Congo Global Action / Action Mondiale pour le Congo

Democratic Republic of the Congo: NGOs Ignoring Crisis in North Kivu

2007-07-24T11:59:00.000-04:00

July 18, 2007

Contacts: Rick Neal and Sayre Nyce
ri@refugeeesinternational.org or 202-828-0110

Refugees International Bulletin

Democratic Republic of Congo: NGOs Ignoring Crisis in North Kivu

More than 160,000 Congolese have abandoned their homes since January 2007, when Tutsi warlord Laurent Nkunda, fresh from a peace deal brokered by his patron, Rwanda , began deploying troops across the eastern province of North Kivu . Quick action has brought immediate relief for some, but few humanitarian organizations, despite the availability of funding, have stepped forward to help as the crisis deepens and needs grow more acute.

The surge in displacement in North Kivu has been a predictable, if disturbing, aberration from the general progress made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) towards peace and recovery from war. The United Nations estimates that, cumulatively, 163,000 have fled since January, including thousands in the past week alone, and that another 170,000 could be displaced by the end of the year. The most affected areas are the territories of Rutshuru and Masisi in the southern part of the province, surrounding the city of Goma .

For some time, the population has lived with extortion and human rights abuses from two sides: the Congolese national army (the FARDC) and the remnants of the Hutu regime that orchestrated the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (the FDLR). Laurent Nkunda and his troops make up a third force, which is now the most serious threat to civilians. Nkunda, supported by Tutsi-dominated Rwanda , is a renegade from the Congolese army and has long resisted efforts to integrate his Tutsi fighters with the FARDC and see them dispersed across the country.

The first wave of displacement occurred in January 2007 when Nkunda deployed troops rapidly into Rutshuru and Masisi. The arrival of Tutsi soldiers allied with Rwanda terrified the local Hutu population, and tens of thousands left their homes and fields for the safety of areas held by the FARDC. Nkunda's troops used the announcement of a formal FARDC offensive against the FDLR in April 2007 as an excuse to target civilians, accusing them of collaborating with the FDLR, and provoking a second wave of displacement. A third wave is now underway as the FDLR retaliates, accusing civilians in turn of collaborating with Nkunda.

One particularly hard-hit area lies to the north of Goma between Kiwanja and Nyamilima, near the border with Uganda . Abandoned villages line the road while the people hide in the forest, surviving as best they can. Tens of thousands have made their way to Nyongera, Kinyandoni, and Ngwenda, just north of Kiwanja, where they have found shelter with host families or in camps. Faced with the influx, residents have opened their doors, sharing their limited resources, which are already under strain due to drought. As one woman, who gave over part of her house to a family of six, explained, no one from the government or the humanitarian community has asked her what she needs or offered to help.

In some areas, many of the displaced, if not their hosts, do receive initial assistance. The World Food Programme (WFP) in North Kivu has dramatically improved its operations over the past year, and it strives to provide a full ration of food (2,100 calories per day) each month for 11,550 households in Rutshuru Territory . Many displaced also receive basic household items like plastic tarps, buckets, and blankets through the Rapid Response Mechanism, established in 2006 by UNICEF and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to ensure immediate assessment of needs and delivery of aid to newly displaced people in eastern DRC. Solidarités, the implementing agency for the Mechanism in North Kivu , also repairs water systems and installs temporary latrines for the displaced.

Beyond these immediate efforts, however, little help is available. Solidarités, as part of its duties, notifies other agencies of unmet needs, but there is no follow-up. Doctors Without Borders no longer provides free primary care for the displaced in North Kivu , a shift humanitarian actors were at a loss to explain. Those in need of healthcare sell their food rations to pay for care or forgo treatment altogether; in addition, the humanitarian community lost a credible source of data needed to assess the severity of the crisis and plan an effective response. UNICEF has been able to organize an innovative project with the local health department to provide free care, but only in six health centers in Rutshuru. Public health activities are also limited. The displaced do not have mosquito nets to protect themselves against malaria and HIV prevention is ignored, to the extent that some displaced said that they had heard of condoms on the radio but had never seen one.

One of the most serious gaps is in site management, which usually refers to planning and operating large, formal refugee camps. In this context, such camps are unnecessary; needs could be well met in the current arrangement of small, informal sites and host families. Currently, however, the displaced and their leaders are left to fend for themselves in setting up shelters and negotiating with local authorities for help. Registration is chaotic and numbers are inflated in the hope of procuring more assistance, which has the opposite effect as donors mistrust the process. Sites are not protected, with armed soldiers from nearby military camps wandering around at will. There is no screening process for new arrivals, leaving those who might need immediate assistance such as malnourished children, the elderly, pregnant women, and the sick to wait, sometimes for months, for the next distribution of food. Even help to reunite children separated from their families, a common aspect of humanitarian assistance in the DRC, is not assured.

In Masisi Territory , to the west of Rutshuru, even basic assistance is largely unavailable. Solidarités has just begun to visit concentrations of displaced people, but Caritas, WFP's implementing partner, does not have the means to distribute food there, and there is no medical agency to care for the displaced. In Buhabo, near the territorial capital of Masisi Center , the local chief has managed to find housing for the increasing number of displaced people fleeing Nkunda's forces, but his requests for help from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have gone unanswered. Even easily accessible areas, such as Minova, on the shores of Lake Kivu , do not get assistance because agencies working in the area do not have the capacity to respond.

Humanitarian response overall in the Kivus has improved this past year, especially with the advent of the Rapid Response Mechanism. However, the current crisis in North Kivu shows its limitations. When Solidarités had trouble meeting its obligations under the Mechanism because of the unexpectedly large movement of displaced people, UNICEF offered it increased funding to meet their needs. Solidarités refused, citing institutional inability to manage a larger project. UNICEF was then unable to find additional partners who could mobilize quickly to fill the gap. Likewise, Caritas has been denied support from the Pooled Fund, a donor mechanism controlled by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Kinshasa , to improve its capacity to distribute food for WFP. WFP has not been able to find another partner, with the displaced suffering the consequences. OCHA and sectoral lead agencies are simply unable to catalyze an appropriate response to the crisis; coordination of assistance has improved but advocacy is ineffective.

In fact, there are a number of humanitarian agencies, such as CARE International, Action Against Hunger, and Catholic Relief Services, that work in other parts of the Congo - and even other parts of North Kivu - but have not bothered to respond to the needs of the newly displaced. Such an emergency response, following the start of a shift to longer-term development, does not fit with their strategy or does not appear warranted. Needs are always high in the DRC and logistics are difficult. Finding staff is a challenge, and the humanitarian crisis in the DRC has dragged on for years. These explanations, however, are untenable under the circumstances; even insecurity, which is worrisome, has not prevented the United Nations and NGOs such as Solidarités from operating. In the face of ongoing attacks and displacement, the rest of the humanitarian community must shake off its complacency and start meeting its obligations.

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDS:

NGOs immediately assess and respond to unmet needs among the newly displaced in the territories of Rutshuru and Masisi in North Kivu .

The DRC Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA, as well as the US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance and the European Community Humanitarian Office, step up pressure on NGOs to respond immediately to the crisis in North Kivu .

WFP find ways to increase and improve food distribution and monitoring by Caritas or find a new partner.

Medical NGOs begin offering health care to the displaced in Masisi, and NGOs like Oxfam implement public health projects to prevent malaria and AIDS.

UNICEF and Solidarités construct emergency water systems for the displaced north of Kiwanja to pump, treat, and distribute river water.

CARE International or other qualified organizations, led by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, intervene quickly in site management, to support committees representing the displaced, ensure proper registration, protect camp sites, and screen new arrivals for those needing immediate assistance.

Advocates Rick Neal and Sayre Nyce visited North Kivu in June 2007.

We need your help to audit the US Government’s assistance to the DRC!

2007-07-24T11:47:00.000-04:00

Read the follow message and submit your reports and comments to Farhanaz Kermalli at KermalliF@gao.gov. Please reflect on your experiences in the DRC as the GAO will not be able to make it to the field the GAO while writing this report. Attached you will find a copy of the text of S.2125 (now Public Law 109-456) and the roundtable invitation sent to a few operational NGOs, human rights groups and think tanks.

S.2125—The Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006—was signed into law by President Bush on December 27, 2006. One of the legal requirements set forth by the Act was for a Report to be written on progress toward the 15 policy goals established by S. 2125 within a year of the legislation’s enactment. The 15 objectives in the bill cover everything from the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of former combatants; to helping the Government of the DRC meet the basic needs of its people; to halting the high prevalence rate of Gender Based Violence in the DRC. The Report will be written by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the independent and non-partisan agency that studies the programs and expenditures of the U.S. government.

Specifically, the report should include; progress made toward accomplishing the goals set forth by the legislation; a description of any major impediments that prevent their accomplishment; an evaluation of US policies and foreign assistance programs designed to accomplish the objectives and; recommendations for improving U.S. policies and programs and any additional bilateral or multilateral actions necessary to promote peace and prosperity in the DRC.

The GAO has called a small roundtable together of operational NGOs, human rights groups and think tanks to discuss these organizations’ perspectives on U.S. policy vis-à-vis the DRC and the major impediments to achieving the policy objectives outlined in S. 2125. In order to keep the discussion manageable, the participant list was limited. However, organizations that were not invited to the roundtable discussion have been provided an email address to send in reports or written comments to those working on the GAO report.

If you would like to contribute your perspective, please keep your remarks consistent with the questions at hand, with a focus on how the U.S. is doing in meeting the 15 goals and what the impediments are that may be preventing it from doing so. Framing your contribution in these terms will assure that it is relevant to the actual research that the GAO is conducting.

Reports and comments can be sent to Farhanaz Kermalli at KermalliF@gao.gov.

Warm Regards,

Kate Phillips-Barasso, CARE

Congo Global Action Member

Here are the S.2125 bill requirements:

SEC. 106. REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING POLICY OBJECTIVES.

(a) Report Required- Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made toward accomplishing the policy objectives described in section 102.

(b) Contents- The report required under subsection (a) shall include--

(1) a description of any major impediments that prevent the accomplishment of the policy objectives described in section 102, including any destabilizing activities undertaken in the Democratic Republic of Congo by governments of neighboring countries;

(2) an evaluation of United States policies and foreign assistance programs designed to accomplish such policy objectives; and

(3) recommendations for--

(A) improving the policies and programs referred to in paragraph (2); and

(B) any additional bilateral or multilateral actions necessary to promote peace and prosperity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .

ENOUGH event in DC, Thursday, July 26th

2007-07-24T11:46:00.001-04:00

Please join ENOUGH, Resolve Uganda , Genocide Intervention Network, the Save Darfur Coalition, and the Congo Global Action Coalition for an update on Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda Thursday, July 26^th 10:30 a.m. at the Center for American Progress. The purpose of this meeting is to set the table for advocacy in the fall by providing a legislative update, and calendar of activities, events and actions items on Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda .

Thursday July 26^th

10:30am-Noon

Center for American Progress, 10th Floor Conference Room

1333 H St. NW

Washington, DC 20005

Map & Directions

Nearest Metro: Blue/Orange Line to McPherson Square or Red Line to Metro Center

If you plan on attending this important meeting please RSVP to Cory Smith at csmith@enoughproject.org

Feature - Child soldiers still fight in Congo's new army

2007-05-24T12:50:00.001-04:00

By Joe Bavier

GOMA, Congo, May 22 (Reuters) - Long after the end of Congo's civil war, child soldier Pierre was told he was finally going home.

The commanders in the renegade army brigade that forced him to fight said he would be free after a deal meant to bring peace to the violence-torn eastern province of North Kivu.

Instead, he was absorbed into the ranks of a new army brigade, one of hundreds of children being hidden within the ranks of Democratic Republic of Congo's government forces, according to the U.N. children's agency UNICEF.

"They lied. They told us we were going to be separated, and we would go to school," said Pierre, 17, after escaping from the Congolese army earlier this year.

"They took us to another base. It was just a way of keeping us from being seen," he said, declining to give his full name.

An estimated 33,000 children were fighting for armed groups at the height of Congo's 1998-2003 war.

Nearly four years after the official end to the conflict, some 4,000 children still remain active in army brigades, local militias and foreign rebel groups mainly in the volatile east, according to the United Nations.

The United Nations accuses five new government army brigades of hiding more than 300 children and sending some into combat, an act human rights campaigners say constitutes a war crime.

Following historic polls last year, President Joseph Kabila, Congo's first democratically elected leader in more than 40 years, vowed to deal with security issues in the east.

The creation of the five so-called mixed brigades was part of a scheme to integrate thousands of fighters loyal to renegade General Laurent Nkunda and end their near three-year campaign against government forces.

But the army initially blocked child protection workers from separating children early on in the process and many were quickly deployed in military operations.

"They are fast. They are brave. They are everything a commander would want. So they are definitely still an asset to the mixed brigades," said Claudia Seymour, child protection officer in North Kivu for Congo's U.N. peacekeeping mission.

THE "LUBANGA EFFECT"

Some rights observers say a new factor may be complicating efforts to separate children from Congo's armed groups.

In January, the Hague-based International Criminal Court decided there was enough evidence to put Congolese militia leader Thomas Lubanga on trial for recruitment and use of child soldiers, making his the first case to go before the new body.

"Anytime armies use children it is a war crime. Governments at the highest level can be held accountable for not removing them from their ranks," said Anneke Van Woudenberg, a senior researcher with U.S.-based Human Rights Watch.

"There's a deliberate strategy now to hide the fact they are committing crimes," she said.

In some cases child soldiers are grouped together and hidden. But underage fighters are also coached by their commanders to say they are over 18, Van Woudenberg said.

It is a phenomenon that's come to be known in Congo as the "Lubanga Effect".

"There aren't any children. We aren't hiding any. Why would we?" Colonel Sultani Makenga, who commands one of the mixed brigades, told Reuters, despite witness accounts and lists of children's names taken at the mixing sites.

But as commanders hamper the efforts of children's advocacy groups, many child soldiers are finding their own way out.

"As of today, we have separated 141 (from the mixed brigades). The majority have escaped. They continue to show amazing courage," Seymour said.

After six children fled his group and the rest were punished as result, Pierre began plotting his own escape.

"In our group there were 25 kids. They took our uniforms and kept us together. I was in charge of guarding the others. I waited until it got dark and I ran away," he said.

"I didn't join up of my own free will, and I never want to be a soldier again."

Providing aid in the Congo

2007-05-18T15:37:00.001-04:00

Source: United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)

Date: 11 May 2007

Providing aid in the Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has long been riven with conflict. Despite the 2003 peace deal that ended years of devastating civil war, violence continues to claim lives and force people from their homes - particularly in the east of the country. Recent outbreaks of hostility in the capital Kinshasa have reinforced the need for effective development work to restore security to the nation and tackle the present humanitarian crisis.

