest commitment allowed MONUC to deliver food, facilitate the withdrawal of abusive government troops for training, provide security guarantees needed by the local Mai-Mai militia to demobilize, and draw people out of hiding in the forest to camps where they could get help. After a few months, thousands of displaced people and former combatants across the region returned home, ready to replant and rebuild.
MONUC must build on this success by moving to protect other civilians under attack. The most pressing priority is the protection of those terrorized by the kidnappings, rape, and torture on the borders of Kahuzi-Biega National Park in South Kivu.
A clear focus on protecting civilians would also prompt a shift in strategy for MONUC. In 2006, joint operations between MONUC and the FARDC provoked the displacement of more than 300,000 people in the eastern DRC, either during offensives against armed groups or afterwards, when MONUC withdrew to leave the population at the mercy of hungry, underpaid, and ill-trained FARDC troops. The United Nations thus found itself in the untenable position of leading the response to a humanitarian crisis that its own troops had created; in addition, the offensives had little strategic impact, as neither MONUC nor the FARDC had the capacity to clear and hold areas controlled by armed groups.
MONUC's strategy needs to evolve. Some Security Council members, particularly the United States, have pushed MONUC to move against the armed groups in the east with military force, with disastrous humanitarian consequences. Council members must allow MONUC to be more balanced, to use its force to deter and contain armed groups while facilitating disarmament and demobilization. In just one example, forward deployment of peacekeepers to FDLR positions would help those who wish to stop fighting to escape their brutal commanders; strong coordination with Rwanda could then help MONUC find durable solutions for these troops through repatriation or resettlement.
Resolving the conflict with the armed groups in the east will be MONUC's biggest challenge under its new mandate. Resolution will not be possible, however, as long as arms continue to flow into the DRC across its borders with Rwanda and Uganda. The Security Council has authorized an embargo on the import of weapons to the DRC and the export of the natural resources that pay for them, and has authorized MONUC to enforce that embargo. MONUC and the countries that contribute its troops have never moved to execute that mandate, citing lack of capacity. In renewing MONUC's mandate, the Security Council must call on Rwanda and Uganda to stop the flow of weapons, request assistance in gathering intelligence on arms flows, and give MONUC the means to enforce the embargo.
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDS:
The Security Council Must Take Steps to Protect Civilians
Despite progress made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) over the past few years, much of it thanks to the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, civilians continue to die from attacks and abuse. As the Security Council debates MONUC's new mandate, protecting those most at risk must be the priority.
For a country with as many strikes against it as the Democratic Republic of the Congo - no state authority, ethnic animosities, abundant natural resources, and hungry neighbors - the transformation of the past four years has been remarkable: a newly-elected government is in place; armed groups are ever more constrained; Congo's erstwhile occupier, Rwanda, has made peace overtures; and thousands of displaced have returned home.
Much of the success dates from 2003, when the Security Council gave MONUC, its struggling mission in the country, an invigorated mandate and the troops to execute it. Now, with the national elections over and a government installed, MONUC's mandate is again under review. It will officially expire on February 15, but the new Congolese government has requested time for consultations, extending the debate by a few months.
MONUC's mandate is critical because pockets of extreme insecurity and need persist in the eastern part of the country, and even the usually calm west has not been immune from election-related violence. For example, in Ituri District, a team from Refugees International found in July 2006 that years of conflict had given way to peace in the northern territory of Djugu; in November, the area slipped back into chaos as a warlord made a last stand on the Ugandan border against MONUC and the national army (the FARDC), and civilians once again found themselves fleeing their newly rebuilt homes. In Irumu Territory, in the southern part of Ituri, battles have raged for more than a year with insurgents that had been defeated by MONUC, then regrouped in Kampala, the Ugandan capital, and crossed back into the DRC to fight again. In North Kivu Province, around the town of Goma, advances by the dissident warlord Laurent Nkunda caused thousands to flee last November before he received a pardon from the government and promised to integrate his troops with the national army.
Civilians bear the brunt of these campaigns; families get caught in the crossfire or suffer reprisals from one group or the other. FARDC troops continue to extort food and labor, and rape and sexually assault women and children, to such a degree that villages still flee in fear of them. And in a country with its fair share of atrocities, reports emerging from the forest near Bukavu, in South Kivu Province, are an echo of the dark days of the war. The tactics used seem designed "to sow intentionally terror in the population," recounts a humanitarian assessment of the area: armed men loosely associated with the remnants of the Hutu force responsible for the Rwandan genocide, the FDLR, kidnap groups of villagers and take them back into the cover of the Kahuzi-Biega National Park. They rape the women and torture the men, releasing any left alive after receiving their ransom. Whole villages stand empty now, testament to the success of fear.
MONUC is well poised to address these challenges, with the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world and the infrastructure and experience to make use of it. A temporary increase in troop levels through 2007 would have a decisive impact, allowing MONUC to move against armed groups across the east, cut off their supplies, and force their surrender. Such an increase is unlikely, however, in a year that will see a high demand for peacekeepers. After Security Council members considered reducing MONUC's troop strength as a post-elections cost-saving measure, it now seems that current levels are assured for the next several months. The Council must guard against any reduction that does not correspond with verifiable indicators such as a reduction in attacks on civilians, the resolution of local conflict, and prosecution for perpetrators of abuse.
While much debate has centered on MONUC's role in reforming the FARDC and encouraging good governance, the Security Council must sharpen the mission's mandate to focus clearly on protecting civilians: stopping attacks and abuse, widening access to humanitarian assistance, and helping people return home. In April 2006, MONUC had a quiet but notable success in its deployment of just 100 troops to protect civilians in central Katanga. This modest commitment allowed MONUC to deliver food, facilitate the withdrawal of abusive government troops for training, provide security guarantees needed by the local Mai-Mai militia to demobilize, and draw people out of hiding in the forest to camps where they could get help. After a few months, thousands of displaced people and former combatants across the region returned home, ready to replant and rebuild.
MONUC must build on this success by moving to protect other civilians under attack. The most pressing priority is the protection of those terrorized by the kidnappings, rape, and torture on the borders of Kahuzi-Biega National Park in South Kivu.
A clear focus on protecting civilians would also prompt a shift in strategy for MONUC. In 2006, joint operations between MONUC and the FARDC provoked the displacement of more than 300,000 people in the eastern DRC, either during offensives against armed groups or afterwards, when MONUC withdrew to leave the population at the mercy of hungry, underpaid, and ill-trained FARDC troops. The United Nations thus found itself in the untenable position of leading the response to a humanitarian crisis that its own troops had created; in addition, the offensives had little strategic impact, as neither MONUC nor the FARDC had the capacity to clear and hold areas controlled by armed groups.
MONUC's strategy needs to evolve. Some Security Council members, particularly the United States, have pushed MONUC to move against the armed groups in the east with military force, with disastrous humanitarian consequences. Council members must allow MONUC to be more balanced, to use its force to deter and contain armed groups while facilitating disarmament and demobilization. In just one example, forward deployment of peacekeepers to FDLR positions would help those who wish to stop fighting to escape their brutal commanders; strong coordination with Rwanda could then help MONUC find durable solutions for these troops through repatriation or resettlement.
Resolving the conflict with the armed groups in the east will be MONUC's biggest challenge under its new mandate. Resolution will not be possible, however, as long as arms continue to flow into the DRC across its borders with Rwanda and Uganda. The Security Council has authorized an embargo on the import of weapons to the DRC and the export of the natural resources that pay for them, and has authorized MONUC to enforce that embargo. MONUC and the countries that contribute its troops have never moved to execute that mandate, citing lack of capacity. In renewing MONUC's mandate, the Security Council must call on Rwanda and Uganda to stop the flow of weapons, request assistance in gathering intelligence on arms flows, and give MONUC the means to enforce the embargo.