DFID’s goal in DRC is to help the people and Government of the country achieve peace and reduce poverty. Our development programme has increased rapidly in recent years. From spending £5.56 million in 2001-02, we have £62 million available in 2006/7 and spending is set to increase further to £70 million in 2007-8, as long as the transition to democracy remains on track. DFID-funded projects that have achieved notable successes in the country include a HIV/AIDS awareness programme, a joint effort with Oxfam to provide water pumps and therefore clean water to villages, and the provision of vital healthcare to victims of rape.

The key components of DFID’s current programme are:

- To re-establish security and strengthen the justice system in the country;

- To support the transition to democracy, including £35.9 million spent on organising democratic elections;

- To help reconstruct the country by investing in transport links, health and education services;

- To provide humanitarian aid to the millions who need it, with funding going towards providing food and shelter, healthcare, and clean water; and

- To improve the management of the country's rich natural resources to benefit all its people.

Working to beat poverty

DFID is determined to help lay the foundations for the reduction of poverty in DRC. DFID supported a research exercise in 2005 in which 35,700 people were consulted throughout the country. For the first time these people had the opportunity to make their voices heard on what poverty means to them, its causes and what should be done to reduce it. This provided data for the development of the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. DFID has been at the forefront of the development of this important document, and is committed to working with the new government to turn it into real action to tackle poverty across the country.

Useful Maps of Congo - Des Cartes Utiles

2007-05-18T15:34:00.000-04:00

Chers partenaires, veiller trouvez les dernières mises à jours sur le site http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net

A. Cartes thématiques

1. Cartes des zones de santé

Le Service d'Information Humanitaire de OCHA RDC met à votre disposition les cartes de zones de santé:
Zone de santé par province
Date : Mai 2007 - Type : Carte thématique - Thème : Santé - Format : A3
3109 - Zones de santé dans le bas Congo / Kinshasa
3108 - Zones de santé dans l’Oriental
3107 - Zones de santé dans le Equateur
3106 - Zones de santé dans le Kasaï Occidental
3105 - Zones de santé dans le Kasaï Oriental
3104 - Zones de santé dans le Bandundu

2. Carte sanitaire : Taux de malnutrition dans les zones de santé

Cette carte a été réalisée suite à une enquête nutritionelle menée par l'organisation Action Contre la Faim ACF

3026 - Activité des projets RRM, PEAR et Protection Monitoring
Date : Mai 2007 - Type : Carte thématique - Theme : Humanitaire - Lieu : Kivu - Format : A3

3. Carte d'activités humanitaires : Sommaire d'activité du RRM et PEAR - Mars 2007

3026 - Activité des projets RRM, PEAR et Protection Monitoring
Date : Mai 2007 - Type : Carte thématique - Thème : Humanitaire - Lieu : Kivu - Format : A3 - Carte : 3026

Ces cartes sont téléchargeables dans les Cartes thématiques du centre de cartes du site :
http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net/fr/article.php3?id_article=59

B. Catographie à façon

1. Carte d'infrastructures: Etat - réhabilitation - accessibilité des routes

Type de route par provinces
Date : Avril 2007 - Type : Carte à façon - Thème : Infrastructure - Format : A3

· 4206 - Type de route dans l’Orientale
· 4205 - Type de routes dans le Katanga
· 4204 - Type de routes dans le Sud Kivu
· 4203 - Type de routes dans le Nord Kivu
Etat des routes par provinces
Date : Avril 2007 - Type : Carte à façon - Thème : Infrastructure - Format : A3

· 4202 - Etat des routes en Ituri
· 4201 - Etat des routes dans le Katanga
· 4200 - Etat des routes dans le Sud Kivu
Accessibilité des routes par provinces
Date : Avril 2007 - Type : Carte à façon - Thème : Infrastructure - Format : A3

· 4214 - Temps d’accès aux principales localités dans l’Ituri
· 4213 - Temps d’accès aux principales localités dans le Katanga
· 4212 - Temps d’accès aux principales localités dans le Sud Kivu
· 4211 - Temps d’accès aux principales localités dans le Nord Kivu
Accessibilité des routes par provinces
Date : Avril 2007 - Type : Carte à façon - Thème : Infrastructure - Format : A3

· 4210 - Réhabilitation des routes en Ituri
· 4209 - Réhabilitation des routes dans le Katanga
· 4207 - Réhabilitation des routes dans le Nord Kivu
· 4208 - Réhabilitation des routes dans le Sud Kivu

Ces cartes sont téléchargeables dans les Pestation à façon du centre de cartes du site :
http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net/fr/article.php3?id_article=40

Plus d'information sur l'action humanitaire en RDC sur http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -
Service d'Information Humanitaire (HIS)
Bureau de Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires des Nations Unies O C H A
République Démocratique du Congo

[Event] The Congo Independence Day Gathering: Cellphones for Congo

2007-05-18T09:19:00.000-04:00

On Saturday June 30, 2007, The Bayindo Group SA, Cinema 116, in conjunction with the non-profit organization Leja Bulela Incorporated, is hosting a Congolese Independence Day fundraiser entitled “The Congo Independence Day Gathering: Cellphones for Congo. The gathering is to benefit the Kalala Muzeu Health Center initiative spearheaded by Leja Bulela Inc. (www.lejabulela.org). The event will take place at The Assistance League of Southern California located at 1370 North Saint Andrews Place, Hollywood California 90028. There is plenty of free parking adjacent to the building. The event will take place between 2pm and 6pm.

The Kalala Muzeu Health Center is a much needed hospital currently under construction in the Kasai Province of The Democratic Republic of the Congo.

A video presentation on Congo’s recent history, an appreciation ceremony, a presentation on African and West Indian heroes, along with a preview clip from the upcoming movie “Once Upon a Time in the Congo” will be shown at this event.

Admission is $10.00 per person, or $5.00 if a person brings a used cellphone (or cellphones). All collected used cellphones will be turned over to an organization that will be processed into a check totaling the collected value of the used phones and that check will be donated to Leja Bulela Kalal Muzeu Health Center project.

Even though this event will take place in Los Angeles, California , you can still be a part of this initiative. To make this a global participation initiative, any cellphones collected in your local area can be mailed to The Bayindo Group SA office and will be donated in the senders’ name.

For further information, please contact Said Yenga Kakese Dibinga either via email said@thebayindgroup.com or by phone at 1.323.446.7181

"War, Peace and Beyond"

2007-05-17T14:56:00.001-04:00

W. Swing: "War, Peace and Beyond"
SRSG William Swing
08 may. 07 - 10.26h
MONUC Chief William Swing held a meeting at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington DC, on May 3 2007. “War, Peace and Beyond” is the title of his exposition where he explains MONUC achievements and the challenges laying ahead not only for this mission but for the whole UN peacekeeping operations.

“WAR, PEACE, AND BEYOND”

I. WAR

A. A New Era for Peace-keeping

At the end of the Cold War, it was common in diplomatic circles to ponder what might most likely fill the ensuing vacuum. It didn’t take long, however, to find the answer. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and today, less than two decades, there have been at least 111_armed conflicts. The vast majority of these were internally driven by clashes over control of a State’s government or territory. In central Africa alone, there have been 11 UN peacekeeping operations in 7 countries since independence, 10 of these since 1990. These conflicts together have cost between 1994 and 2004 in Angola, Burundi, Congo and Rwanda an estimated six million deaths (four million of these in the Congo and one million in Rwanda); countless wounded and HIV infected; more than 5.3 million IDPs; and more than 3.8 million refugees.

These figures do not reflect the incalculable economic and infrastructural destruction of these wars. Since the demise of the Cold War, war or the prospect of war on a global scale or between world powers, thus, has given way to a period of smaller, regional, intra-state conflicts. These conflicts have nonetheless been deadly, partly because of the proliferation of small arms as the downsizing of many armies in the post cold war era resulted in small arms surpluses which headed to the markets, in many cases with loose or no control.

That’s the bad news. There is some good news, however. First, the total number of wars has declined by about 50 percent since the 1990s. Second, whereas from 1946 to 1990, twice as many conflicts ended through victory rather than through negotiation, in contrast, between 1995 and today, negotiated settlements were 3 times as likely to end war as military victory. A recent International Peace Academy study found that “more wars have ended than started since the mid-1980s, reducing the numbers…..of armed conflicts in the world by roughly half .” It notes that 70 percent of these were concluded through negotiation rather than outright victory or defeat. The United Nations has been associated to the resolution of many of the major conflicts.

B. New Skills and New Partners for a New Era

If there is a lesson to be learned from all of this, perhaps the most obvious is that peacekeeping and nation-building skills must urgently be added to traditional war-fighting skills. Certainly, in Haiti, where 21,000 US troops invaded in 1994 in “Operation Restore Democracy” to restore the legitimately-elected President, the US force suddenly had to undertake a range of non-traditional military tasks, including reconstruction, public health and rule of law, in addition to helping maintain public order. In the recently-concluded national and provincial elections in the Congo – the largest elections that the UN has ever assisted – MONUC troops, besides helping provide electoral security, helped distribute electoral materials and undertake many other “extra-curricular” activities in support of the electoral process.

It is essential that UN multi-lateral peace operations be undertaken in close collaboration with regional and sub-regional organizations. This worked well in Haiti, for example, whereby the UN furnished the peace-keeping force and the Organization of American States (OAS) provided the human rights mission with substantial UN financing. In the same vein, in the Congo, despite the heavy UN investment in personnel, aircraft and financing, the process has remained a quintessentially African process. Our two main regional partners, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and, of course, South African President Mbeki, are major players in the process, a process which is unthinkable without them.

In addition, on two occasions, at the United Nations’ request, the European Union came to MONUC’s aid in emergencies: from June to September 2003 in Ituri with “Operation Artemis”, a multi-lateral military force led by France to stabilize the capital Bunia and give the Secretary-General the three months he needed to assemble an Ituri brigade. Again, from July to December 2006, “EUFOR”, a multi-lateral force led by Germany and France, helped MONUC to maintain stability in Kinshasa, especially during the elections. This paradigm could be replicated to give other current and future United Nations missions a temporary surge capacity in emergencies.

As a general policy, the United Nations strongly favours more engagement by regional organizations and actors, as the overall peacekeeping demand outstrips the supply available from any single organization. While doing so, it is important to keep in mind that there can be and often is significant difference from one regional organization to another in terms of mandate, regional coverage, finances, capacity and political acceptance by the parties to a conflict. The United Nations, however, still remains the single organization capable of mounting a multi-disciplinary response under the leadership of a single “commander in theatre” – the SRSG – bringing together political, military, electoral, human rights , humanitarian and other skills under a single strategy in any part of the world.

C. Process becomes the Substance

There is perhaps a further lesson to be learned from the past 20 years, in which negotiations have played a more dominant role; and that is that the process is all-important. If the DRC is taken as an example, it can be argued that the “process becomes the substance”. A credible, effective process is key to meeting most, if not all, peace-keeping challenges. At least three or four elements are essential to a successful process:

* an International Legal Framework (In the case of the Congo, this consists, among others, in 5 major peace agreements and several other regional accords; more than 35 UN Security Council Resolutions; and the International Great Lakes Pact on Security, Stability, Peace and Development.);

* Implementing Mechanisms (MONUC, the International Committee to Accompany the Transition – CIAT; the Tripartite Commission Plus; Joint Verification Commission and Joint Verification Teams; the Eminent Persons Group; the Contact Group, et al.); and

* Financial Resources Commensurate with the Mandate (with some $5 billion invested in the Congolese Peace Process, MONUC is funded at $1 billion per year.)

* Regional support: albeit intra-state, modern conflicts can and often do have regional ramifications. Unsupportive neighbors can play a significant spoiling role. Their commitment to the success of the peace process, on the other hand, can be critical for its success, not least by denying re-supply routes and safe-havens to warring factions, thus pushing them to abandon the military option and sit on the negotiation table.

Yet, there’s also a final element – the most essential of all – the will of a people to be free and to elect freely their leaders. It was true in South Africa in the nineties. It is true today in the Congo.

D. Having a strategy and the required means to implement it

The successes and failures of peacekeeping operations have also taught us several additional lessons: (1) do not go in unless you have the right strategy (mandate), (2) do not go in unless you have the resources to implement this strategy; and (3) one size does not fit all. In Somalia in 1991, the international community moved with appropriate resources to keep the peace, including the presence of well-equipped, trained and supported US-Army troops. The mandate was ill-defined, however, leading to a failure which is known by the public at large as “Black Hawk down”. This, together with the international community’s failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 seriously eroded confidence in peacekeeping. In short, when moving in, it is critical to have both the adequate strategy to “win the peace” and the means to implement it. Finally, there is no “one-size fits all” strategy: each peacekeeping intervention should be conceived in a way that takes into account the specificities of the conflict, the nature and interest of the key national and international players, and the state of regional relations.

II. PEACE

A. Peace-keeping: the United Nations’ Cardinal Role

The United Nations was founded in the aftermath of World War II “to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (United Nations Charter Preamble). Established against a background of the deadliest war in modern times, the United Nations has no more urgent or enduring mandate than that of peacekeeping. And while, as we shall see in the latter part of my presentation, peace is more than the absence of war, a stable peace is the foundation of progress and development.

The study quoted and other recent analyses highlight “of the wars ended since 1988, the United Nations has exercised some peace-building role in half of these, including several in Southern Africa and West Africa”. Further, international “peace operations can help reduce a country’s risk of reversion to war.”

As others have noted, peacekeeping is the most cost-effective means of addressing chaos or reversion to chaos, and “the rise of international peace-keeping deserves significant credit for the decline in civilian deaths since the end of the Cold War.” Recent studies on peace-keeping in Haiti by Rand and the GAO reach a similar conclusion independently.

In one of his first remarks on UN peace-keeping, Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon observed that “no other multi-national actor deploys the same number of military and civilian personnel. No bilateral partner engages in multiple field operations of such scope and contingency.” Taking the Secretary-General’s remarks further, I believe that it is statistically correct to say that (a) the United Nations today is the world’s largest single repository of peace-keeping experience and skill; (b) that the United Nations does peace-keeping more economically than most. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United Nations is currently managing 19 peacekeeping operations on four continents, comprising more than 100,000 personnel drawn from more than 100 countries. More than 70,000 of these are uniformed personnel. Other than the United States, no single State or organization has as many uniformed personnel deployed oversees on the ground under its flag.

The number of such peace operations, some nineteen, is at an all-time high, with more than 100,000 personnel in the field. In 2006 alone, the UN negotiated memoranda of understanding with more than 100 troop contributing countries; MONUC’s military force itself is composed of 52 nationalities and MONUC as a whole has 116 nationalities; the UN transported 800,000 passengers, and 160,000 metric tons of cargo by air; and operated more than 200 hospitals and clinics.

There are other reasons that the United Nations has become the organization of choice for peace-keeping. For example, some governments and organizations have the requisite resources yet may not be perceived as impartial; while others with an image of impartiality may lack the resources. As a Security Council institution, a United Nations peacekeeping mission has both – resources, and an image, reputation and record of impartiality.

B. Exponential Expansion of Peace-keeping

United Nations peace-keeping has entered a period of the greatest expansion since it began formally in 1948. In addition to the nineteen peace-keeping operations already operating globally, new missions are currently under active consideration, including Somalia, Chad, and the Central African Republic. As a result, the global budget for peace-keeping, which operates on assessed-funding, has more than doubled in five years:

2001 -- $2.8 billion;
2007 -- $5.5 billion; and
2008 -- $7 to $8 billion.

To keep this in perspective, however, the total cost of UN peacekeeping since 1948 is still less than $60 billion. What price peace? Costly, by any standard. The most expensive peace, however, is still a better bargain than the cheapest war.

C. Chapter VII -- Aggressive Peace-keeping

By definition, to do peace-keeping, there has to be a peace to keep. Yet, even where there is peace, that is, an end to the fighting, as one person put it so well recently, “in the new international reality, peace is actively made, not passively kept”. So today, there is a trend emerging toward more aggressive peace-keeping whereby the Blue Helmets are authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter “to use all necessary means” to fulfill some aspects of their mandate. Blue Helmets are more likely to use lethal force today in keeping the peace than in earlier decades when Missions were more passive, the classical Chapter VI cease fire observation peacekeeping operations. Being combat-trained, many peace-keepers may find peace-keeping rather frustrating, at least initially. The new pro-active military operations in peace-keeping may help dissipate some of their tension with regard to more traditional peace-keeping.

The outer edges of peacekeeping under Chapter VII mandates can entail considerable risks and require troops with combat experience and capabilities. At the same time, Chapter VII peacekeeping is different from war fighting and requires doctrine, training, tools and techniques uniquely tailored accordingly.

The move from Chapter VI passive, towards Chapter VII robust and aggressive peacekeeping is also a by-product of the end of the Cold War. Indeed, robust international intervention in resolving a conflict is no longer as likely to be vetoed in the Security Council by its permanent members. The resolution of intra-state conflicts is no longer tributary to the preservation of a global equilibrium – or a status quo – between two antagonistic superpowers.

Based on my own modest experience, the move towards robust and more aggressive peacekeeping is a welcome development. Having served as Special Representative in Western Sahara with a Chapter VI mandate and in the Congo, first with a Chapter VI mandate and for the past three years with a Chapter VII mandate, I have a decided preference for Chapter VII as a better means of achieving one’s mandate. A more active, aggressive form of peace-keeping is achieving results in the Congo where it has been partly driven by the very size of our force.

Although our 17,000 strong force is popularly touted as the largest UN peace-keeping force, it is small relative to the size of the country and the challenge – it constitutes the same size force as the UN had in Sierra Leone, which is one twenty-fourth the size of the Congo. MONUC now has attack helicopters and Special Forces; and regularly undertakes joint military operations with the Congolese army (FARDC) against foreign armed elements such as the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. We at MONUC have pushed the Chapter VII envelope further than perhaps any other mission but, in doing so, have always striven to be prudent in order to avoid disproportionate use of force; collateral death or damage; and to avoid increasing the number of internally-displaced persons (IDPs).

Perhaps this current trend toward aggressive peace-keeping has contributed to the phenomenon of an apparent division of labor between the Third World that supplies the lion’s share of UN troops; and Western countries that supply the bulk of the financing. The latter tend to send troops to places such as Kosovo but not to Africa, except for the French to their former colonies. Contrary to popular misperceptions, however, some UN missions are conducting combat operations, with extremely capable forces from countries such as India and Pakistan (which, unfortunately, have had considerable battle experience and certainly more so recently than most western countries), amongst others, equipped with heavy fire-power, and robust mandates and rules of engagement in such places as the DRC and Haiti.

III. BEYOND WAR AND PEACE: THE REAL CHALLENGE

A. While peace is peace-keeping’s proximate objective, peace-keeping is important for other reasons as well. Peace for what, we may ask? One of our most important tasks is to assist with elections. The Secretary-General’s Electoral Assistance Division is arguably the world’s largest repository of cumulative electoral experience, management and hands-on expertise.

The Congo is one of the most recent countries to hold democratic elections. It did so against all odds. The Congolese elections are the largest elections that the UN has supported: The largest country (the size of Western Europe); the largest electorate (25 million); and the largest challenge (no roads; no I.D. cards; no recent census; no multi-party elections in 40 years). In fact, the United Nations has never undertaken anything quite on the scale of the Congolese elections.

As democracy is a process and not merely an event, however, elections in themselves will not insure democracy. Without elections, however, which are events that punctuate the democratic process, a country is unlikely to become a democracy.

A plethora of tasks lie before the Congo -- and before the UN and the international community. A number of the tasks are left over from the transition: establishing a capable, responsible army and civilian police force; justice reform, including courts and prisons and generally helping establish the rule of law; local elections; an end to impunity and corruption; and many, many more issues to be tackled.

B. A “Sustainment Strategy”

A major global challenge to us all in the world community is to remain engaged following successful elections in countries emerging from conflict. Our record as international community in assisting “post-conflict” societies is better than our performance in responding to the immediate requirements of “post-electoral” societies. Ironically, the exponential increase in popular post-electoral expectations too often confronts a countervailing donor tendency to reduce support after successful elections. Since elections constitute the all-vital bridge between peace-keeping and peace-building, continuity of support is vital.

The Congo is a case in point. The rather remarkable international alliance that was built and maintained over the past eight years needs to continue, more than ever. The Congo is a vast, potentially rich country that has no “lead nation” as partner; and daunting challenges await the Congo -- a country in which everything is broken but the human spirit. A country in which everything is a legitimate priority, including SSR; humanitarian crisis; good governance; rule of law; army, police, judicial reform, etc.

Looking back on my time as a diplomat, perhaps my greatest frustration is that as diplomats, we are given issues to resolve that have only a long-term solution, yet we are given short-term commitment and a one-year budget, often as not un-renewable. For Government commitment to peace-keeping to be credible, it would have to be more clearly reflected in budget requests for peace-keeping. And to help our respective governments, we as diplomats would need to make a more compelling case to our parliaments, governments and peoples as to why precisely a certain policy or course of action is in their interest.

In most post-election situations, a “sustainment strategy” – not an exit strategy – is required. For this to happen, a change in our own thinking must occur. The UK’s 10-year commitment, e.g., to help Sierra Leone build a new army reflects a realistic appreciation of the importance of remaining engaged if peace is to become enduring. To insure that Member States’ original investments in “post-conflict” societies achieve permanent positive results, further investment will be needed.

During my four years as ambassador to Liberia, for example, the US provided Liberia half billion dollars in aid; very shortly thereafter, however, this commitment was scaled back. Similarly, as ambassador to Haiti, our aid program to Haiti immediately following the return of President Aristide was $235 million along with a heavy commitment in terms of US troops and political support; gradually, however, within the next year or so, this engagement was drastically reduced, and the results are now well known. In both cases, as well as more recently in East Timor, the international community abandoned the terrain prematurely; and, in each of these instances, peace-keepers had to return not long thereafter, but each time with greater difficulty and at greater expense.

By contrast, the world community remained committed in Sierra Leone, as in Liberia today, well after elections, and the positive results are quite evident. The time has perhaps come to recognize that peace-keeping as a concept and a practical matter is likely to be a permanent fixture in world affairs for some considerable period of time; therefore, support for peace-keeping will require a more sustaining quality than in recent years.

The postulate remains valid that there is no security without development just as there is no development without security. The withdrawal of peacekeepers should be calibrated with the acceleration of development assistance in order to provide “peace dividends” and consolidate the peace. This requires, again, longer-term commitments of the international community to a given process.

C. The Era of the “Big Mission”

None of this will be easy. Besides the global expansion of peace-keeping operations, Member States will be confronted with the new phenomenon of the “big mission”. And now, there are two: the Congo and the Sudan – either of which is larger than all the other countries together in which the UN currently has peace-keeping missions. These are continent-size countries with major populations – the Congo with 60 million, and the Sudan with more than 40 million. The issue then becomes one of cost and sustainability. Member States will increasingly be asked to support peace-keeping missions that have annual budgets of $1 billion or more, that is, $3 million a day. It won’t be easy, but it will increasingly be in our individual and corporate interest to find the means to sustain peace operations in the interest of us all.

CONCLUSION

The Cold War’s demise has ushered in a new era of international activism in which negotiations and peace-keeping are undergoing unprecedented expansion, offering, for perhaps the first time on a global scale, an alternative to force in the settlement of disputes.

To be successful, these peacekeeping operations require new skills, regional partners, and more aggressive Chapter VII operations to protect civilian life. A new approach by Governments is also currently required, one that recognizes peace-keeping as a permanent global concern, both in budgetary and other terms. Admittedly, at a time of exponential expansion of peacekeeping operations, the budgetary implications of these requirements are significant, but not if measured against the considerably greater loss on investment of abandoning “post-electoral” societies prematurely.

2007-05-17T12:26:00.000-04:00

Chers Frères, Chères soeurs du RDC,
Je vous encourage à continuer le combat pour votre chère patrie. Moi je suis une amatrice de l’environnement et je saurais pas vous dire comment la dégradation de l’écosystème forestière est une perte énorme pour le monde. C’est encore révoltant de voir les mines du pays qui ne profitent pas aux nationaux.

Dernièrement un article apparu dans East Africa du
16-22 Avril m’a révolte alors en route sur Nairobi, Voila l’hôtesse qui m’amène un journal que je parcoure
calmement. Un titre attire mon attention: EUROPEAN
LOGGERS PLUNDERING CONGO RAINFOREST FOR TEAK Riduculous : Communities are given gifts such as bags of salt and crates of beer worth less than $ 100.
Alors j’ai lu la suite qui me révèle que des compagnies européennes font signer les locaux des contrats sans que ces derniers connaissent le contenu des contrats. Quant ces mêmes gens crient haut et fort que le monde est menace de changement climatiques alors qu’ils n’hésitent pas de détruire le patrimoine forestier. Vraiment essayons d’agir vite avant qu’il ne soit trop tard. Je ne sais pas comment vous être utile mais je suis à votre disposition.
Bonne chance dans votre combat et a Bientôt

Marie- Ange Kigeme

Where anti-Arab prejudice and oil make the difference

2007-05-17T12:17:00.001-04:00

The contrast in western attitudes to Darfur and Congo shows how illiberal our concept of intervention really is

Roger Howard
Wednesday May 16, 2007
The Guardian

In a remote corner of Africa, millions of civilians have been slaughtered in a conflict fuelled by an almost genocidal ferocity that has no end in sight. Victims have been targeted because of their ethnicity and entire ethnic groups destroyed - but the outside world has turned its back, doing little to save people from the wrath of the various government and rebel militias. You could be forgiven for thinking that this is a depiction of the Sudanese province of Darfur, racked by four years of bitter fighting. But it describes the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has received a fraction of the media attention devoted to Darfur.

The UN estimates that 3 million to 4 million Congolese have been killed, compared with the estimated 200,000 civilian deaths in Darfur. A peace deal agreed in December 2002 has never been adhered to, and atrocities have been particularly well documented in the province of Kivu - carried out by paramilitary organisations with strong governmental links. In the last month alone, thousands of civilians have been killed in heavy fighting between rebel and government forces vying for control of an area north of Goma, and the UN reckons that another 50,000 have been made refugees.

How curious, then, that so much more attention has been focused on Darfur than Congo. There are no pressure groups of any note that draw attention to the Congolese situation. In the media there is barely a word. The politicians are silent. Yet if ever there were a case for the outside world to intervene on humanitarian grounds alone - "liberal interventionism" - then surely this is it.

The key difference between the two situations lies in the racial and ethnic composition of the perceived victims and perpetrators. In Congo, black Africans are killing other black Africans in a way that is difficult for outsiders to identify with. The turmoil there can in that sense be regarded as a narrowly African affair.

In Darfur the fighting is portrayed as a war between black Africans, rightly or wrongly regarded as the victims, and "Arabs", widely regarded as the perpetrators of the killings. In practice these neat racial categories are highly indistinct, but it is through such a prism that the conflict is generally viewed.

It is not hard to imagine why some in the west have found this perception so alluring, for there are numerous people who want to portray "the Arabs" in these terms. In the United States and elsewhere those who have spearheaded the case for foreign intervention in Darfur are largely the people who regard the Arabs as the root cause of the Israel-Palestine dispute. From this viewpoint, the events in Darfur form just one part of a much wider picture of Arab malice and cruelty.

Nor is it any coincidence that the moral frenzy about intervention in Sudan has coincided with the growing military debacle in Iraq - for as allied casualties in Iraq have mounted, so has indignation about the situation in Darfur. It is always easier for a losing side to demonise an enemy than to blame itself for a glaring military defeat, and the Darfur situation therefore offers some people a certain sense of catharsis.

Humanitarian concern among policymakers in Washington is ultimately self-interested. The United States is willing to impose new sanctions on the Sudan government if the latter refuses to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force, but it is no coincidence that Sudan, unlike Congo, has oil - lots of it - and strong links with China, a country the US regards as a strategic rival in the struggle for Africa's natural resources; only last week Amnesty International reported that Beijing has illicitly supplied Khartoum with large quantities of arms.

Nor has the bloodshed in Congo ever struck the same powerful chord as recent events in Somalia, where a new round of bitter fighting has recently erupted. At the end of last year the US backed an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to topple an Islamic regime that the White House perceived as a possible sponsor of anti-American "terrorists".

The contrasting perceptions of events in Congo and Sudan are ultimately both cause and effect of particular prejudices. Those who argue for liberal intervention, to impose "rights, freedom and democracy", ultimately speak only of their own interests. To view their role in such altruistic terms always leaves them open to well-founded accusations of double standards that damage the international standing of the intervening power and play into the hands of its enemies.

By seeing foreign conflicts through the prism of their own prejudices, interventionists also convince themselves that others see the world in the same terms. This allows them to obscure uncomfortable truths, such as the nationalist resentment that their interference can provoke. This was the case with the Washington hawks who once assured us that the Iraqi people would be "dancing on the rooftops" to welcome the US invasion force that would be bringing everyone "freedom".

Highly seductive though the rhetoric of liberal interventionism may be, it is always towards hubris and disaster that it leads its willing partners.

· Roger Howard is the author of What's Wrong with Liberal Interventionism

U.N. Extends Congo Peacekeeping Mission

2007-05-17T12:16:00.001-04:00

By EDITH M. LEDERER
Associated Press Writer

UNITED NATIONS — The Security Council voted unanimously Tuesday to extend the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo until the end of the year while calling for a timetable to gradually withdraw the nearly 18,000-member force.

The resolution extending the force's mandate deplored outbreaks of violence earlier this year and urged the government and opposition to remain committed to reconciliation and democracy. It demanded that all militias and armed groups in volatile eastern Congo lay down their arms.