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDS:
- The Security Council sharpen MONUC's mandate to stop attacks against civilians, widen access for assistance, and help the displaced to return home.
- The Security Council increase or at least maintain MONUC troop levels through 2007, basing any future reduction on progress towards civilian protection, resolution of conflict, and prosecution of perpetrators of abuse.
- MONUC deploy immediately to protect civilians from kidnapping, torture, and rape currently carried out by armed marauders associated with the FDLR around the Kahuzi-Biega National Park in South Kivu.
- MONUC suspend joint operations with the FARDC until clear and verifiable policies are in place to reduce displacement of civilians, prevent reprisals against civilians, and protect civilians from abuses by the FARDC following operations.
- MONUC deploy mobile operating bases closer to FDLR bases to facilitate the voluntary demobilization of FDLR troops, while working with Rwanda to implement durable solutions for members of the FDLR.
- The United States reduce pressure on MONUC to implement a strictly military solution in the east against armed groups while increasing pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to fulfill their regional responsibilities towards stabilization and peace.
- The Security Council ensure that MONUC has the resources it needs, including intelligence, to enforce its embargo on the movement of arms and natural resources in and out of the DRC; and MONUC and troop contributing countries engage far more than they have in the past to fulfilling this aspect of their mandate.
Advocate Rick Neal visited the D.R. Congo three times in 2006 to assess displacement, returns, and humanitarian response
Wednesday, February 07, 2007
BBC Article - Congo General Agrees to Peace
BBC Thursday, 18 January 2007, 13:13 GMT
| Congo general 'agrees to peace' | ||
| The Democratic Republic of Congo's military has announced a peace deal with dissident army general Laurent Nkunda, wanted for war crimes. He confirmed his militia will be integrated into the national army but denied he was seeking asylum elsewhere. Gen Nkunda, who has been leading a rebellion in the east, said he wanted his arrest warrant be repealed. The agreement comes three months after Joseph Kabila was elected as DR Congo's first president in 40 years. About 17,000 United Nations peacekeepers operate in the country, overseeing the peace process after the end of a bloody five-year war in 2002. 'Asylum' The Congolese military told the BBC that, under the deal, Gen Nkunda will be given asylum in another country, despite outstanding war crimes charges against him. But Gen Nkunda denied this, saying he would remain in DR Congo. "I'm going to serve in the army... We must repeal this arrest warrant," he told Reuters news agency. Rwanda has recently been hosting talks between representatives of the Congolese government and Gen Nkunda. Rwanda was accused of backing the general, who left the army and launched his own low-level rebellion after the war ended, saying that the country's transition to democracy was flawed and had excluded the minority Tutsi community. Congolese army officer Col Delphin Kiyimbi told the BBC that he had been put in charge of integrating Nkunda's fighters - estimated to be between 1,500 to 2,000 - into the army. He said the operation would take place in Mweso in North Kivu region by 21 January, and he was planning to create four brigades. The BBC's Emery Makumeno in the capital, Kinshasa, says the removal of the fighters could bring much-needed stability to the war-torn region. Mr Kabila said on taking office that peace and stability in the east was his immediate priority. | ||
Economist Article on MONUC
CONGO
Jan 29th 2007
The UN is trying to restore normality in Congo
THERE are tougher places Ban Ki-moon could have chosen for his first trip as secretary-general of the United Nations. Perhaps the Middle East or the Korean peninsula are more troubled than Congo, but not by much. The vast central African country's recent war cost millions of lives and large tracts remain an ungoverned mess. But the gloom is lifting a little. Elections in the middle of last year were a qualified success, and Mr Ban is now hoping that he can help Congo move towards stability and away from chaos.
There is reason for hope. Between 1998 and 2003 the war in Congo sucked in eight other African countries, and around 4m people may have died (mainly as a result of starvation and disease). Given this background the successful election, in a huge country with little working infrastructure, was nigh miraculous. Joseph Kabila, the son of a former president of Congo assassinated in 2001, retained the presidency. Fears that his rival, Jean-Pierre Bemba, would contest the result and let loose his personal militias were unfounded. Instead, Mr Bemba finally accepted defeat. Mr Ban said, correctly, that the past year had seen "remarkable progress".
Mr Kabila, nonetheless, has a difficult political balancing act to perform. To maintain the fragile peace he must give a share of power not only to Mr Bemba but other militia leaders and warlords too. And though months have passed since the elections, a government has yet to be formed. Perhaps the international attention that preceded Mr Ban's visit shamed Mr Kabila and his lieutenants into action. But the announcement on January 24th that the cabinet would have 59 ministers and vice-ministers--enough for every faction to get its share of the spoils--shows just how hard it will be to govern Congo.
And in eastern Congo, the situation remains grim. Untamed warlords continue to terrorise the local population. And recently, militias associated with Hutus from Rwanda (the same lot responsible for that country's genocide in 1994) have taken to kidnap, rape, torture and demanding ransoms near a national park close to the border between the two countries. But militias and Rwandan GeNOCIDAIRES are not the only threat. The Congolese army was supposed to reintegrate fighters of different factions into a national force. But at the moment it is almost as big a threat to civilians as the groups it is meant to defend them against.
One of the main reasons for Mr Ban's trip to Congo was to visit MONUC, the UN's peacekeeping force there. It is the biggest UN deployment in the world, with 16,500 soldiers and 100 aircraft. Rick Neal of Refugees International, who has travelled extensively in Congo, hopes Mr Ban's visit will do two things in particular. He hopes for a narrowing of MONUC's focus to a primary mission of protecting civilians, and to get it to enforce the embargo on arms into Congo and the export of goods which are used to pay for more arms.
But MONUC is still undermanned, underarmed, and without the intelligence and logistical support it would need to protect civilians properly. The force's mandate is likely to be renewed by the Security Council in February, but it probably will not be given new troops. For one thing, it has been a deadly mission: almost 100 peacekeepers have died in Congo. And in any case, the world's supply of peacekeepers has been squeezed. The UN currently fields 74,000, and peacemakers are looking for troops for Somalia, so the Ethiopian army can withdraw from its recent invasion there. The Congo mission will have to make do at its current size.
Still, Mr Neal says, Congo represents "a tremendous success story for the UN". The tough decision to authorise a large force after the war ended in 2003 was a brave one that has made peace in Congo at least a possibility. The next step for Mr Kabila's government will be to establish the bare minimum of governance: running a disciplined army, observing the rule of law and restoring basic infrastructure around the country. If this can be done, perhaps Congo's tremendous natural wealth can help to put it on the road to real recovery.
See this article with graphics and related items at http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8616657&fs
rc=nwl
Jan 29th 2007
The UN is trying to restore normality in Congo
THERE are tougher places Ban Ki-moon could have chosen for his first trip as secretary-general of the United Nations. Perhaps the Middle East or the Korean peninsula are more troubled than Congo, but not by much. The vast central African country's recent war cost millions of lives and large tracts remain an ungoverned mess. But the gloom is lifting a little. Elections in the middle of last year were a qualified success, and Mr Ban is now hoping that he can help Congo move towards stability and away from chaos.
There is reason for hope. Between 1998 and 2003 the war in Congo sucked in eight other African countries, and around 4m people may have died (mainly as a result of starvation and disease). Given this background the successful election, in a huge country with little working infrastructure, was nigh miraculous. Joseph Kabila, the son of a former president of Congo assassinated in 2001, retained the presidency. Fears that his rival, Jean-Pierre Bemba, would contest the result and let loose his personal militias were unfounded. Instead, Mr Bemba finally accepted defeat. Mr Ban said, correctly, that the past year had seen "remarkable progress".
Mr Kabila, nonetheless, has a difficult political balancing act to perform. To maintain the fragile peace he must give a share of power not only to Mr Bemba but other militia leaders and warlords too. And though months have passed since the elections, a government has yet to be formed. Perhaps the international attention that preceded Mr Ban's visit shamed Mr Kabila and his lieutenants into action. But the announcement on January 24th that the cabinet would have 59 ministers and vice-ministers--enough for every faction to get its share of the spoils--shows just how hard it will be to govern Congo.
And in eastern Congo, the situation remains grim. Untamed warlords continue to terrorise the local population. And recently, militias associated with Hutus from Rwanda (the same lot responsible for that country's genocide in 1994) have taken to kidnap, rape, torture and demanding ransoms near a national park close to the border between the two countries. But militias and Rwandan GeNOCIDAIRES are not the only threat. The Congolese army was supposed to reintegrate fighters of different factions into a national force. But at the moment it is almost as big a threat to civilians as the groups it is meant to defend them against.
One of the main reasons for Mr Ban's trip to Congo was to visit MONUC, the UN's peacekeeping force there. It is the biggest UN deployment in the world, with 16,500 soldiers and 100 aircraft. Rick Neal of Refugees International, who has travelled extensively in Congo, hopes Mr Ban's visit will do two things in particular. He hopes for a narrowing of MONUC's focus to a primary mission of protecting civilians, and to get it to enforce the embargo on arms into Congo and the export of goods which are used to pay for more arms.
But MONUC is still undermanned, underarmed, and without the intelligence and logistical support it would need to protect civilians properly. The force's mandate is likely to be renewed by the Security Council in February, but it probably will not be given new troops. For one thing, it has been a deadly mission: almost 100 peacekeepers have died in Congo. And in any case, the world's supply of peacekeepers has been squeezed. The UN currently fields 74,000, and peacemakers are looking for troops for Somalia, so the Ethiopian army can withdraw from its recent invasion there. The Congo mission will have to make do at its current size.
Still, Mr Neal says, Congo represents "a tremendous success story for the UN". The tough decision to authorise a large force after the war ended in 2003 was a brave one that has made peace in Congo at least a possibility. The next step for Mr Kabila's government will be to establish the bare minimum of governance: running a disciplined army, observing the rule of law and restoring basic infrastructure around the country. If this can be done, perhaps Congo's tremendous natural wealth can help to put it on the road to real recovery.
See this article with graphics and related items at http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8616657&fs
rc=nwl
Friday, February 02, 2007
Funding Proposal
Launching Congo
January 26, 2007
Executive Summary
A Movement for
A historic opportunity is at hand for the
However, the DR Congo does continue to suffer from the consequences of a very long and deadly war. More than 4 million people have died in the war in the
Why has the world’s deadliest humanitarian emergency, the deadliest of all conflicts and humanitarian crises since World War II, been met with such a gravely insufficient response?
The simple answer is ignorance. The media does not cover the DR Congo in a significant way, so people do not know about it. And even if they are aware of this crisis, there are precious few outlets for mobilizing their concern. Instead, world leaders focus their attention on more politically pressing issues, regardless of the scale of the atrocities taking place in the DR Congo.
There is reason to hope. We have learned that once communities and key leaders know the story of the DR Congo, people want to act. The DR Congo deserves and needs a global, engaged citizens’ movement that will educate and mobilize communities around the world to support the Congolese. These communities, organizations and individuals will then partner with policy experts to bring the DR Congo to the forefront of our governments’ agendas and urge an international response appropriate to the scale of the need.
As Congo Global Action, we have brought together policy experts and grassroots organizations to form the world’s largest coalition on the DR Congo that will mobilize increased local and international response to the DR Congo crisis.
Through months of meetings, we have laid the groundwork. Now we ask your support in launching this coalition. Drawing on the experiences of other successful movements such as Genocide Intervention Network, Africa Faith and Justice Northern Uganda Lobby Days, Save Darfur, Ban Landmines, Control Arms, Jubilee Campaign and others, we have devised a clear strategy, and now we are gathering the resources that will let us implement it.
Enclosed, you will find detailed information about the conflict in the DR Congo, our coalition and our vision for the three conferences and future action. We hope you will join us in sparking a movement that will be the long-overdue action responding to the voices of the people of the
INTRODUCTION
DR Congo: The World’s Deadliest Emergency
The war in DR Congo is by far the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II. The International Rescue Committee’s latest mortality survey in 2004 demonstrated that 3.9 million people had died because of the conflict and that a further 39,000 are possibly still dying every month, with nearly half of these deaths being children under the age of five.
The conflict in the DR Congo began at the conclusion of the Rwandan genocide. The Interahamwe, the Hutu militias responsible for the massacre of one million people in
Various militias and government forces were sent in to fight first the Interahamwe, then each other. The chaos erupted into what has been termed “
Though a peace accord was reached in 2003 and the first democratic elections in over 40 years have just taken place in 2006, the conflict continues to cause a complete shut-down of vast regions of the country, leaving civilians to fend for themselves against brutal attacks, torture, looting, rape and murder, as well as deprivation of the most basic conditions necessary for life.
Shockingly, of the excess mortality recorded in the DR Congo, only 2% are a result of violence. Security issues have severely limited access to humanitarian relief and basic services, resulting in tens of thousands of “excess deaths” every month, primarily from easily preventable diseases and malnutrition.
In areas where the UN Security Forces have maintained a presence, the number of “excess deaths” drops dramatically. Additionally, with a major up-scaling of humanitarian aid, simple and cost-effective interventions can easily prevent these deaths. National judicial reform, effective and transparent economic policies and monitoring can end the economic exploitation and looting that many see as one of the main causes of the conflict.
Considering the DR Congo’s vast resources, an end to the conflict could transform this long-neglected nation into a major stabilizing influence on all of its nine neighboring countries. “
As Human Rights Watch put it, "If you want peace in
Nurturing Hope in the Heart of Darkness
Despite these grave statistics, the Congolese people have hope and have taken steps to improve their day-to-day lives. Many small, disparate grassroots efforts have mobilized citizens around the DR Congo through education and fundraising for direct aid projects. There are groups setting up schools and hospitals, counseling victims of rape and violence, and caring for orphans. But despite their efforts and dedication, their impact is limited and millions of Congolese remain out of reach of education, health care, and basic necessities. Small projects have surely improved the lives of many families and individuals, but solving the problems of the DR Congo will require much more.
International NGOs and policy experts have long recognized the need and advocated for greater involvement on the part of the international community in addressing these larger issues. Yet they have often had difficulty rallying support among decision-makers. Advocates have found that this is not because of a lack of compassion but a lack of awareness among decision-makers’ constituents. Unless legislators are hearing directly from their constituents that they are concerned about the DR Congo, this country and its people will never be a priority.
Now more than ever it is time to nurture this burgeoning hope and sustain the momentum the peace and rebuilding process has thus far attained. Therefore, we Congolese and international groups have come together to raise global and local awareness of the needs and advocate for greater assistance to the Congolese people as they continue to rebuild their lives and their country.
Together, as the Congo Global Action Coalition, we form a movement far greater than the sum of its parts, with a momentum that will generate the action, policy recommendations and funding assistance for the benefit of the people of the DR Congo. We will share our talents, expertise and resources to unite effective high-level policy advocacy with a groundswell of grassroots support. Together we will set the agenda to undertake and fund practical, constructive solutions to the DR Congo crisis.
Congo Global Action is a collection of humanitarian, human rights, environmental and faith-based organizations, students, Congolese Diaspora and other grassroots movements. What began with a single meeting on July 7, 2006 of representatives from fifteen organizations concerned about the DR Congo has grown into a coalition of more than 60 organizations with weekly meetings and new organizations joining every day. With a membership base of over half a million people, our organizations are coming together to advocate for the DR Congo and to urge increased local and international response.