The mineral-rich central African nation has been wracked by years of war and decades of dictatorship. Last year, the country held its first free elections in more than 40 years, but the government led by President Joseph Kabila remains fragile.

The council stressed the Congolese government's primary responsibility for ensuring security and protecting civilians, and urged that state to extend its authority throughout the country.

It authorized the U.N. force to help the government protect civilians, report on the movement of armed groups, deter any attempt by armed groups to threaten the political process and train law enforcement authorities.

The U.N. mission was also authorized to support efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and promote national reconciliation and human rights.

The resolution authorized the force "to use all necessary means within the limits of its capacity" to carry out its mandate, extended until Dec. 31.

Last month, the council expressed "grave concern" about the loss of lives, especially civilians, in March 22-25 clashes between Congolese security forces and guards of Senator Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former warlord who was runner-up in the presidential election. Dozens were killed in the bloodshed.

The resolution adopted Tuesday "exhorts the democratically elected authorities to respect the space and role conferred on the opposition parties by the constitution in order to ensure their effective participation in the national political debate."

Congo's U.N. Ambassador Atoki Ileka said the government had asked Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to come up with a plan for the gradual withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission, which is the U.N.'s largest.

He said that in the short term, the mission should remain at full strength, but in the long run "it's good to have an exit strategy."

The resolution asks Ban to submit a report by Nov. 15 with benchmarks and a timetable for the gradual withdrawal of the force.

http://www.ajc.com/news/content/shared-gen/ap/Africa/UN_Congo.html

CongoFest Summer Games’07 in Los Angeles, California

2007-05-08T14:09:00.000-04:00

The Congolese Communities of California, in association with ASCO, Inc. (Association Sportive Congolaise), with the support of the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Congo, is proud to bring CongoFest Summer Games’07 to Hollywood_California, from Thursday, June 28th to Sunday, July 1st, 2007 at the following venues:

- Lawndale High School Soccer Fields (Soccer Games and Outdoor functions);
- Crowne Plaza Hotel at L.A.X (Diner receptions);
- Hollywood Park Casino (Live Concert and Grand Finale Independence Reception)

The four days festivities, from 06/28/2007 to 07/01/2007, will commemorate simultaneously the 47th Anniversary of the Independence of the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as the 7th Annual Congolese Summer Soccer games, regrouping teams from 14 states (U.S) and 2 teams from Canada.
Given the magnitude of this year’s event(3-4,000 anticipated attendees), all contacts have been made with local as well as media from the Congolese diaspora from Canada, England, Belgium, France and D.R Congo to attend, and broadcast the festivities to their respective areas of coverage.
The following activities will provide to our guests and sponsors, we believe, a unique and pleasant experience amongst the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Africa in general:

• Soccer Tournament (Organized by ASCO).
• Fashion Show.
• African Art & Photo Expo.
• Kidz’n Hollywood Entertainment.
• Fundraising Dinner.
• Live performance by Gospel singers.
• Live performance by Leading Congolese Artists.
• Women Health Seminar.
• Grand Finale Dinner Party.
• Congolese Business Expo.
• Taste of Congo ( A daily tasting experience of various cuisine from the Democratic Republic of Congo).

- Lawndale High School Soccer Fields (Soccer Games and Outdoor functions);
- Crowne Plaza Hotel at L.A.X (Diner receptions);
- Hollywood Park Casino (Live Concert and Grand Finale Independence Reception)

We would like your organization to be apart of this Special 3-day Event.

CongoFest Summer Games, now in its 6th year, is a socio-economical and cultural 3-day event during the Summer, organized by ASCO, Inc. in collaboration with Congolese Communities throughout the United States of America, with the main objective to Uplift our Sense of Community and encourage the Congolese Diaspora to Make a Difference and Become Involved in the Reconstruction of our beloved country, the Democratic Republic of Congo.

As in previous years, the festivities will coincide with the anniversary of the Independence of the Democratic Republic of Congo (47th). Though the main attraction during the day remains our much anticipated 6th Annual Congolese Summer Soccer games, opposing approximately 15 teams from 15 cities/ states of the U.S.A., we have also planned a series of activities ranging from children’s activities, fashion show, women’s health seminar, African business forum, gospel concert, a taste of Congolese Cuisine, a fundraising dinner for the Dikembe Mutombo Foundation as well as live performance concert by a list of local African artists.

Given the magnitude of this year’s event (more or less than 2,500 anticipated attendees), we believe MoneyGram International, Inc. and other organizations can certainly use the exposure, and take advantage of this opportunity to present its line of products to the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and ultimately increase its brand awareness among Congolese and other African guests sending money home on a daily basis. Additionally, we will create a souvenir brochure highlighting the memorable moments of CongoFest_Summer Games’07.

For the Congolese Communities of California (Home of CongoFest Summer Games’07) and ASCO, Inc,

Jules Boyele (President of CCSC)
Hughes Efole (Project Director)
Serge Kabeya (Treasurer)
Dennis Somanza (Public Relations)
Ben Mandela (Public Relations)

CongoFest Comes to Hollywood_Summer’07

Dozens killed in DRC military offensive

2007-05-08T13:05:00.000-04:00

http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?from=rss_Central%20Africa&set_id=1&click_id=136&art_id=nw20070502215442565C652770

May 03 2007 at 12:19AM

Kinshasa - At least 42 Rwandan Hutu rebels and four government soldiers have been killed in a crackdown by the Democratic Republic of Congo's military in the strife-torn east, the UN said on Wednesday.

The FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda rebel group) have lost at least 42 men, while four DR Congo soldiers have died in a combat zone north of the eastern town of Goma, it said.

The United Nations, which released casualty figures provided by the army, is not taking part in the operation, which is being carried out by soldiers and former rebels.

DRC soldiers began the offensive in North Kivu last week, deploying six battalions, or about 3 500 men, to secure two arterial roads linking the town of Goma, the regional capital, and Ishasha on the Ugandan border.

The violence has prompted hundreds to flee their homes

On April 16, suspected FDLR rebels attacked a minibus on the road between Goma and Ishasha, killing a student. Three days earlier, they exchanged gunfire with DRC soldiers on the same road.

The violence has prompted hundreds to flee their homes.

Gabriel de Brosses, a spokesperson for the UN force in Congo (MONUC), said about 890 people had been displaced by the latest fighting.

Andrew Zadel, of the UN office for the co-ordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA), said it was "very difficult to have a clear idea of population movements in the war zone as humanitarian workers lack access."

He said that more than 113 000 people had been displaced since the start of the year in the province of North Kivu, of which Goma is the capital.

Rwandan Hutu fighters, estimated to be about 10,000-strong by the United Nations, are still present in eastern DR Congo.

They led 14 attacks in April in the Walungu and Kabare areas, according to Kemal Saiki, a MONUC spokesperson.

Another 72 people were kidnapped and several rapes were reported.

Some of the rebels are accused of having participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. About 800 000 people, most of them ethnic Tutsis, were killed within six weeks in Rwanda by members of the Hutu ethnic group. - Sapa-AFP

UNHCR launches plan to help Congolese refugees return from Zambia

2007-05-08T11:23:00.001-04:00

MWANGE REFUGEE CAMP, Zambia, May 3 (UNHCR) – More than 400 Congolese refugees who had sheltered in Zambia headed back to their homes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on Thursday as the UN refugee agency launched a three-year voluntary repatriation programme.

"This is a historical day because it marks the start of the organized voluntary repatriation of Congolese refugees from Zambia," said Vedasto Mwesiga, UNHCR acting representative in Zambia. "Having just concluded the repatriation of Angolan refugees in January this year, today is the beginning of yet another milestone in our search for durable solutions for refugees in this country."

The ceremony at the refugee camp near the DRC border in the north of Zambia followed negotiations between UNHCR and the two governments over the details of the programme, which they agreed to continue until the end of 2009.

Senior Zambian government officials attended the departure of the first convoy with 414 returning refugees headed to the Zambian town of Mpulungu on eight buses and four trucks. They will leave Zambia by boat on Friday and travel along Lake Tanganyika to the DRC port of Kalemie.

"We plan to repatriate up to 20,000 Congolese refugees in 2007," Mwesiga said. "Zambia currently hosts about 60,967 Congolese refugees. A total of 43,854 are in camps – more than 21,000 in Mwange and 19,000 in Kala – 2,113 in urban areas and 15,000 spontaneously settled outside the camps."

Mwesiga said refugees had to make their own decisions on whether to return to DRC, but UNHCR believes most will repatriate because of the improved security in their homeland. The country last year held democratic elections after years of bloody conflicts. The minister of Zambia's Northern Province, Lameck Chibombamilimo, called on Congolese refugees to return home and join in rebuilding their country.

About 300 Congolese refugees sheltering in Mozambique have also requested UNHCR assistance to return home and are expected to depart over the next two months. Thirteen Congolese refugees returned from Malawi earlier in the week.

The start of the Congolese repatriation follows the successful completion of a four-year voluntary repatriation to Angola, mainly from Zambia and DRC. The programme officially ended in December, but the last of the nearly 410,000 Angolan returnees were flown home in March. Of those, nearly 139,000 refugees returned with the assistance of UNHCR – including 71,000 from Zambia.

"UNHCR will work strenuously with the government, the International Organization for Migration and implementing partners to ensure that there are steady, expeditious and regular repatriation convoys to Congo in accordance with set international standards," Mwesiga said.

The voluntary repatriation programme to DRC is to take place in phases. The initial convoys will take refugees to areas that meet conditions necessary for organised return: they can be reached by road, landmines have been cleared, and basic services such as schools, health clinics and potable water are available.

In areas of DRC not yet suitable for repatriation, UNHCR is working with the government and other partners to prepare them for returns in the coming months.

"I know life back home will be tough but I have to start afresh," said 33-year-old Mambo Sanog, who fled fighting in DRC eight years ago and was returning alone after the death of her husband while in exile. Like all the initial batch of returnees, she had fled from the Kalemie area.

Returnees will spend the first days back in the DRC in a reception centre where they will receive mine awareness training, HIV/AIDS information and any necessary medical assistance.

Before leaving for their home areas, refugees receive food rations, blankets, soap, kitchen items, buckets and a construction kit to assist in rebuilding homes. Later in the year, they will receive seeds and farming tools in their home communities to help them become self-sufficient.

In addition to the Congolese refugees, Zambia hosts about 40,000 Angolans who did not repatriate and nearly 17,000 refugees of other nationalities.

"I wish to underline that over the years, UNHCR continued to receive support, cooperation and excellent relations with the government of Zambia and its people," Mwesiga said. "In the true spirit of African generosity, Zambia kept the asylum door open for persons who genuinely needed protection."

By Kelvin Shimo
in Mwange Refugee Camp, Zambia

Congo ’s Peace: Miracle or Mirage?"

2007-05-08T11:07:00.001-04:00

Jason K. Stearns in Current History

On March 22 this year, the worst fighting that Kinshasa has ever seen broke out between government forces and supporters of the opposition. Hundreds of people lay dead in the streets and opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba announced his departure into exile. Yet some diplomats in the capital played down the violence as a hiccup in the peace
process. “We think,” one of them told me, “these are the death throes of the old war, not the beginning of a new one.”

Many in the international community feel the same way: too much has been accomplished in the more than four years since the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in Pretoria , South Africa , for war to break out again. Indeed, the Democratic R epublic of Congo, once divided among half a dozen warring fa ctions, is now united. A national army has been created. The eight foreign nations at one time involved in the conflict have withdrawn their forces.

Most importantly, in 2006, presidential, national,
and provincial assembly elections took place in the first multiparty polls since 1965. The logic of guns, so the saying goes in Kinshasa , has been replaced by the logic of ballots. The incumbent Joseph Kabila (who had assumed the presidency after the assassination of his fa ther, Laurent Kabila, in 2001) won the 2006 presidential race, and his coalition now dominates parliament and most of the provincial assemblies. There have been other successes: the country has a new, improved constitution; Congo ’s administration and army have been largely unified; security in parts of the country has improved dramatically.

The peace process, however, has been only partially successful. The
elections did eviscerate some rebel groups, but, as the recent fighting demonstrates, new fa ult lines have emerged. Many reforms have been cosmetic: the Congolese state is unified but remains deeply corrupt and abusive. The administration provides almost no social services to the population. And the integrated army is the largest human rights abuser in the country, terrorizing the people it is supposed to protect.

Herein lies the paradox of the transition’s success: in order to avoid alie nating anyone and to keep the shaky political process going, a blind eye has been turned to high levels of corruption and abuse. Impunity has been to some extent the glue of the peace process. This fa ct could undermine the country’s fragile stability.

Peace on Kabila’s terms

The war in Congo has been one of the bloodiest of modern times, leaving an estimated 4 million
dead, largely from disease and hunger. The conflict dates back to 1996, when a coalition of regional powers, including R wanda , Uganda , Angola , and Eritrea , backed an invasion by a rebel group led by Laurent Kabila. They toppled the dying dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, installing Kabila as head of state in May 1997. Fighting resumed in 1998 when Kabila asked his R wandan patrons to leave the country. The R wandans reinvaded, creating a proxy rebel group in the east. Five years of conflict drew in eight countries and spawned a dozen different Congolese armed groups.

The 2002 peace deal succeeded where its many predecessors had fa iled, offering each signatory something better than the status quo. The timing had much to do with this. After years of fighting, R wanda , Uganda , and Zimbabwe were withdrawing their troops from the country, making a military victory for the remaining belligerents almost impossible. For the Congolese R ally for Democracy ( R CD) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), R wanda and Uganda ’s respective proxy forces, the deal provided a lifeline and lucrative positions in the transition. The agreement also elevated the smaller, auxiliary parties—political opposition groups, civil society, and three small rebel movements—from minor players to highranking positions. Finally, by offering Joseph Kabila the presidency and command of the transition, it presented him with peace on his terms and a good
chance of winning the elections.

On the fa ce of it, the deal provided relatively equal terms to the principal belligerents. Kabila had to share power with four vice presidents, and all positions in the executive branch, legislature, and security services were divided among the signatories. However, since Kabila controlled the central state apparatus and most of the country’s revenue—in particular from the mining areas of Katanga and the Kasais—many aspects of the agreement amounted not so much to power-sharing as to an integration of the other parties into Kabila’s administration.

While the army command, for example, was given to the R CD, the powerful maison militaire—the head of state’s cabinet of military advisers— controlled army funds and decision making during the first part of the transition. The 10,000-strong presidential guard was an added asset for Kabila, since it fell under his direct control. Similarly, the political opposition took control of the ministry of mines, but businessmen still had to get presidential approval for major deals. Positions in other institutions— such as the central bank; the supreme court; the two largest stateowned mining companies, MIBA and Gecamines; and the intelligence
service—were not shared among the signatories, despite promises in the peace deal. Kabila simply refused.