Four months of brainstorming and outreach to other organizations culminated in a three-day retreat November 9-12, 2006 during which we produced a final Unity Statement, a structure for the coalition, and a plan for our next advocacy steps.
With organizations from four continents, Congo Global Action is truly a global community. Organizations that have already signed on to our Unity Statement include:
- The Bayindo Group SA
- Bureau pour le Voluntariat au Service de l’Enfance et de la Santé
- CARE
- Coalition pluraliste des Patriots Congolais - COPPAC
- Concern Worldwide
- Congolese Community of
- Conseil Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation – COPARE
- En Avant
- Friends of the
- The Friends of the
- Friends of the Earth
- Global Witness
- Hand Up Congo
- Initiatives Femmes Enfants et Developpement – Bukavu
- International Foundation for Elections Systems - IFES
- International Rescue Committee
- Jubilee Campaign
- Mama Makeka House of Hope
- Mennonite Central Committee
- Norwegian Refugee Council (pending approval)
- OXFAM (pending approval)
- Run for
- Save the DRC
- Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur
- Tous Unis pour Batir
- UMCOR – United Methodist Committee on Relief
- World Relief
- World Vision (pending approval)
There are many more organizations whose membership is pending approval by their boards of directors and/or senior management.
Please see the next page for the Unity Statement that joins us together in our efforts to improve life in the DR Congo.
A historic opportunity is at hand for the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly
The Congolese people have demonstrated their overwhelming commitment to the peaceful rebuilding of their country by participating in their first democratic election in more than 40 years.
Nonetheless, the DR Congo continues to suffer from what the United Nations calls "the world’s deadliest emergency" and faces massive obstacles to its reconstruction:
Ø More than 4 million Congolese have died since 1998 as a result of the war. Although "
Ø Rebel groups, militias, and oftentimes the underpaid and poorly trained Congolese armed forces continue to kill, torture, rape, enslave, loot, and harass populations. Sexual violence in the DR Congo remains a daily threat for women and girls living in war-affected areas. Nationwide, the justice and security instruments remain largely dysfunctional and corrupt.
Ø Vast quantities of mineral wealth are smuggled and exported from the DR Congo every year without benefit to the Congolese people. The UN has accused all nations involved in the conflict of using the war as a cover for this looting. Networks of armed groups, elites, corporations, governments and Congolese civil and military officials control and pilfer diamonds, gold, cobalt, tin, copper and other natural resources. We benefit daily from the use of the DR Congo’s looted riches such as coltan, a vital component of our computers, cell phones, and home gaming systems.
The collective response to this crisis remains gravely insufficient.
The government must establish and maintain peace throughout all its provinces. It also must restore basic services, help millions of people return safely home and resume their livelihoods, set up efficient and trusted security and judiciary institutions, and organize economic usage of natural resources for the benefit of the Congolese. The people of the DR Congo must be empowered to hold their government accountable. The international community must provide adequate and sustained support for these efforts in order to save lives, keep people safe, and end economic exploitation.
As humanitarian, human rights, and faith-based organizations, students, Congolese, and grassroots movements, we come together to advocate for the DR Congo and urge increased local and international response, beginning with our own communities and institutions.
JOIN US.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Congo Global Action aims to raise global and local awareness of the needs of the Congolese people and advocate for specific responses from policy makers, including increased funding, both at the international and national level. There are three objectives that will form the pillars of the coalition’s efforts:
· Saving Lives,
· Keeping People Safe, and
· Ending Economic Exploitation
Pillar I: Saving Lives
Pillar I is devoted to helping to end the humanitarian crisis in the DR Congo by stopping the thousands of unnecessary deaths due to disease and malnutrition that are easily prevented with the provision of clean water, reliable access to healthcare and inexpensive medicine.
To achieve this vision of a healthy DR Congo, Pillar I has three advocacy goals:
1. To advocate for the full funding of the Humanitarian Action Plan for the DR
2. To promote bilateral and multilateral funding for humanitarian programs and other financial assistance to the DR Congo.
3. To encourage private donations and charitable giving to Congo-based humanitarian programs, especially local civil society groups, hospitals, and other programs dedicated to the rebuilding of local infrastructure.
Pillar II: Keeping People Safe
Ending the nightmare of violence in the DR Congo that includes offenses by militias and national military alike who loot, rape, kill and abuse Congolese civilians is the goal of Pillar II.
To achieve a level of safety and security that allows men, women and children to lead normal lives free of fear, Pillar II has the following goals:
- Advocate for the renewal and expansion of MONUC (the UN peace-keeping force in the DR Congo) and security sector reform. See Annex A for our letter to the UN Security Council
- Advocate for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs.
- Create a campaign that defends women and educates men about rape prevention.
- Restore the childhood of thousands of war-affected children, many of whom have served as either soldiers, sex slaves.
Pillar III: Ending Economic Exploitation
The DR Congo is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural resources and mineral wealth, yet the Congolese people live in abject poverty unable to benefit from the wealth of their own country.
To end the cycle of economic exploitation of the
1. Establish a process to ensure certifiably clean resources.
2. Establish a nationwide Contract Review Process in the DR Congo.
3. Ensure transparency and equality in the Export Process.
4. Establish a Code of Conduct for businesses working in the DR Congo.
5. Establish mechanisms to fight corruption on a local level.
COALITION ACTIVITIES
The coalition envisions undertaking a variety of activities over the next five years to achieve its goals. Its activities will fall into five categories: communications and outreach; fundraising and grassroots organizing; training and capacity building; annual grassroots conferences; and engagement with policy makers.
There will be three phases of activities. During the initial phase, the coalition will focus on consolidating its membership. Activities will concentrate on disseminating information, solidifying relationships among member organizations and individuals. In addition, the coalition will hone its advocacy messages for each pillar, sharpen members’ advocacy skills and methods, and take those messages to policy makers. IN addition, during the first phase the coalition will finalize its structure and operational needs in order to successfully accomplish its goals.
Progress will be measured by the extent to which awareness of the need to save lives, keep people safe and ending economic exploitation has increased among average citizens and policy makers. (Please see the “Results” section of this proposal for more details). As Phase I benchmarks are met, the coalition will be able to move on to Phase II activities.
Phase I will focus on two major categories of activities: Communications and Outreach Activities and Grassroots Organizing and Fundraising. These types of activities will continue throughout the life of the campaign and advocacy efforts. Examples of each are listed below:
A. Communications and Outreach
- Website
Quick and easy access to current, accurate information and resources will be crucial for the coalition’s success. A powerful website will be necessary to spread information to all parts of the globe and engage everyday citizens on all continents in Congo Global Action activities and conferences. All of the materials of the Coalition will be in French and English. The website will also serve as a clearinghouse and a reference for coalition members, grassroots organizers, the media, and the rest of the world. Plans are underway for a website that will allow for interactive activities such as:
· Reading up-to-date information on the DR Congo;
· Subscribing to a news feed and blog;
· Registering for upcoming conferences and activities;
· Sending e-postcards to key government officials, legislators and staff;
· Posting local grassroots events and messages;
· Downloading materials such as our logos, posters, and advocacy kits;
· Creating student chapters, Community Groups and organizations for all ages;
· Interacting with fellow members via peer to peer and other virtual tools.
- Influencing Policy Makers
The founding coalition members have extensive experience influencing policy makers. Most recently, they came together to advocate for the recent passage and signing of Senate Bill 2125, the
Congo Global Action plans to continue such collaboration to influence policy makers in the
· The UN Headquarters: United Nations Security Council members, the United Nations Operation Agencies such as UNICEF, UNOCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, etc.
· US State Department
· US National Security Council
· US Congress – House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Appropriations.
· Universities across the Unites States via student groups, International Relations departments, etc.
· Think-Tank Groups based in larger cities, such as
· US Congressmen and Congresswomen in their home towns – at Town Hall meetings and constituent meetings.