This, of course, did not go down well with Kabila’s rivals. The R CD withdrew from the transition process in August 2004; the MLC threatened to do the same in January 2005. However, in both cases, with the international community’s help, Kabila was able to call their bluff. R eal retreat would have forced them into the isolation of their rebel strongholds where, without the military backing of their former patrons, their future would have been questionable. They would also have foregone Kinshasa ’s opulence: each
vice president was allocated $250,000 dollars per month for himself and his staff. Both the MLC and the R CD had 7 ministers and 118 parliamentarians each, making $4,000 and $1,500 per month respectively (several times more than judges’ or doctors’ salaries). Some of the directors of state companies, most of whose jobs were finally shared out by 2005, made as much as $20,000 a month. As a dissident R CD member lamented: “They couldn’t get their hand out of the sugar bowl.”

The weakness of the political parties also favored Kabila. The belligerents had been motivated by self-interest, not by ideology; once in the transition, each leader tried to fend for himself. Indeed, five MLC ministers defected to Kabila’s camp, as did Olivier Kamitatu, the party’s secretary general. Three R CD ministers left their party. This political advantage helped Kabila during the election campaign. He controlled state radio and television; in violation of electoral law, they broadcast mostly Kabila campaign advertisements and coverage. He deployed his presidential guard to the country’s main airports, where they harassed rival candidates as they arrived or departed. R iot police in
Kinshasa prevented large demonstrations from taking place; given the anti-Kabila sentiment in the capital, protests would have been favorable to the president’s rivals. In perhaps the most heavy-handed incident, authorities arrested the private security guard of presidential hopeful Oscar Kashala in May 2006 for an alleged coup plot that was never substantiated.

On August 20, 2006, the day the results of the first round of the presidential election were announced, events offered a glimpse of what might have happened had the transition not worked out in Kabila’s favor. Kabila fa iled to obtain a clear majority, sending him into a runoff with Bemba, head of the MLC and one of the vice presidents. While the exact chain of events that day is not completely clear, Kabila’s presidential guard launched a frontal attack on Bemba’s residences in Kinshasa with tanks and hundreds of troops.

The international community, which was spending more than $2 billion a year on the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo and aid to the country, did not want to ruffle any feathers—in particular not those of Kabila, the head of state to whom ambassadors were accredited. The International Committee for Supporting the Transition, a group of donors and countries in the region that backed
the peace process, had up to that point avoided discussing the threat posed by the presidential guard. When Kabila’s guard did become a problem in August 2006, the committee denounced the violence but refrained from pointing fingers. The bias shown toward Kabila in the transition agreement was problematic in that it assumed he would win the election. In hushed conversations, diplomats wondered what would happen if the incumbent were to lose the runoff. But Kabila did not lose, and the polls themselves were relatively free and fa ir. The president won by a wide margin, garnering 2.5 million votes more than his rival.

Regional shifts

One of the most important achievements of the peace process has been a realignment of relations in the region. The two main rebel movements, the R CD and the MLC, were created by R wanda and Uganda , respectively, and relied heavily on their patrons for military survival. During the 2002 peace talks in the South African luxury resort Sun City , both countries came under increasing pressure from donors that supplied more than half of their budgets. Criticism increased after successive UN investigations revealed high-level involvement by R wanda and Uganda
in the looting of timber and minerals from eastern Congo . Perhaps the most damning indictment of their presence in Congo came when the two countries clashed in Kisangani in 1999 and 2000. The fighting over diamonds in a town more than 300 miles from their borders rendered absurd their claim that their intrusion in Congo was strictly for self-defense.

In 2002, the United States abstained for the first time in a vote by the International Monetary Fund on renewing loans for R wanda . Shortly thereafter, under direct pressure from South African President Thabo Mbeki, Kabila and R wandan President Paul Kagame signed an
agreement for R wandan troops to leave eastern Congo . Kabila was supposed to demobilize R wandan rebels, now regrouped as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of R wanda, whom he had funded and supported during the war.

Under pressure from donors, and less threatened by a weakened rebel resistance, R wanda slowly shifted its foreign policy from military confrontation to one of diplomacy and cooperation. High R wandan and Congolese officials held discreet talks. Meanwhile, R wanda ’s relations with Uganda thawed considerably. Even its relations with the former Hutu rebels who had come to power in Burundi in 2005 became cordial.

The logic expressed by R wanda ’s leaders was clear, if somewhat quixotic: they want R wanda to become the service hub of the region, the “Singapore of Africa,” an ambitious aspiration for a desperately poor, landlocked country. As part of this effort, Kagame has courted investors, including the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and Wal- Mart. He has also recognized the need to clean up appearances—a R wanda open for business cannot be seen as stoking conflict in Congo .

The impact this realignment had on the R CD was evident.
Without R wanda , the rebels lost their military backbone. After the withdrawal of the R wandan Defense Forces in July 2002, the R CD almost collapsed as Mai-Mai militias supported by Kinshasa took large chunks of its territory. After it was forced into the political process, the RCD’s organizational weaknesses also became apparent. R wanda had run the rebels as a proxy movement and had never allowed a strong political organization to emerge, focusing instead on military strength. During the war, R wanda had replaced the RCD’s leader four times in five years. Divisions quickly emerged during the transition as many R CD officials distanced themselves from the hard-line Hutu and Tutsi leadership.

Relations between Kigali and Kinshasa did not improve overnight, and the improvement was endangered by a hefty dose of brinksmanship. At the beginning of the transition, both R wanda and the rebels wanted to keep their options open. According to several rebel sources, high-ranking R CD officers were encouraged to refuse army integration in order to remain as a reserve force. The leader of these dissidents was Brigadier General Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi and former intelligence officer in the R wandan army. In May 2004, as UN investigations later confirmed, R wanda was involved in a mutiny by the dissidents that captured the town of Bukavu for several days. When Kabila overreacted by sending thousands of troops, sparking brutal fighting, R wanda briefly reinvaded in November 2004.

Although relations appear to be on the mend today, the brinksmanship is likely to continue. Kagame says he speaks regularly with Kabila on the phone, and both sides now insist that their former rival no longer poses a threat. But Kabila, accused of being a R wandan stooge himself during the election
campaign, is afraid of being seen as pro-Kigali. Kagame was not invited to Kabila’s inauguration ceremony, and many Congolese officers still accuse R wanda of hegemonic ambitions in their country. The UN has evidence that Nkunda is continuing to recruit in R wandan refugee camps, probably with government consent.

Buying peace

At
times, Congo seems condemned to eternal negotiations. The state does not have a monopoly on violence. Its army is desperately weak. And the 17,000 UN peacekeepers present in the country will not carry out the messy counterinsurgency operations necessary in the east, since they lack the will to sustain the casualties such operations would entail. Left with no choice, the government is forced to bargain with warlords.

It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the words of a human rights worker in Kinshasa, “impunity greased the gears of the transition.” In contrast with peace processes elsewhere, justice and reconciliation have ranked low on the list of priorities in Congo . After some talk of an international tribunal for war crimes, it was left out
of the 2002 accord. A truth and reconciliation commission was created, but its leadership, too, was divided among the former belligerents, who have little interest in exposing crimes committed during the war.

The absence of justice has ended up rewarding criminal behavior. Six militia leaders from the Ituri region were promoted to the rank of general in 2005 and thirty-two others were offered ranks of colonel, including some of the most notorious human rights offenders in the country. Following an international outcry, some of these warlords were
arrested, including Thomas Lubanga, who was the first person to be tried at the International Criminal Court in The Hague . However, as soon as these leaders were removed, others sprang up to replace them. Even Nkunda, the R CD dissident, is currently engaged in negotiations for positions for himself and dozens of fellow officers.

Government officials tend to blame the impunity problem on a weak army and justice system, but it is also closely linked to members of the political elite. Patronage networks permeate the police and army. During the first two years of the transition, this allowed officers to
embezzle, according to some estimates, over half of the payroll, or $3 million each month. Powerful generals and politicians in Kinshasa shield their protégés in the field from accusations. The civilian population has borne the consequences of this impunity. According to UN human rights reports, the Congolese national army is the worst abuser. UN observers documented 344 murders and 349 rapes carried out by members of the police and army in 2006. Since the UN presence is thinly spread across the country, this is just the tip of the iceberg. In addition, mismanagement of the army has allowed 14,000 to 18,000 militiamen to continue terrorizing the
population in the east. In 2006, half a million people were displaced because of fighting there.

Turning a blind eye

Impunity has also devastated public administration, rendering it incapable of even providing social services. According to a UN estimate, more than $1 billion is embezzle d in the customs sector alone each year. Again, these losses can be
attributed in part to predatory patronage networks that permeate the state to the highest level. In 2004, a parliamentary audit of state companies revealed the complicity of six ministers and Kabila’s chief of staff in embezzlement and graft. The state auditor has compiled evidence of colossal mismanagement that leaves about one-third of the budget improperly accounted for. Despite this evidence, not a single official was tried for corruption during the transition.

Although it is too early to make predictions about how the incoming government will perform, many of the figures in it are fa miliar. Part
of the reason for this is that, in contrast with peace deals in countries such as Liberia , the settlement in Congo has kept power largely in the hands of the former belligerents. The elections only allowed for a limited infusion of new fa ces into the political elite. With the notable exception of Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, the leader of the Unified Lumumbist Party, most ministers in the new government were in office during the transition. The most important ministries—interior, defense, foreign af fa irs, reconstruction, finance, and planning— are all occupied by former belligerents. More important, the president and his powerful entourage have remained the same. This raises doubts about the extent to which the government will be willing or able to crack down on the corruption and abuses that
they sanctioned and were at times complicit in during the past three years.

The international community, which funds over half of the country’s budget, has refrained from criticizing Congolese leaders too harshly. In contrast to Liberia , the Balkans, and East Timor, where serious efforts were made to exclude human rights abusers from security forces through a vetting process, in Congo there has been little talk of accountability. Good governance has also been shelved since Security Council members refused to mandate the UN mission to form a donors group to crack down on corruption. Some donors saw impunity as a necessary evil, needed to keep the transition together. As one diplomat
explained: “If we start bringing people to justice, where do we stop? Some of the worst abusers are at the top.”

The elections appear to have accentuated donor frailty. During the transition, donors pressured the interim government through the International Committee for Supporting the Transition. They seem more reluctant to do so today with a new, sovereign government. None of the embassies denounced the massacre of 100 civilians in the fa r western province of Bas Congo in January 2007. And, despite the condemnation of the fighting in Kinshasa , the
French development minister arrived in the capital shortly after it broke out to sign an aid package worth $300 million with Kabila.

Another reason for donors’ reticence has to do with economic interests. Congo is enormously rich in copper, tin, diamonds, and gold. With the end of the hostilities, the country is opening up to business again. Two of the world’s largest mining companies, BHP Billiton and AngloAshanti, have bought large concessions and begun operations. us-based Phelps Dodge has acquired one of the world’s largest
copper concessions, Tenke Fungurume. Embassies in Kinshasa have been involved in helping to negotiate deals for companies based in their countries. In the absence of strong domestic lobbies for Congo , this has discouraged donors from speaking out too boldly about abuses.

The fa llout of elections

If the transition was a
mixed bag of successes and fa ilures, where does it leave us now? Congo in 2006 held its first multiparty elections in 40 years. Kabila’s coalition, the Alliance for the Presidential Majority, emerged victorious. Besides winning the presidential race, his coalition won around two-thirds of the seats in parliament, allowing Prime Minister Gizenga to form an Alliance government. The coalition replicated its victory in the elections of senators and governors by provincial assemblies—although allegedly with the help of hefty bribes—winning 10 of the 11 governorships and a majority in the upper house of the national legislature.

Yet the elections, for all their success, have created new divisions and risks. Whereas, during the war, the east was the center of conflict, the west is now also becoming a source of concern. In coming years, there is a good chance of antigovernment unrest bubbling up in the capital and other western towns. Discontent with Kabila was evident in the elections, which revealed a divided country. Kabila won over 80 percent of the vote in the east, while Bemba won by similar margins in five western provinces. Anti- Kabila sentiment runs high in these provinces, since his government administered Bas Congo and Kinshasa for six years without successfully addressing poverty and social woes there. Unemployment is close to 80 percent, and many fa milies eat only once a day. These frustrations are accentuated by ethnic bias—Kabila and his close advisers are from the Swahili- speaking east. Kabila himself is perceived as a foreigner, since he grew up in Tanzania and speaks stilted French and poor Lingala, the language of the west.

Another fa ctor stirring up urban unrest in the
west is the political marginalization of the opposition, which is largely based in the west and the center. Although Bemba won 42 percent of the popular vote, his opposition coalition, the Union for the Nation, is too weak in the national assembly to challenge the ruling Alliance . Bemba’s coalition has a majority in four provincial assemblies, but many of its members were bought out during gubernatorial elections, limiting his control to one provincial government. The sidelining of the opposition could push its supporters into the streets, provoking unruly protests and riots in western cities.

A first sign of this took place in Bas
Congo on January 31, 2007, when opposition supporters demonstrated against corruption in the gubernatorial elections. The spiritual leader of a local religious sect, Bundu dia Kongo, had been a candidate on the losing opposition ticket. A melee broke out between his supporters and the police, and several people on each side were killed. Feeling under siege, the governor brought in the army. In the ensuing bloodshed, policemen and soldiers killed more than a hundred civilians.

The Kinshasa fighting in March 2007 was different. This time the government’s opposition was armed; Bemba had a guard
of 400 to 500 soldiers in the capital. Both sides had indicated they would be willing to negotiate a solution that would guarantee Bemba’s safety while downsizing his militia. Hardliners in both camps won out and forced a confrontation, plunging the capital into brutal fighting. According to one human rights group, 330 people were killed; other estimates go as high as 500. While the security situation is now stable, the government seems less and less tolerant of dissent. Dozens of opposition members have been rounded up in Kinshasa under dubious charges of espionage and treason, and several television stations belonging to the opposition have been shut down.

The opposition, however, may lack the unity and strength to galvanize the population. Bemba will go into exile, and there is no clear leader to replace him. The opposition is full of former followers of the late dictator Mobutu, and none of them have Bemba’s stature. The lack of lucrative positions to pass around will also weaken his coalition; some allied parties already have protested the MLC’s hoarding of the few senatorial and governor positions the opposition can claim.

A crushing weakness

After the elections, the defining feature of the Congolese state remains its weakness. This ailment, the result of decades of misrule, affects public administration, the security services, courts, the parliament, and political parties. While most donors perceive governance to be a technical problem, patronage is deeply political. Weakness has become a strategy of rule, as elites undermine institutional checks and balances in
order to continue to profit from procurement contracts, mining deals, and customs fraud. In the meantime, the government provides almost no social services— health care and education are mostly paid for by their users, churches, and nongovernment organizations. Infrastructure rehabilitation is carried out almost exclusively by donors. Of the state’s own revenues, the bulk of what is not embezzled is spent on salaries.