· United Nations offices in
· European Union leadership in
· Influential Governments: The
· Universities across
· Think-Tank Groups based in larger cities:
· Newly formed Government of the
· African Union in
· The Tri-partite Plus Commission with DR Congo,
· Key Border Countries and influential Governments: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Congo – Brazzaville, Zambia, Angola, South Africa, Namibia, and the Central African Republic
- Editorials and Media Outreach
Congo Global Action intends to take advantage of the incredible power of the media, to both educate the grassroots and to persuade governments and private companies to make decisions that will benefit the people of the DR Congo. One of the most successful campaigns in recent years has involved conflict diamonds and the need for diamond companies to take responsibility for the ways their diamonds are obtained. Global Witness and World Vision, two important members of Congo Global Action, led this campaign which, through threats of boycotts and calls for increased transparency, all but ended the trade of conflict diamonds by major diamond distributors like DeBeers. This abrupt turnaround in a formerly extremely corrupt industry can be replicated in the DR Congo’s lucrative industries.
Run for Congo Women is another example where media was used to reach out to new and unlikely demographics. Coverage in Runner's World, Oprah, and Fitness Magazine exposed athletes and other fitness enthusiasts to the issues of the DR Congo and the work of Run for
Congo Global Action will rely on its members’ extensive experience and expertise in media outreach and campaigns to plan a media strategy that will gain global support for the DR Congo.
Key elements of our media strategy include:
.
· Placements in key newspapers, magazines and journals around the world on a monthly and quarterly basis
· Op/Ed placement
· Editorial board lobbying
· Print and TV media releases and stories
· Working with a film-maker to create a documentary about the DR Congo
· Coordination of celebrity involvement
· A downloadable press kit that will include information about the DR Congo, contact information for coalition member experts, fact sheets, photographs and indexes
· B-roll footage that will be available for News and TV stations to use in covering the DR Congo
· Downloadable press releases and instructions for gaining media attention for community and grassroots activities
B. Grassroots Organizing and Fundraising
Congo Global Action will also organize and provide advice and assistance on grassroots organizing that will engage communities and concerned citizens in the DR Congo, the
- Run for
Run for Congo Women is a grassroots fundraiser designed to raise awareness about the war in the DR Congo, and to raise money to sponsor individual war-affected women. The Run was started in 2005 by Lisa Shannon who ran 30 miles to raise $28,000 on her own to sponsor 80 Congolese women through Women for Women International. In 2006, runs ranging from one to 200 participants were organized in ten
The purpose of the run is threefold. Firstly, it educates those who might not normally be aware of the plight of the Congolese. Participants educate their communities about the DR Congo when asking for pledges via email, personal contacts, and hosting house-parties. Secondly, it directly invests sponsoring individuals in the lives of individual Congolese women. Not only do they help these women rebuild their lives, but they gain a sense of personal connection to the crisis through letter exchanges with their "sister". Thirdly, it generates greater awareness through advocacy and media attention. Letter campaigns and other advocacy activities have been incorporated into Run for Congo Women events in the form of petitions and advocacy letters. Additionally, Lisa Shannon has used the clout gained by media and growing momentum with the runs to lobby for the passage of DR Congo related legislation. In 2006, there were feature articles about the Run in The Oregonian, Runner's World, Oprah Magazine, Chicago Public Radio's Worldview, and many other local and national media outlets.
In 2007, runs in their second year are expected to grow in numbers of participants. New runs will be added in locations from
Congo Global Action believes that Run for Congo Women has the potential to be a key entry point for committed grassroots leaders to join its coalition. We intend to capitalize on the Run for
- Community and Social Activities
Community and social activities have proven to be successful methods of gathering people to learn about issues and concerns and what can be done about them. Such activities were instrumental in the success of the Run for Congo Women effort and the efforts of the Genocide Intervention Network and are a primary means of gaining membership throughout Europe and
Congo Global Action plans to incorporate these types of activities into its “advocacy tool kit” and encourage its members to do the same. Examples of activities are: Book clubs for all ages, house parties, and outreach to churches and other faith-based organizations with ideas for fundraisers and material for study and youth groups.
- Youth Activities
So far, Congo Global Action members are predominantly professional employees of NGOs of all sizes and visions, but in the coming months we will work to engage an increasing number of youth. Involving youth and encouraging their activism is important on several levels. Firstly, it is important that they learn about the world around them and how they fit into a global community. Secondly, as the future leaders and policy makers of the world, it is important that they learn how to be constructive members of a democratic society. Thirdly, their interest and enthusiasm can provide tremendous energy to advocacy efforts and grassroots organizing such as those of Congo Global Action.
The coalition plans to harness this energy and give youth the tools to become good global citizens through activities such as creating student chapters in universities and high schools around the world, reaching out to school teachers and providing them with curriculum supplements, and setting up pen-pal projects to link students in the DR Congo with students in North America, Europe, Asia and Australia.
- Annual Grassroots Conferences
Congo Global Action intends to bring its members together each year to strengthen the network, provide an opportunity to share knowledge, experience and skills, and provide advocacy opportunities in key geographic locations. The grassroots conferences are designed to give everyday people the skills, knowledge base, and support needed to become community leaders for the DR Congo. The coalition organizations will draw on their members and constituencies (over half a million people) to participate in these conferences. We will also reach out to other key groups to mobilize a diverse cross section of activists, students, and communities.
It is essential that this grassroots movement be global in its reach. Hence, we propose three conferences with similar agendas in Africa, Europe and
Specifically, the aims of the conferences are the following:
· To educate a diverse array of citizens around the world about the crisis in the DR Congo, facilitate their advocacy to world governments and increase their participation in activities that directly benefit the Congolese people in the DRC.
· To provide a forum where international leaders and civil society members of the DR Congo can connect, network, and generate a collaborative enterprise that will last.
· To assemble and create links between movements and persons concerned by the situation in the DR Congo that will facilitate grassroots lobbying with policy-makers in decision centers such as Brussels, Washington DC and Nairobi.
Experts will be invited to deliver workshops on key issues within each of the three pillars: Saving Lives; Keeping People Safe; and Ending Economic Exploitation. For instance, issues to be covered with respect to “Saving Lives” include gender-based violence, health and well-being, and issues faced by returnees. Issues to be covered with respect to “Keeping People Safe” are human rights and the path to good governance in the DR Congo, demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of fighters, and the role of the United Nations in the DR Congo. Issues to be covered under the “Ending Economic Exploitation” pillar include the role of the DR Congo’s mineral riches and international organizations in the conflict, labor issues and the environmental impact of the war.
Participants will also attend workshops to improve their skills in grassroots organizing and influencing policy makers. The conferences will culminate in a day of meetings with elected representatives and policy makers located in each of the three locations.
A detailed agenda can be found in Annex B.
Participants
Participants will be invited by sponsoring organizations to travel to the nearest of the three conference locations for the event. A particular focus will be placed on the following groups:
- Civil Society Organizations from the DR Congo
- Civil Society Organizations from around the world
- University Students
- Faith-Based Groups
- Congolese Diaspora
- Environmental Groups
- Organizations & Constituencies not yet involved in our coalition
- Human Rights Groups and their constituencies
Voluntary donations of $25 will be requested as a registration fee. In limited cases, student groups and other disadvantaged individuals will be able to apply for travel scholarships to attend and participate in one of these conferences.
Guests of honor, such as global NGO advocacy leaders, national grassroots leaders, think tank leaders, embassy representatives, and US State Department officials will also be invited.
Keynote Speakers
Congo Global Action has already begun to identify and contact possible keynote speakers. We are seeking people from the Human Rights Community, Nobel Peace Prize winners, former United Nations officials such as Koffi Annan and Jan Egeland, and key writers or journalist that have promoted the cause of the DR Congo.
For Congolese Keynote speakers, these include:
Mr. Denis Mukwege Mukengere, Director of the
Mr. Murhabazi Namegabe, Director of the Office of Voluntary Service for Children and Health. He will deliver precise information concerning human rights violations and their consequences for children.
Ms. Christine Karumba, Director of Women for Women International. She has extensive practical knowledge of the situation of women in the DR Congo and can share her perspectives on the experiences of refugees.
Locations
Conference I:
The coalition has chosen
Conference II:
Conference III:
Expected outcomes
The coalition expects the following four outcomes from the three grassroots conferences:
1. At least 500 participants per conference; approximately 1,000 participants are expected for the
2. At least 100 Student Chapters created throughout the world.
3. At least 100 Community Chapters mobilized on the DR Congo throughout the world.
4. Global advocacy grassroots network formally in place via the Coalition – Congo Global Action will have the membership to solidify the international grassroots network.
We anticipate three main results from these new members and grassroots groups when they return home:
1. Increased advocacy to policy makers;
2. Increased education and outreach at the community level and
3. Solidification of coalition networks and relationships.
Activities that will help us to achieve these results include targeted and strategic efforts to:
1. Raise awareness about the crisis amongst the world public;
2. Empower participants to translate knowledge and passion into action that affects clear and defined policy and other goals;
3. Invite constituents into conversations about re-imagining popular conceptions of Africa and relations between the International Community and
4. Access mainstream and other media tools with thoughtful information and messaging;
5. Coordinate influential leaders as well as pre-existing organizations and constituencies to speak and mobilize with one voice; and
6. Lobby elected and appointed officials to take decisive action;
Though this campaign will focus primarily on the DR Congo Crisis, our efforts will ultimately have a tremendous impact on global awareness of humanitarian crises across
Our campaign will:
1. Pressure governments to enact policies that support sustainable peace in the entire region affected by the conflict;
2. Increase public discourse internationally about the global causes and effects of as well as possible solutions to the conflict;
3. Raise the stakes for individuals who are responsible for the perpetuation of conflict and the failure to mitigate its consequences to force them to act more responsibly;
4. Foster amongst target audiences intelligent conversation about global civic engagement and the value of all human life;
5. Create a constituency of people concerned about broader global inequity and boundaries between peoples
ACTION PLANS FOR YEAR ONE
Congo Global Action will determine action plans for that will incorporate all types of activities in order to achieve the goals of each of the three pillars.
Pillar I, “Saving Lives”, activities in 2007 will include the following:
Ø Meet with selected UN Security Council members (US,
Ø Meet with the Belgium Mission to the UN in
Ø Write Op-Eds and newspaper articles for major media outlets alerting the public about the humanitarian conditions in the DR Congo and urging support for humanitarian funding
Ø Write press releases, develop an on-line activism strategy, and initiate a letter-writing campaign targeting U.S. Government offices following the release of the 2007 budget in February
Ø Develop on-line “Take Action” campaigns that permit citizens to contact their elected officials in support for funding for the DR Congo
Ø Develop a “Post-Card Campaign” targeting major donor nations to support the 2007 Humanitarian Action Plan
Ø Participate in
Ø Create and participate in grassroots events, vigils, and interfaith events highlighting the plight of people in the DR Congo.
Pillar II, “Keeping People Safe”, activities in 2007 will include the following:
Ø Contact the UN Security Council members through letters or Aria Formula urging an expanded mandate for MONUC See Annex A for our letter to the Security Council
Ø Work within the World Bank MDRP Structure to provide timely information about their DDR program and the inclusion or not of children
Ø Contact male celebrities to record radio statements speaking out against rape to be played on Radio Okapi in the DR Congo
Ø Work with organizations that have in-place awareness programs and school programs about land mines, child sorcery, and other child-related security concerns with a goal to disseminate the information nation-wide through the national school system.
Ø Hold an inter-faith dialogue to raise awareness about gender-based violence in the DR Congo
Ø Join the 2007 “16 Days” campaign against violence towards women
Ø Supply the Congo Global Action website with timely information about gender-based violence, child soldiers, and other security issues in the DR Congo
Ø Participate in grassroots activities aimed at educating the public worldwide about violence towards women and security concerns in the DR Congo
Pillar III, “Ending Economic Exploitation”, activities in 2007 will include the following:
Ø Pressure the World Bank and OECD governments to review their
contracts and uphold international standards
Ø Explore the possibility of having the European Union trade commission hold a hearing on the role and policy of EU based companies that have contracts in the DR Congo
Ø Facilitate the convening of an intergovernmental panel of arbitration of specialists to receive complaints, analyze reports, and make recommendations
Ø Work with the World Bank to convene a Special Panel to examine their investment in DR Congo-based development-aimed extractive projects
Ø Nominate one DR
Ø Educate and mobilize civil society in the
March 8 - International Women's Day to organize a radio show on
affiliate, DC based WPFW focusing on the impact of economic exploitation
of the
March 9-12 - Ecumenical Advocacy Days 2007
April 8-13th - The end of the first 100 days of the new DRC government
April 25th - the anniversary of the Clean Diamond Trade Act to work with
coalition members to support advocacy opportunities on
June 30 -DRC Independence day to develop a grassroots media focused
activity
December 10 - International Human Rights Day to develop a grassroots
media focused activity
Ø Develop a corporate target and campaign which will use investor-based and grassroots strategies to exert leverage on companies operating in the DRC
Phase II Activities
Phase II will focus on capacity building, fundraising, and direct engagement of public officials. The coalition will work to strength newer member organizations and grassroots groups and efforts that have come together as a result of its education and advocacy efforts in Phase I. As a result, advocacy efforts will be more driven by these groups as they continue to focus on achieving the objectives of the three pillars.
- Training and Mentoring
Targeted trainings and workshops will be developed for coalition members that exhibit a high level of commitment to and skill for advocacy on the three pillars and grassroots organization. These promising individuals will be identified from the Congolese organizations and newly formed grassroots organizations in particular. Training would be provided in the coalition’s main activities: communications and outreach; influencing policy makers; grassroots organizing; and fundraising. Key training in communications and outreach would include use of the media, public speaking, strategic messaging, and writing of editorials and press releases. Techniques for effective lobbying and interaction with elected representatives and policy makers as well as policy formation will also be taught. Effective grassroots organizing skills would include how to engage the community and how to hold an effective “stunt” or protest. Fundraising training would include the creation and implementation of fundraising strategies and management and hosting of fundraising events. These trainings would also provide an opportunity for these individuals to have access to experts for ongoing policy briefings and updated information from the field.
These individuals will also be matched up with more experienced members of the coalition who will serve as mentors. Mentorship will provide a more structured yet inexpensive way for coalition leaders to share their experience and knowledge, provide advice and strengthen the network. It is envisioned that the main methods of communication will be email, instant messaging and phone. The annual conference will provide an opportunity for in-person interaction. Members will also be encouraged to have additional face to face meetings to the extent possible. The coalition will explore funding opportunities for other workshops and gatherings as well.
- Internships
Professional internships are often a good opportunity for organizations and individuals with similar goals to learn from each other first hand and strengthen their working relationship. The majority of the founding members and organizations are well-established, professional organizations from which the Congolese and newly formed grass roots organizations could learn a great deal by observing and working with them firsthand.
Founding members and organizations will identify opportunities in their programs and work plans that would be valuable for other coalition members to visit and participate in. Examples might be fundraising events, trainings, advocacy days, conferences, etc. In addition, depending in which country the internship takes place, the interns can visit other coalition members, grass roots organizations, and policy makers to provide their perspective on the ongoing needs of the DR Congo as well as practice their education and advocacy skills.
Internships would be unpaid. The coalition will work with the participating members to help them identify funding for airfare, accommodation and meals during their stay.