The weakness of the state contrasts with its omnipresence. There are about half a million civil servants in the country and another 200,000 policemen and soldiers. Few of them make a living wage—the official monthly salary of a soldier is $22
a month, while a doctor makes less than $100—forcing them to look for other ways to make money. In a 2005 World Bank survey, when asked what they would do to the state if it were a person, many answered: “Kill him.” This is the Congolese paradox: a state that is perceived as crushingly brutal, yet is deeply weak.

This weakness is in many ways the biggest obstacle to peace in the country. It allows small militias, which should constitute a law-and-order problem, to press the government for negotiations, only for other commanders to spring up later with new demands. It turns the security forces and public administration
into predators, causing rampant abuse. And it depletes the budget of valuable resources needed to rebuild the country.

While many sub-Saharan states are fragile and corrupt, Congo ’s situation is particularly bad. There are 100,000 demobilized soldiers in the country, many of whom are about to finish a year-long donor program that provided them with meager earnings. There are still thousands of militiamen in the east, operating as warlords in their fiefdoms, as well as an enormous presidential guard. The ranks of the opposition are packed with former rebels and Mobutists who, deprived of lucrative positions in the state, could use civil unrest to bring the government to its knees.

The international community played a crucial role in making elections happen. But the donors’ track record in peacebuilding is not nearly as good as in peacemaking: they lose focus quickly, and the new government is eager to make a show of its sovereignty. In addition, with costly peacekeeping operations moving into gear in Sudan , Lebanon , and Somalia , the temptation to declare victory and go home will be great.

There are no silver bullets for Congo ’s recovery. It is clear that the country will not be able to rise out of the trap of
poverty, corruption, and war unless the Congolese leadership itself wants to. In order for this to happen, the government needs to be held accountable for its actions by the parliament, the courts, and the media. In short, democratic institutions need to work.

The international community needs to help in this process. A first step will be coming to an understanding with the new government on terms for the huge international investment there. The billion-dollar question will be: How do you implement reforms that go against entrenched interests of the ruling elite? After the scandals and fa ilures of the first
two post-independence republics, Congo ’s Third R epublic has begun with many questions and few answers.

Jason K. Stearns, based in Kenya, is a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group. From 2002 to 2004 he served with the UN mission in the Democratic R epublic of Congo .

Justice : Me Marie Thérèse Nlandu acquittée

2007-05-08T10:34:00.001-04:00

http://radiookapi.net/index.php?i=53&a=13068

Kinshasa | Politique et Citoyen | 30 April 2007 à 17:00:07

Le tribunal militaire de garnison de la Gombe a acquitté ce lundi 30 avril Me Marie Thérèse Nlandu Mpolo et ses 9 codétenus, après 5 mois de détention au Centre pénitentiaire et de rééducation de Kinshasa, CPRK. Il a estimé que les preuves n’étaient pas suffisantes pour appuyer les accusations du ministère public, rapporte radiookapi.net

Me Nlandu avait été arrêtée le 21 novembre 2006 par les services spéciaux de la police. Elle était accusée d’être à la base du mouvement insurrectionnel qui a causé l’incendie de la Cour suprême de justice et de détention illégale d’armes de guerre. Pour le tribunal, le pillage et l’incendie de la Haute cour étaient l’œuvre de manifestants incontrôlés. Il n’y a pas de preuves qui appuient ces accusations, a-t-il tranché. De même, le tribunal a relevé une confusion sur le lieu de saisie des effets militaires dont Me Nlandu était accusée de détenir.

Congo-Kinshasa: UNHCR - 'We Are Very Concerned With the Situation in North Kivu'

2007-05-08T10:32:00.000-04:00

http://allafrica.com/stories/200704301606.html

United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)

April 30, 2007
Posted to the web April 30, 2007

Eoin Young

The situation in North Kivu remains precarious with 64,000 people displaced since March, as Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) operations against the FDLR and Mai Mai militias intensifies. According to UNHCR spokesman Jens Hesemann, the accompanying looting and violence committed against the civilian population by both the militias and the FARDC is the primary cause of the crisis.

The Kiwanja- Nyamilima axis is the focal point of the displacements, as well as Rutshuru and other areas, where whole villages lie deserted as people flee into the forests or seek refuge at MONUC Mobile Operating Bases (MOB's).

UNHCR has sent 25 monitoring teams to the area to identify key human rights problems and to assess the needs of the local population. They have visited various sites and taken statements from the displaced, compiling evidence of gross human rights violations.

"The FARDC, the FDLR and the Mai Mai have committed gross violations, including widespread looting, sexual violence, and direct attacks on civilians. The FARDC, especially the newly mixed brigades, have a perception that the local population is cooperating with the militias, and because of this they are committing attacks on civilians," Mr. Hesemann explained.

UNHCR's main focus is to help protect civilians from violence, through monitoring and advocacy.

"Our teams are going back with information on displacements to the military and the authorities, and we are working very closely with WFP and UNICEF / OCHA as well," Mr. Hesemann said.

Mr. Hesemann concluded by saying that the tension went up after the mixage process, with more incidences of inter ethnic violence.

"The military operations against militia have increased, but the toll that this takes on the civilian population is enormous. Although there is a big risk of more displacements over the coming weeks, UNHCR have not yet seen any cross border movements into Uganda."

Democratic Republic of the Congo: IDPs and Returnees in the Eastern Provinces

2007-04-27T11:52:00.001-04:00

Useful map with details on numbers:

Title - Democratic Republic of the Congo: IDPs and Returnees in the Eastern Provinces (as of March 2007) Source - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Format - pdf ; 367k Date - 20 Apr 2007 URL Address - http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/JBRN-72FDTY?OpenDocument

Maintain the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

2007-04-27T11:50:00.000-04:00

Please find the following op-ed by Oxfam America and the International Crisis Group on the DRC and funding for MONUC appearing in today’s Christian Science Monitor (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0423/p09s02-coop.html).

Maintain the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The US must keep funding levels for UN troops intact until the Congolese government and security forces grow stronger.

By Raymond C. Offenheiser and Mark L. Schneider

Washington and Boston - In the gold-rich Ituri district of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), civilians can now do what was once unthinkable: walk down the streets without fearing for their lives. Until recently, the region had been torn apart by anarchy and brutal fighting.

The UN Peacekeeping Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) played a critical role in bringing a semblance of peace to Ituri, protecting civilians from violence and securing the country for successful democratic elections last November. Despite such progress after years of war, the DRC remains extremely fragile. If the Bush administration pushes for UN peacekeepers to pull out too soon, violence could once again take root.

Four million civilian deaths have been linked to the eight-year conflict in the DRC, costing more lives than any other conflict since World War II. The debate on the decision to extend the UN Mission's mandate, which ends on May 15, has been under way for weeks, but no consensus has been reached on what the postelection peacekeeping mission will look like. An immediate extension through Dec. 31, as requested by the UN secretary-general, should be the minimum time frame.

It is more worrisome that some still want to reduce the number of troops and weaken their ability to keep the peace. Both would be tragic mistakes for a country that already has seen too much tragedy.

This first year following Joseph Kabila's election is crucial for building stability for future generations. However, aftershocks continue to shake the tenuous peace. Just a few weeks ago, fighting broke out in Kinshasa between former vice president and rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba's security forces and the Congolese armed forces. More than 200 were reported killed and many more wounded before the DRC Army restored order. Mr. Bemba, who was elected senator in January, took refuge in the South African Embassy until MONUC secured his departure to Portugal, reportedly for medical care. These recent clashes in the nation's capital demonstrate a fragile peace that needs to be nurtured and strengthened. Now is not the time to hamstring the UN mission.

Former US Ambassador William Swing, who is the secretary-general's special representative to the DRC, has publicly stated that shrinking MONUC will pose an irreversible threat to the country's forward movement. He has also called on the US Congress, which funds about 25 percent of the peacekeeping mission, to ensure that the force is sufficiently funded in the coming year by guaranteeing at least $260 million to sustain its efforts. But the Bush administration has not been listening.

The administration's budget projects a nearly $90 million cut – almost 35 percent – in the US share of the MONUC budget, which it says "assumes a significant reduction in mission size." As Congress looks to fund MONUC in the 2008 foreign operations spending bill, they should listen to what Mr. Swing – and more recently Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon – have said about the urgency of maintaining MONUC's force level. As the DRC government gains experience and its security forces become stronger and more efficient, some reductions will be possible and desirable. Until then, Congress must keep current funding levels intact.

The UN mission has in-creased humanitarian access, making possible the first Congolese elections in 40 years, and it now must build on that peace by taking on security sector reform. Rwandan and Ugandan rebels still operate in the DRC, several thousand Congolese militiamen continue to control isolated areas in the east, and the Congolese Army too often abuses the people it is meant to protect. Chiefs in the lakeside villages of Tchomia and Kasenyi recently told Oxfam that if the UN peacekeeping force were to close its base and stop patrols, the people would leave tomorrow because it simply would no longer be safe – at least not yet.

The International Crisis Group in Kinshasa recently reported that militias indeed need to be fully dismantled, but that demobilization alone is not enough to ensure stability. The full political rights of legitimate opposition parties must also be guaranteed for the infant democracy to flourish. The Bush administration should use all available diplomatic levers to assure a strong MONUC mandate that includes civilian protection, conflict prevention at the local and national levels, establishment of an international donors group, and promotion of political dialogue.

There is one constant lesson in post-conflict peacekeeping: Weakening a UN mandate and pulling troops out too soon almost always guarantees a return to war. This is precisely what occurred in Liberia and in East Timor. Despite enormous suffering and vast remaining challenges, the UN has helped create the space to build peace in the DRC. The country can't afford to lose that treasured space – nor can it afford to lose any more lives.

• Raymond C. Offenheiser is the president of Oxfam America, a nonprofit international development and relief agency. Mark L. Schneider is the senior vice president of the International Crisis Group, an international conflict prevention organization.

Burundi, Rwanda, RDC renew their cooperation after 14 years

2007-04-27T11:49:00.000-04:00

BUJUMBURA, April 17, 2007 (AFP) - Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo on Tuesday relaunched the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), an organisation that has been dormant for 13 years.

Diplomatic heads from the three nations participated in the meeting, which will relaunch an organisation begun in 1976 but inactive because of war and rebellion that has plagued the region.

Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht was also in Bujumbura for the occassion, representing the former colonial power in the three nations.

"We are going to relaunch the CEPGL. The revival of economic cooperation between Rwanda, the DRC and Burundi is very important for this region from an economic point of view but also from a political one. This cooperation, if well-developed, will ensure lasting piece and stability in this region," the Belgian minister said.

"The CEPGL has been active in the past, but the war that has ravaged the region has brought its activity to almost zero," he said.

The relaunch program includes a budget for the first year of 970,000 dollars, financed primarily by Belgium and the European Union, and the creation of an interim executive secretary.

The organisation will permit the free movement of people and goods within the region, and plans to create a regional bank and an institute for agricultural research.

The Great Lakes Countries were plagued by violence in the 1990s, with the beginning of the ongoing civil war in Burundi in 1993, the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which was followed by rebellions and regional warfare in the DRC.

esd/mc/bd/smc

Copyright (c) 2007 Agence France-Presse
Received by NewsEdge Insight: 04/17/2007 10:57:37

©AFP: The information provided in this product is for personal use only. None of it may be reproduced in any form whatsoever without the express permission of Agence France-Presse.

Videos Show Congolese Need Help Rebuilding After War

2007-04-11T09:30:00.000-04:00

Source: Refugees International Newsletter

Refugees International has produced two short videos that show the beauty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the daily activities of local villages, and the challenges the people face as they rebuild. The nation is entering a moment of hope after suffering one of the bloodiest conflicts of the last half century. Four million people have died since 1998 and 1.5 million people remain displaced from their homes today. Still, hundreds of thousands of people are returning home and trying to rebuild their lives. As peace returns and the recently elected government stabilizes the country, these two videos call for more action. "Recovering from War" shows a village in the center of the country that desperately needs support from UN agencies and "Returning Home" calls on the international community to help refugees return home.

Katanga to Host Progress Report Webcast

2007-04-05T09:47:00.000-04:00

Katanga to Host Progress Report Webcast

Source: AP Alert - Energy
Date: April 04, 2007

LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM_(Market Wire) _

Katanga Mining Limited (TSX: KAT) will host a live webcast and conference call on April 11, 2007 at 9am Eastern Standard Time to provide an update on the progress of its Kamoto Joint Venture in rehabilitating mines and plants near Kolwezi in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The webcast will be at:
(http://events.onlinebroadcasting.com/katanga/041107/index.php)
http://events.onlinebroadcasting.com/katanga/041107/index.php.
Alternatively, to
listen to the conference call, dial 1 800 565 0813 (toll-free in North
America)
or +1 416 695 9706 (outside North America). A presentation will be viewable on the webcast and there will be an opportunity both online and on the conference call to ask questions.

Arthur Ditto, President and Chief Executive Officer will give an overview of recent developments at Katanga and Rick Dye, Senior Vice President, Technical Services will give a detailed review of progress to date at the site.

The webcast (audio and presentation) will be archived at the same location and the presentation available on Katanga's website, (
http://www.katangamining.com)
http://www.katangamining.com, immediately after the webcast. The conference call will be available for replay for seven days at 1 888 509 0081 or +1 416
695
5275, pass code 642776.

To learn more about Katanga Mining Limited, please visit our website at
(http://www.katangamining.com) http://www.katangamining.com

Katanga Mining Limited is becoming significant in global copper mining by rehabilitating mines and plants near Kolwezi in the Katanga Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The site is getting ready to ship copper in December 2007. By 2011, the complex will produce 150,000 tonnes of refined copper and 5,000 tonnes of refined cobalt a year and will be among the world's lowest cost producers.

The Company is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol KAT.

Contacts: Katanga Mining Limited Arthur H. Ditto President & Chief Executive Officer +44 (0)20 7440 5824 Mobile: +44 (0)7983 447774 Katanga Mining Limited Anu Dhir Vice President, Corporate Development +44 (0)20 7440 5822 Mobile:
+44
(0)7983 438942 Katanga Mining Limited 15 Golden Square London W1F 9JG United Kingdom +44 (0)20 7440 5800 Website: (http://www.katangamining.com) http://www.katangamining.com

Copyright (c) 2007 Market Wire
Distributed by the Associated Press

APviaNewsEdge
Copyright (c) 2007 The Associated Press Received By NewsEDGE/LAN:Wed Apr 04 14:54:06 2007

World Bank threatens Congo's rainforest

2007-04-04T10:06:00.000-04:00

World Bank plans to increase timber production in Congo threaten the environment and ignore the rights of forest dwellers.
By Jean-Roger Kaseki, March 19, 2007 9:00 AM,

In 2004, more than 100 environment, development, and human rights groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo called on the World Bank to stop plans that would carve up the world's second-largest rainforest into industrial logging concessions.

Internal World Bank documents obtained by the Rainforest Foundation revealed that the bank intended to create a favourable climate for industrial logging in the Congo, and envisioned a 60-fold increase in the country's timber production.

Plans for the development of the forests would have major repercussions on the rights and livelihoods of millions of Congolese citizens, with serious and irreversible impacts on the forest environment.

Covering around 1.3 million square kilometres, the rainforests of the Democratic Republic of Congo are the largest in the world after Amazonia, and have so far largely been spared extensive destruction. An estimated 35 million people live in and around these forests, including Bantu farmers, and Twa and Mbuti hunter-gatherer Pygmies.

Full story on comment is free

The Congo is the Earth's second largest river by volume and has the world's second largest rainforest (18% of the planet's remaining tropical rainforest). The Congo Basin represents 70% of the African continent's plant cover and makes up a large portion of Africa's biodiversity with over 600 tree species and 10 000 animal species. Six nations - Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon - share the 1.5 million square mile Congo basin.

The Congo is one of the world's most threatened ecosystems. Commercial logging, clearing for subsistence agriculture, and widespread civil strife has devastated forests, displaced forest dwellers, and resulted in the expansion of the "bushmeat" trade. Since the 1980s, Africa has had the highest deforestation rates of any region on the globe.

Source: rainforests.mongabay.com/congo

World Bank Approves Funding for Congo's Capital

2007-04-04T10:03:00.000-04:00

Source: Reuters Foundation

Date: 29 Mar 2007

World Bank approves funding for Congo's capital

By Lesley Wroughton

WASHINGTON, March 29 (Reuters) - The World Bank board on Thursday approved $180 million to help rebuild the capital of Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, and said it would go ahead with project plans despite recent deadly violence.

Pedro Alba, the bank's country director to Congo, said the fighting between a former rebel faction and government troops in Kinshasa was regrettable, but added that the poor should not have to suffer because of it.

The grant funding for Kinshasa will help restore running water, rehabilitate roadways, help parents pay for primary schooling, and provide bed nets to residents to prevent malaria, the mosquito-borne disease that is Africa's biggest killer.

"These projects have been under preparation since December last year and the approval will allow us to provide assistance to Congo's poor," Alba told a conference call.

"The regrettable clashes in Kinshasa last week should not prevent poor people access to water, roads, bed nets and education, and we urge all parties, including the government, to work together to create a political environment in which poverty reduction and development activities can be carried out," he added.

While the brunt of Congo's civil war was in the east of the country, Kinshasa has experienced occasional flare ups of political unrest. Years of neglect have left it in ruins.

Last year, President Joseph Kabila won the country's first democratic elections in over four decades, following years of corrupt leadership and a 1998-2003 war that killed an estimated 4 million people through conflict, war and disease.

The World Bank grants are part of a new "rapid response" policy that the World Bank -- hoping to offer people proof of a peace dividend -- approved last month to deliver aid more quickly to countries emerging from war and disaster.

World Bank officials acknowledged the unrest could recur in Kinshasa, amid the lingering tensions between Kabila's government and groups loyal to former presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba, who sought refuge in the South African embassy during the violence.

But the officials said they were confident they could implement the rebuilding projects with the help of special agencies and development groups.

They said the World Bank could now proceed with discussions with Congo's government on a more formal lending program, which could be concluded by mid-year.

Visitez le nouveau site-web des NU sur la RDC

2007-03-22T12:28:00.000-04:00

Cher tous,

Je vous invite a visiter notre site a www.un.int/drcongo . Le site est toujours en construction. Il a pour vocation d'informer le large public des activites diplomatiques de la RDC aux Nations Unies, de meme que de diffuser une large information sur le pays.

De meme, le site souhaiterait apporter sa modeste contribution aux efforts du Gouvernement dans ses politiques de redressement de l'economie congolaise et du developpement du pays.

Merci de nous faire part de vos conseils.

S.E.M. ILEKA ATOKI
Ambassadeur/Representant Permanent
Rep. Dem. du Congo
Nations Unies

Film Screening Announcement

2007-03-22T11:29:00.000-04:00

Tuesday, March 27, 7-10 pm.

Jack Morton Auditorium, George Washington University

Please join me for a screening of the rough cut of my documentary
"Congo - Hope on the Ballot" in Washington DC on Tuesday, March 27,
7-10 pm. This hour-long work-in-progress follows the uncertain
progress of democracy in one of the most war ravaged places on earth:
the Democractic Republic of Congo. It that builds on a short version
that I made for PBS's Frontline World last year.

The screening will take place at Jack Morton Auditorium at George
Washington University. The auditorium is located on the campus of
George Washington University in their Media and Public Affairs
Building Exact address is 805 21st Street (on the corner of 21st and H
Streets), NW Washington DC. Link to map is at
http://maps.yahoo.com/py/maps.py?Pyt=Tmap&addr=805+21st+Street+Nw+&csz=Washington+DC+&Get%A0Map=Get+Map

More details:
http://www.docsinprogress.org/

Best regards,
George Lerner

Bemba militia clash with troops in Congo capital

2007-03-22T11:28:00.000-04:00

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L22192939.htm

KINSHASA, March 22 (Reuters) - Gunfire and explosions rocked Kinshasa on Thursday as armed followers of a former rebel leader fought government troops, in the first clashes in Democratic Republic of Congo's capital since landmark elections last year. The shooting broke out after the personal militia of defeated presidential contender Jean-Pierre Bemba defied a government order last week to disband following landmark elections in 2006. A Reuters witness heard frequent fire from small arms, heavy machineguns and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) in the neighbourhood around the Supreme Court in Kinshasa's administrative district, close to one of Bemba's residences. Armoured personnel carriers (APCs) of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo, known by its French acronym MONUC, patrolled the streets as the gunfights raged, but did not intervene. "We are moving our APCs to the area," U.N. military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Didier Rancher told Reuters, but declined further comment. MONUC has agreements to evacuate certain individuals, such as senior diplomats and their families, in the event of fighting in Kinshasa. The clashes were the first in the sprawling riverside capital, a stronghold of Bemba's support, since the elections which were meant to draw a line under a 1998-2003 war that killed nearly 4 million people, mainly through hunger and disease. Dozens of people were killed last year in fighting between Bemba's forces and President Joseph Kabila's presidential guard before an October second-round run-off between the two men. Kabila, who took office when his father was assassinated in 2001 and won last year's polls, has ordered Bemba to slash his security detail to just 12 police officers. The former rebel's supporters say he has the right to "an appropriate personal guard" under a U.N.-brokered deal signed before October's presidential runoff. The head of the 17,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo, William Swing, had been due to meet Kabila on Thursday to try to defuse the crisis. "There is a lot still going on behind the scenes," a Western diplomat told Reuters before the clashes. "Both sides are very, very stubborn. I don't see where a breakthrough will come from." Swing met Bemba and Congolese Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga on Wednesday. Before the fighting erupted, a senior MONUC official said "The situation is very tense. The Congolese people don't want any more blood, this situation has a political solution ... We are pushing for that."

Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

2007-03-21T14:26:00.000-04:00

Press Release No. 07/55
March 19, 2007

The following statement was issued on March 13 in Kinshasa by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission:

"An International Monetary Fund (IMF) African Department mission visited Kinshasa from February 27 to March 13, 2007 at the invitation of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The mission would like to thank the authorities for their warm welcome and for the quality of its discussions with them.

"The mission notes that the objectives of the government's economic program (Programme relais de consolidation—PRC) covering April-December 2006 have not been met. Budget overruns were recorded in the second half of 2006 and there were significant delays in the implementation of structural reforms.

"Economic performance under the PRC in 2006 can be described briefly as follows:

• Real economic growth slowed to about 5 percent.

• Inflation rose to 18.2 percent on a year-on-year basis, compared with a forecast of 9.5 percent.

• The Congolese franc depreciated by 15 percent.

• International reserves remained at a very low level.

• The basic fiscal balance was 2.5 percentage points of GDP below the projected level, leading to CGF 47.5 billion in bank financing.

"Deterioration in the economic and financial situation remained a concern in the first two months of 2007. Bank financing of fiscal operations, estimated at more than CGF 20 billion, led to a 4 percent increase in consumer prices (25 percent on an annual basis) and a 10 percent depreciation in the Congolese franc over the course of two months.

"The mission underscored the urgency of taking measures to strengthen macroeconomic stability. It reiterated the need to tighten the fiscal stance and to avoid recourse to bank financing. In this context, it discussed with the authorities the draft budget for 2007, which reflects these recommendations. It also encouraged the BCC to continue its efforts to bring down inflation.

"The mission recommended that key structural reforms be completed, including the implementation of the simplified temporary payroll procedure in the civil service, the audit of expenditure financed by debt relief under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, and the organizational audit of the BCC.

"The mission also encouraged the government to implement the governance contract approved by the National Assembly, particularly by publishing and analyzing the partnership agreements that have been signed in the mining sector.

"Following the organization of free and democratic elections that have given the population new hopes for peace, security and prosperity, the mission noted the firm commitment of the new government to address the many challenges that it is already facing.

"The mission reaffirmed the IMF's commitment to work with the new government in its economic recovery and poverty reduction efforts. Progress toward the restoration of macroeconomic stability will facilitate discussions on a medium-term program that could be supported by the IMF in the context of a new arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility."

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Members of Congo Global Action

2007-03-14T12:02:00.000-04:00

Member Organizations who have ratified the unity statement:

Africa Faith and Justice Network

The Bayindo Group SA

Bureau pour le Voluntariat au Service de l’Enfance et de la Santé

CARE

Chicago Congo Coalition

Coalition pluraliste des Patriots Congolais - COPPAC

Concern Worldwide

Congolese Community of Southern California

Conseil Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation – COPARE

En Avant Congo

Friends of the Congo

The Friends of the Congo – Affiliate of the National Peace Corps Association

Friends of the Earth

Global Witness

Hand Up Congo

Initiatives Femmes Enfants et Developpement – Bukavu

International Foundation for Elections Systems - IFES

International Rescue Committee

Jubilee Campaign USA

Mama Makeka House of Hope

Mennonite Central Committee

Pole Pole Foundation

Run for Congo Women

Save the DRC

Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur

Tous Unis pour Batir

United Methodist Church – General Board of Church and Society

UMCOR – United Methodist Committee on Relief

World Relief

Executive Committee Bios

2007-03-14T11:59:00.000-04:00

Shannon Meehan

International Rescue Committee’s Deputy Director for Advocacy, Shannon Meehan has spent more than 17 years working in conflict zones around the world. As Deputy Director of Advocacy at the IRC, Shannon is responsible for covering the IRC’s policy priorities for the continent of Africa. A former Peace Corps volunteer in Senegal from 1989 - 1991, Shannon went on to represent the American Refugee Committee International (ARC) in Guinea and later Kosovo, where she served as Country Director, designing and implementing a multi-sector and cross-ethnic program that reached more than 100,000 beneficiaries. When she was a consultant for Refugees International and the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation, Shannon conducted missions in Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, Sudan, the DRC, Rwanda and in the Middle East: Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq. She is an expert on the humanitarian and protection needs of displaced populations and refugees. Her humanitarian work was highlighted in the book, Those Who Dare, by Katherine Martin (2004). She is a graduate of the University of Oregon, 1998 with a BS in History and Economics.

Nita Evele

Nita Evele is an activist from the DR Congo. She was born in Kinshasa, the capital, in 1974 and moved to the US in 1996 after the rebellion started in the DR Congo. In 1998, she found her calling and become an activist, which allowed her to connect directly with the struggle of individuals instead of passively watching events unfold. In the US, together with other Congolese activists, churches and other organizations, she has worked to support morally and socially the people in the DR Congo whom war had decimated deeply, especially children. In 2005, after briefly considering political life, she decided to fight for a cause beyond political party membership, and instead work with everyone involved in relieving people’s suffering and bringing them peace and prosperity. In 2006, she joined Coalition of Pluralists and Congolese Patriots (COPPAC) which brings together Congolese that want to bring DR Congo issues into the spotlight. COPPAC primarily deals with issues pertaining to the DR Congo but also the social issues that are common to the entire African continent and African Diaspora. The coalition is rooted in its members’ dedication to freedom, equality, and opportunity. They are devoted to the fight for equal rights and opportunities for all and advancing the sovereignty of their territory and continent.

Hervé de Baillenx

Since March 2007, Hervé de Baillenx has been the Director of the International Rescue Committee’s Belgium office, where he carries out advocacy and represents the IRC global network to the European Union. Prior to this, he had set up and spent four years managing CARDI, the Consortium for Assisting Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia, a collaboration of four major NGOs concerned with populations affected by conflict. He spent another six years as Program Director or Country Director in Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Burundi and Guinea for several NGOs, including Oxfam and CARE, always in contexts of conflict, displacement or post-conflict rehabilitation. Most recently, he co-authored the chapter on Enhancing Local Capacities in the NGO Impact Initiative assessment commissioned by the Office of the UN Special Envoy on Tsunami Recovery. His earlier career began in the aeronautics industry, where he ended as the Director of Contracts & Finance for a joint venture between major European aerospace companies, before turning to humanitarian work. He graduated from ESCP, a French business school.

Lisa Shannon

Lisa Shannon, a small business owner and creative professional, was home sick one day watching Oprah when she learned of the crisis in the DR Congo. She set out to raise sponsorships for Women for Women International's Congo program through a lone thirty mile trail run. Since that first run in September 2005, with over $100,000 raised and counting, Run for Congo Women has grown into an international effort, now with run organizers in places from Louisiana to Australia, from Maui to Singapore. Lisa's message of hope for Congo has reach millions through the audiences of National Public Radio affiliates, O- The Oprah Magazine, Runner's World, and soon Fitness Magazine. She holds a B.A. in Environment and Development from Hampshire College.

Maurice Carney

Maurice Carney is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Friends of the Congo. He is an independent entrepreneur and human rights activist who has fought with Congolese for over a decade to bring about positive change in the heart of Africa. Maurice has degrees in French Education and Geography. He also holds a Masters Degree in Geography and is pursuing a Ph.D. in political science with a focus on Africa and Black Politics. He has worked as a research analyst at the nation's leading Black think tank the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. While at the Joint Center, Mr. Carney worked with civic associations in West Africa providing training on Research Methodology and Survey. He served as the Africa working group coordinator for Reverend Jesse Jackson while he was Special Envoy to Africa for President Clinton. Mr. Carney also worked as a research consultant to the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation addressing issues such as the politico-economic condition of African American communities.