- Fundraising
Congo Global Action will continue to raise funds primarily to support the work and development of Congolese civil society organizations that have solid reputations who are working to achieve the goals of the three pillars. Recipients of the funding would be selected through a competitive grant proposal process.
The initial funds for these grants will be raised through a number of coalition grassroots efforts. Such efforts would include but not be limited to the following:
· The growth of Run for Congo Women. Each year, runs will be added in other
· The holding of national house parties. Coalition members will be asked to hold house parties on a certain day and to invite friends, family and neighbors to contribute a certain amount (for example, the amount that they would spend to go out to dinner).
· A call for front yard fundraisers such as lemonade stands, garage sales, and bake sales
· Organizing concerts or other community events
· Holding Film Nights
- Dialogues with public officials
In the second phase of the coalition’s work, it will be important to engage public officials and policy makers more intensely. This will allow more coalition members to impress upon them their concerns and commitment to the DR Congo as well as engage the officials in creating solutions and committing resources.
This sort of dialogue will be most important in the DR Congo for its peace and rebuilding process. Regular dialogues with their elected officials, whether at the local or national level, will strengthen the democratic process and help citizens and citizens’ organizations to hold their officials accountable. At the same time, a constructive dialogue will likely lead to government officials having a greater understanding of citizens’ concerns and priorities as well as the creation of more appropriate and viable solutions. Such interaction is also likely to be viewed as positive democratic progress by the international community and encourage it to continue investing in the peace and rebuilding of the DR Congo.
At the same time, such activities will have a significant effect in other countries as well. Grassroots organizations will be encouraged to hold dialogues with their elected and appointed national representatives in their home districts. This will allow more people to participate in the discussion and for these elected officials to gain a better understanding of the importance that saving lives, keeping people safe and ending economic exploitation in the DR Congo holds for their constituents.
Lastly, policy makers and public officials from around the world and the DR Congo in particular, who have shown commitment to and support for Congo Global Action’s objectives and activities will be invited to speak at and participate in the annual grassroots conferences and other events to further awareness on critical issues for the DR Congo.
Phase III Activities
Congo Global Action recognizes that nurturing hope and progress in the DR Congo is a long-term effort. Phase III activities will focus on sustaining the progress that has been achieved in the first two phases. As such, the timing and precise activities will depend largely on those results.
Congo Global Action seeks to be a long term supporter of the people of the DR Congo as the country transitions to a self-sustaining healthy, secure and prosperous nation. In order to remain in position to continue its advocacy and support efforts the coalition envisions having a small secretariat with a small, core staff that will take over the day-to-day management of the coalition’s activities. The current coalition committee structure would evolve into a Board of Directors. The Executive Committee would have more oversight function but be less involved in the day to day operations. The same is expected for the other committees. The Board of Directors would be expected to continue their involvement in specific advocacy efforts as well as fundraising.
Perhaps just as importantly, Congo Global Action will seek to share the knowledge, skills and experience gained by its membership with the larger global community seeking to prevent other countries from experiencing the suffering that the DR Congo has. Based on the ideas outlined in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report, "Responsibility to Protect" (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/) Congo Global Action aims to be a founding partner in the creation of a lasting international umbrella organization of dedicated, mobilized citizens, NGOs and policy makers poised to advocate for the prevention and cessation of mass atrocities when governments fail to protect their own citizens. The world is in desperate need of an international institution with a mobilized citizen base, which will pressure our own governments to act as these situations arise. The focus will be general advocacy and situation specific campaigns (for instance Darfur, DR Congo,
Congo Global Action will continue to advocate for the rebuilding of this vast and strategic country, the DR Congo, but we won't stop there.
COALITION STRUCTURE
The founding members of Congo Global Action are committed to building the coalition and have created an organizational structure to advance its mission and implement its activities. The coalition structure will consist of an Executive Committee, a Steering Committee, an Advisory Committee, a working group for each of the three pillars, task oriented working groups, and Associate members. It is important to note that all working groups and committees are made up of volunteers from our member organizations and agencies. Their commitment to this coalition goes above and beyond the duties of their full-time jobs and is a tribute to how strongly Congo Global Action members feel about their work on the DR Congo. The committees and working groups are described below:
Executive Committee
The Executive Committee is responsible for the overall management of the coalition. It is made up of six (later nine) members who are truly passionate about this coalition and were elected democratically and unanimously. They will serve a nine-month term, up for re-election in July, 2007 or these positions will be taken over by paid staff and/or a formal Board of Directors.
The Executive Committee will be responsible for:
· Maintaining the vision and direction of the coalition;
- Coordinating, overseeing and advising the working groups;
- Outreach to coalition members and potential members;
- Launching necessary additional working groups and tasks; and
- Handling all fundraising, and financial and administrative oversight.
Executive Committee Members:
Chair: International Rescue Committee (Shannon Meehan)
Vice Chair: Coalition Pluraliste de Patriotes Congolais (Nita Evele)
Run for
Friends of the
International Rescue Committee –
Please see Annex C for background on the Executive Committee members.
Steering Committee
The Steering Committee’s primary responsibility is to provide leadership and direction in the coalition’s efforts to achieve the three pillars as well as other activities. It is made up of those individuals who are dedicated to the coalition and willing to put in the time and effort to remain active in the coalition. Each pillar working groups has selected a chair and vice-chair to coordinate the activities.
Specifically, the steering committee will:
- Create and draft the policy statements for the assigned pillar
- Lead and coordinate the direction and activities of the three pillars;
- Vet all public statements by the coalition;
- Advise, lead and coordinate necessary additional working groups and tasks;
- Create grassroots activities for community outreach; and
- Participate in all biweekly Friday conference calls.
Advisory Committee
The Advisory Committee is made up of individuals who may not have the time to be part of the steering committee, but are available for consultation on projects concerning their areas of expertise and interest. These individuals represent the organizations that have full membership in the coalition. In particular, the committee members will:
- Be available and responsive when approached by a member of the coalition;
- Stay informed about issues affecting the DR Congo, and share our message at every opportunity; and
- Authorize all public statements by the coalition.
Associate Members
These members are organizations and individuals, who strongly support the mission of Congo Global Action and who, for whatever reason, feel they cannot sign their name to coalition documents, statements, or activities, but are willing to provide behind-the-scenes advice, assistance and/or financial support for the efforts of the coalition.
Working Groups
In order to effectively accomplish specific goals in our advocacy for the DR Congo, coalition members have divided into six working groups. Working groups include representatives from organizations of all sizes and types. The complex messages they have created are informed by policy experts that will not only be used to target policy makers, but can also be adapted to be more accessible for grassroots mobilization. Each group meets regularly and has developed a set of goals and a plan of action for achieving those goals.
There is a working group for each of the three pillars:
- Pillar I: Saving Lives
- Pillar II: Keeping People Safe
- Pillar III: Ending Economic Exploitation
These groups are responsible for creating and implementing the action plan for each pillar.
In addition, there are three task-based working groups:
· Media, Communications and Website. This group is currently designing the website and researching media possibilities.
· Grassroots Organizing. This group is currently planning grassroots activities for 2007 and creating downloadable tools for community activities.
· Hope for
Figure 1: Current Coalition Structure
Associate Members (Input) Advisory Committee
Budget Narrative
This budget reflects funding for the two primary objectives of the Congo Global Action Coalition:
1. To have full-time staff to manage the growing membership, pillar messaging, communications and grassroots activities for at least 12 months.
2. To hold three Regional Conferences to solidify and galvanize the global movement for action on the DR Congo.
We have organizations that will donate the office space for the staff members, for example, the IRC offices in
In addition, African Faith and Justice Network (AFJN) is willing to be the fiscal sponsor where the coalition’s fundraising can be housed under a separate bank account within AFJN under their 501 (c3) status until the Coalition is firmly rooted in structure and funding.
It is important to note that the working groups and pillar work is done via volunteered time by many people from all across the coalition’s membership.
A detailed budget is attached. The following is a description of the costs and their intended results.
Staffing Requirements
Regional Outreach Coordinators
We would hire these positions in phases that best suit the needs of each region and these positions will all respond to outreach not only in their specific location but coordinate globally. Please see attached job description in Annex D.
The Coalition has budgeted fringe benefits at 30 percent to provide a competitive benefits package and to cover related employment taxes as stipulated by each country’s labor law.
Total Staffing Requirements are estimated to be 243,750 USD.
Office Requirements
Initial equipment and supplies
Each regional coordinator will be equipped with a basic work station set up. This will include a laptop computer and software, a printer, chair, desk, mobile phone, and initial office supplies. A laptop and mobile phone will be particularly important as it is envisioned this position will undertake significant travel within his/her region.
Recurring Office Costs
As stated previously, office space for each of the coordinator will be provided free of charge by member organizations. We estimate this in-kind contribution has a value of 600 USD per month per coordinator resulting in a total contribution of 21,600 USD for the year.
The coalition anticipates significant communication needs for each of the coordinators. This includes internet access, mobile phone service coverage and conference calls.
We have also budgeted for basic office supply needs on a monthly basis.
Other Costs
Legal Fees:
Congo Global Action will have to be legally registered so that it may employ staff and accept donations. We anticipate that the legal fees associated with this registration will be donated and have an estimated value of 2,500 USD per country for a total of 7,500 USD.
Website Design & Branding Development:
There will be initial costs for licensing and full website development and training of staff to maintain the site. The coalition anticipates receiving donated services for the maintenance of the website once it is set up.
Database Maintenance:
Subscription to a robust database program and interactive website tools such as those provided by Democracy in Action or GetActive are necessary for managing constituency information, allowing for an interactive website, and for website maintenance. The cost for a year of these services has been estimated at 6,300 USD.
Total Office Requirements and Other Costs are estimated to be 143,540 USD.
Staff Travel
The coalition coordinators will be required to travel within their regions for outreach and networking. We have estimated four trips per year per coordinator.
Washington, DC Coordinator: this coordinator would make trips around the United States to large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia and Houston, as well as cities with large and active student populations such as Boston, San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Ann Arbor, Durham, Atlanta, etc. for outreach to Diaspora groups, student chapters, and active community groups, and for organizing grassroots activities.
Regional airfare has been estimated at 550 USD for travel within Africa, Europe and the
Total Staff Travel requirements are estimated to be 14,100 USD.
The Grassroots Conferences
Meals
Breakfast, lunch, dinner and two coffee breaks will be provided on each of the three days of the three conferences for all participants. This will result in a cost of 107,250 USD per conference.
Program Requirements
Conference packages with advocacy and documentary materials will be provided to participants at each of the three conferences. Printing will be done in black and white for cost savings. The coalition estimates these to cost approximately 3,330 USD per conference.
Communications and outreach will be necessary to inform conference participants and ensure smooth organization of the conference. We estimate the associated costs to be approximately 3,330 USD per conference.
T-shirts, buttons and other small advocacy and promotional items will be provided to the participants in recognition of their participation and commitment to the coalition’s goals. These will also be of use to them when they are back in their home communities and educating fellow citizens on the issue of the DR Congo. We estimated T-shirts to cost 5,336 USD per conference and buttons and other materials to total 850 USD per conference.
Audio/ visual equipment will be required for many of the conference sessions. The coalition will borrow from its membership organizations to the extent possible. However, rental at the conference will be necessary. We have budgeted 2,000 USD per conference for this requirement.
Two keynote speakers will be invited to address the participants at each conference. The coalition will cover their travel and accommodation. A small honorarium is also budgeted. The total anticipated cost is 4,000 USD per conference.
Travel Scholarships for Participants
Recognizing that not all participants will have the means to cover the cost of travel to the conference, the coalition envisions providing travel scholarships for 10% of participants. We have budgeted regional airfare at 350 USD per trip for approximately 60 participants per conference. This comes to a total of 21,000 USD per conference.
We have also budgeted three nights of accommodation at 100 USD per night per participant per conference for these selected scholarships. This is a total of 18,000 USD per conference.
The coalition would like to ensure that Civil Society representatives from the
The attendance of senior coalition members will also be essential for conducting coalition business and networking with coalition members. Congo Global Action will cover the travel costs for these members.
For the
One roundtrip airfare from Africa to
Three roundtrip airfares from the
For the
One roundtrip airfare from Africa to
One roundtrip airfare from Europe to
One roundtrip airfare the West Coast to
For the
One roundtrip airfare from Europe to
Three roundtrip airfares from the
Total costs for the Grassroots Conferences will be 576,558 USD.
Value of Donated Services and in-kind Contributions
As previously noted, the coalition anticipates receiving donated services and in-kind contributions from its members and others. Currently, we have factored in the following:
- Office space for each coordinator estimated at 600 USD per month for a total of 21,600 USD for the first year
- Donation of legal services and use of 501 c 3 for registration and receipt of donations estimated at 2,500 for each country
- Membership support to the conferences and the coalition structure at approximately 100,000 USD.
This results in a total value of 129,100 USD in donated services/ in-kind contributions.
Therefore,
Annex A:
January 31, 2007
Dear Ambassador,
We, the Congo Global Action, are a collection of humanitarian, human rights, environmental and faith-based organizations, students, Congolese Diaspora and grassroots organizations. With a membership base of over half a million people, our organizations are coming together to advocate for the Democratic Republic of Congo and to urge increased local and international response.
One of our key points is to advocate for the renewal and expansion of MONUC (the UN peace-keeping force in the DR Congo) and security sector reform.
It is widely known to our organizations and our members in the DR Congo that the national army remains the most prominent perpetrator of human rights violations today. Its tactics and methods create acute humanitarian crises and contribute to the displacement of civilians, especially during harvest times. These tactics only serve to compound the human suffering in the Eastern portion of the country today.
It is, therefore, crucial that MONUC remain in the DR Congo, and their new mandate focuses on the following priorities:
- MONUC must concentrate its efforts to train the National Army and Civilian Police on the international standards, including human rights and humanitarian responsibilities that they are sworn to protect.
- MONUC must do all it can to assist the DR Congo to achieve the necessary skills and capacity at all government levels to address conflict without a return to arms and further human suffering.
- MONUC must exert political pressure and work with the newly elected government to ensure that any human rights violations or abuses to civilians by police and/or national army are deemed illegal and unacceptable and that perpetrators will be held accountable. MONUC must play a key role in ending the impunity that currently pervades DR Congo.
- MONUC must report publicly on arms trafficking in DR Congo. The United Nations presence in the DR Congo is in the best position to highlight violations of the arms embargo and the trade of illegal arms. They must take the necessary action to end the flow of arms and put in place mechanisms that ensure safeguards against further illicit weapons trade.
The above actions, combined with the imposition of MONUC’s exit strategy must be linked to measurable improvements in the lives of Congolese people. We believe that the UN’s actions in combination with the
Now is the time for the United Nations Security Council to support the DR Congo by strengthening and extending MONUC’s mandate. The extreme conditions in the DRC require determined and well planned intervention by MONUC and the entire International Community.
We, the undersigned organizations, urge the United Nations Security Council to strengthen and expand MONUC’s mandate in order to effect an unprecedented change during the most crucial period in the history of DR Congo.
List of NGOs:
Annex B: Conference Schedule
Conference Schedule
Friday
3:00 pm - 7:00 pm Registration and exhibit hall open
6:00 pm - 7:00 pm Reception and Dinner
7:00 pm - 8:30 pm Keynote speaker and Film
8:30 pm – 10:30 pm Film Screening of