Rocco Puopolo

Rocco Puopolo, a Xaverian Missionary Priest, hails from Norwood, Massachusetts. He was ordained in 1977. During 12 years in Sierra Leone, West Africa he was involved in high school teaching, village evangelization and development as the diocesan administrator of schools, university chaplain, National Chaplain to the Young Christian Students and Catholic Youth Organizations. His last assignment there was as director of the National Pastoral Center in Kenema. He was there both during peaceful times as well as times of civil conflict. In the United States, he was involved in seminary training and advocacy for Africa in Milwaukee and Chicago. While involved in this ministry he served on the board of the Federation of Returned Overseas Missions (From Mission to Mission), the Milwaukee Archdiocesan Mission Office Board, The Midwest Mission Task Force, Youth immersions such as the ReachOut Program of Milwaukee and the International Youth Peace Camp. He has been involved with the Archdiocesan Muslim/Christian Dialogue groups as well as the Archdiocesan CRS advisory Board. He holds a Masters of Divinity in Cross Cultural Ministry from Catholic Theological Union, Chicago (1977), and was a research fellow at the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University (1994) in preparation for his return to Sierra Leone in 1995. As of September of 2006 he is the executive director of the Africa Faith and Justice Network in Washington, D.C.

Congo Global Action Structure

2007-03-14T11:57:00.000-04:00

COALITION STRUCTURE

The founding members of Congo Global Action are committed to building the coalition and have created an organizational structure to advance its mission and implement its activities. The coalition structure will consist of an Executive Committee, a Steering Committee, an Advisory Committee, a working group for each of the three pillars, task oriented working groups, and Associate members. It is important to note that all working groups and committees are made up of volunteers from our member organizations and agencies. Their commitment to this coalition goes above and beyond the duties of their full-time jobs and is a tribute to how strongly Congo Global Action members feel about their work on the DR Congo. The committees and working groups are described below:

Executive Committee

The Executive Committee is responsible for the overall management of the coalition. It is made up of six (later nine) members who are truly passionate about this coalition and were elected democratically and unanimously. They will serve a nine-month term, up for re-election in July, 2007 or these positions will be taken over by paid staff and/or a formal Board of Directors.

The Executive Committee will be responsible for:

· Maintaining the vision and direction of the coalition;

Coordinating, overseeing and advising the working groups;
Outreach to coalition members and potential members;
Launching necessary additional working groups and tasks; and
Handling all fundraising, and financial and administrative oversight.

Executive Committee Members:

Chair: International Rescue Committee (Shannon Meehan)

Vice Chair: Coalition Pluraliste de Patriotes Congolais (Nita Evele)

Run for Congo Women (Lisa Shannon)

Africa Faith and Justice Network (Rocco Puopolo)

Friends of the Congo (Maurice Carney)

International Rescue Committee – Europe (Hervé deBaillenx)

Please see Annex C for background on the Executive Committee members.

Steering Committee

The Steering Committee’s primary responsibility is to provide leadership and direction in the coalition’s efforts to achieve the three pillars as well as other activities. It is made up of those individuals who are dedicated to the coalition and willing to put in the time and effort to remain active in the coalition. Each pillar working groups has selected a chair and vice-chair to coordinate the activities.

Specifically, the steering committee will:

Create and draft the policy statements for the assigned pillar
Lead and coordinate the direction and activities of the three pillars;
Vet all public statements by the coalition;
Advise, lead and coordinate necessary additional working groups and tasks;
Create grassroots activities for community outreach; and
Participate in all biweekly Friday conference calls.

Advisory Committee

The Advisory Committee is made up of individuals who may not have the time to be part of the steering committee, but are available for consultation on projects concerning their areas of expertise and interest. These individuals represent the organizations that have full membership in the coalition. In particular, the committee members will:

Be available and responsive when approached by a member of the coalition;
Stay informed about issues affecting the DR Congo, and share our message at every opportunity; and
Authorize all public statements by the coalition.

Associate Members

These members are organizations and individuals, who strongly support the mission of Congo Global Action and who, for whatever reason, feel they cannot sign their name to coalition documents, statements, or activities, but are willing to provide behind-the-scenes advice, assistance and/or financial support for the efforts of the coalition.

Working Groups

In order to effectively accomplish specific goals in our advocacy for the DR Congo, coalition members have divided into six working groups. Working groups include representatives from organizations of all sizes and types. The complex messages they have created are informed by policy experts that will not only be used to target policy makers, but can also be adapted to be more accessible for grassroots mobilization. Each group meets regularly and has developed a set of goals and a plan of action for achieving those goals.

There is a working group for each of the three pillars:

Pillar I: Saving Lives
Pillar II: Keeping People Safe
Pillar III: Ending Economic Exploitation

These groups are responsible for creating and implementing the action plan for each pillar.

In addition, there are three task-based working groups:

· Media, Communications and Website. This group is currently designing the website and researching media possibilities.

· Grassroots Organizing. This group is currently planning grassroots activities for 2007 and creating downloadable tools for community activities.

· Hope for Congo Conferences Organizing. This group is responsible for the planning, organization and implementation of the three conferences.

Statement at UN Security Council Briefing about the Great Lakes Region

2007-03-14T11:54:00.000-04:00

Statement by Kirk McBride, Deputy Political Counselor for Special Political Affairs to the United Nations, at the Open Briefing on the Great Lakes Region, March 9, 2007.

Mr. President,

I want to thank SRSG Fall for his briefing. The United States joins the others in this room in thanking Mr. Fall for his 4 years of leadership in the Great Lakes region.

In the past decade, this resource rich region in heart of Africa, has suffered from wrenching, destabilizing conflicts that have produced almost unimaginable suffering. Today the situation remains fragile and the challenges remain immense, but the prospects for peace and development have improved, in part because of the attention of the international community but, even more so, because of the will and efforts of the people in the region to overcome these setbacks. The transition in Burundi and historic elections in the DRC are among a number of encouraging developments. We have all noted a spirit of trust and cooperation that is growing among the states in the region.

The "Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region," signed in Nairobi last December 15 by eleven African states, was a promising conclusion to the UN-sponsored International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. This agreement has the potential to become a means of preventing future conflicts in central Africa while offering a roadmap for consolidating democracy, good governance and development. We join others in encouraging the states in the region to live up to their commitments to respect national sovereignty, to seek peaceful settlement of disputes, and to cooperate to strengthen the economies of the region.
This is a vision that cannot be imposed. Regional ownership of this process is vital.

Bilateral agreements and other regional efforts can and should complement this process. We would note in this regard one initiative that my country has facilitated, the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission, which is aimed at promoting security and stability in and between the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. We are confident that these countries, which are also signatories to the Nairobi Pact, will fulfill their commitments to enhance cooperation for peace among Commission members.

World Bank Article - Post Conflict DRC Challenges

2007-03-13T16:19:00.000-04:00

Source: The World Bank Group

Date: 08 Mar 2007

Post-conflict DRC moves to reintegrate former soldiers, protect forests

World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz gets a first-hand look today at one of the biggest challenges to the Democratic Republic of the Congo as it emerges from decades of strife.

With fears lingering that a relapse into conflict is still a possibility notably across the country’s “lawless far east”, thousands of former soldiers or militia members are re-learning how to be civilians — embracing jobs, reintegrating families and societies, and even returning to school.

Several of the former soldiers told their personal stories to Wolfowitz at a regional center of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (CONADER) in Kisangani at the start of a two-day visit to this resource-rich but poverty-stricken nation of 66 million people.

The World Bank supports DR Congo’s transition to peace through a US$100 million Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, funded by the International Development Agency—the arm of the World Bank that provides interest-free credits and grants.

Some 100,595 former soldiers have been demobilized—given up their weapons and left the army or an armed group. Of these, 69,000 are being reintegrated into society.

Militias have also released about 30,000 children who served as child combatants or as sex slaves; 80 percent have been reunited with their families thanks to the program.

Despite the progress, the new DRC government, elected in October 2006, still needs to encourage a further 60,000 to 70,000 armed forces members to return to civilian life—an effort expected to require another US$60 million.

And the government—the first democratically elected in 40 years—has other major challenges.

DRC is one of the poorest countries in Africa, with two-thirds or possibly three-quarters of the population living below the poverty threshold of a dollar a day. Some regions have poverty levels above 80 percent.

Only 60 percent of children are enrolled in primary school, according to the most recent data, and infant mortality—at 1,850 per 100,000 live births—is the highest in Africa.

Social safety net programs are virtually non-existent. Parents pay most of the costs of operating schools, and patients bear most of their health costs.

But as DRC has become more stable over the last year, there have been promising signs for the economy. GDP growth remained above 5 percent in 2006. More than US$1 billion in foreign direct investment flowed to DRC in 2006 despite its ranking as the worst country in the world according to the “Doing Business Indicators.”

Though the country’s formal economy virtually collapsed in the last few decades, DRC is rich in natural and human resources: fertile soils, ample rainfall, and mineral resources. Mining of copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, zinc and other metals, as well as petroleum extraction, once accounted for 75 percent of its GDP.

A major peace dividend may therefore accrue from the new opportunity afforded by newfound peace and security to improve the sustainable management of and protection of the country’s vast resources, including the forests of the Congo Basin, the second largest rainforest in the world.

Forest Conservation Reforms

Some warn, however, that peace and new roads may bring chaotic development to the forest belt, harm biodiversity, or lead to conflict over traditional rights if efforts to reform forest management don’t take hold.

In 2002, acting on Bank advice, DRC canceled illegal forest concessions (rights to harvest trees) affecting over 25 million hectares—an area as large as the United Kingdom.

Last month at a conference in Brussels the new government pledged to boost the country’s conservation efforts by maintaining a moratorium on new logging, implementing a legal review of existing concessions, and providing legal recognition for the rights of indigenous people.

The stakes are high. Some 40 million people rely on the forest for their food, medicines, energy and income. Indigenous groups—among them the Pygmies—rely almost entirely on the forest.

The Bank, which administers the Multidonor Forest Trust Fund on behalf of the European Commission, Belgium, France, and the UK, plans to support DRC’s reform efforts with a new project, financed with IDA funds, to strengthen the forest department, the nature conservation institute, and civil society organizations.

Country Assistance Strategy

The Bank will also support DRC’s recovery and reform through a new Country Assistance Strategy, expected to be presented to the Bank’s Board in mid-2007.

The CAS will devote resources to:

- good governance and peace

- macroeconomic stability and economic growth

- access to social services and reducing vulnerability

- HIV/AIDS

- and promotion of community dynamics.

Since 2001, the Bank has committed US$2.4 billion to DRC and disbursed US$1.2 billion. About US$1.6 billion has been committed to nine projects to support infrastructure rehabilitation, social services delivery, institutional strengthening, consolidating peace and promoting economic stability, and health sector rehabilitation, among other things.

BBC Article: Congo Arrest over Missing Uranium

2007-03-08T13:55:00.000-05:00

Congo arrest over missing uranium

The Democratic Republic of Congo's top atomic energy official is being held over allegations of uranium smuggling.

Atomic energy centre director Fortunat Lumu and an aide have been questioned since their arrest on Tuesday.

A large quantity of uranium is reported to have gone missing in recent years, although state prosecutor Tshimanga Mukeba did not reveal any figures.

He told the BBC an "important quantity" of uranium was taken from the nuclear centre and they were investigating.

DR Congo's daily newspaper Le Phare reported that more than 100 bars of uranium as well as an unknown quantity of uranium contained in helmet-shaped cases, had disappeared from the nuclear centre in Kinshasa as part of a vast trafficking of the material going back years.

But the BBC's Kinshasa correspondent, Arnaud Zajtman, says that as of yet, no evidence has been made public to support the allegations made by the newspaper.

Creation of centre

Uranium is the basic raw material of both civilian and military nuclear programmes.

A mine in Congo's southern province of Katanga supplied the uranium that was used in the atomic bombs that were dropped by the Americans on the Japanese town of Hiroshima in 1945.

To thank and reward Congo, the Americans funded the creation of Congo's nuclear centre in 1958.

It was established on the university campus and only for research purpose.

But in the late 1970s, a bar of uranium disappeared from the centre, raising concern about security at the site.

Moreover, the site of the centre is facing some erosion problems. And people fear a landslide that could lead to a wider disaster, our reporter says.

In recent years, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency has visited the centre and security was believed to have improved.

Last year, a partnership was also signed between Congo's atomic energy centre and British company Brinkley Mining, aiming at prospecting for uranium deposits in the Congo.

But our correspondent says that this new allegation of uranium smuggling might tarnish DR Congo's ability to handle dangerous and expansive products such as uranium and raise concerns about who might benefit.

Ecumenical Advocacy Days this Weekend!

2007-03-07T09:38:00.000-05:00

Join thousands of other Americans as they advocate in Washington, DC this weekend for the issues they care about.

Check out the website for schedule and information about the different tracks:
www.advocacydays.org

Below is the list of Africa Track workshops (several members of the coalition have put a lot of planning and work into some of these workshops).

For more information about the Coalition's role in the Ecumenical Advocacy Days, contact Rocco Puopolo at director@afjn.org

Africa

Universally parents hope that their hard work will give their children better lives; but today in sub-Saharan Africa more than 11 million children under the age of 15 have lost at least one parent to HIV/AIDS; millions more face their future as orphans confronting disease, poverty, hunger, and war. We must challenge the crisis of survival caused by the rising death rate of children under the age of five, from preventable causes. The world has enough knowledge, wealth, food and medicine for all people to achieve a wholesome existence. Along with African experts and activists, in interactive workshops, Africa Track participants will explore ways to transform U.S. policy towards Africa and challenge international systems designed so that trade, loans and investment impoverish many for the benefit of a few. Come join the call we will take to Congress for cancellation of Africa's $200 billion plus debt burden, and take home new clarity from workshops on the impact of the "war on terror", trade, aid and overcoming regional conflicts.

Saturday March 10 2007

Track Time 1 9:00am - 10:30am

Plenary 1 Washington Room

Debt and Trade: Alternatives to Unjust Systems

(Co-sponsored with Jubilee/ Economic Justice Track)

Speakers:
Emily Joy Sikazwe - Executive Director, Women for Change, Zambia
Francis Ng’ambi - Economic Justice Network of the Fellowship of the Christian Councils in Southern Africa

People of faith have been leading the way for policies that enforce fair trade instead of free trade and debt cancellation without conditionality. Become more familiar with the global systems that involve debt and trade. Learn why the current model isn’t working and what we can do to implement alternatives. Hear from partners in the global south about grassroots campaigns and learn how these tie in with US grassroots campaigns.

Track Time 11 Workshops 10:45am - 12:15pm

Child Solders and Conflict: The Roots of Conflict and Ways to Peace

Jackson Room

(Co-sponsored with theGlobal Security Track)

Facilitators:
Father Rocco Puopolo, s.x. - Executive Director, Africa Faith and Justice Network
Rev. Mark Koenig - Presbyterian Peacemaking Program

Panelists:
Fr. Rocco Puopolo, s.x. - "Use and Abuse of Children as Soldiers and the Role of the Extractive Industry."
Mr. Jacques Bahati - Rutchuru, DRC, Intern at Africa Faith and Justice Network, "Experiences in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”
Ms. Nita Evele - Kinshasa, DRC, Vice Chair of Congo Global Action, "Working for Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo."
Jo Becker - Human Rights Watch (Invited) , "Legislative Initiatives to Address the Use of Child Soldiers.”
Joel Hanisek - Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) United Nations Representative,"The Role of the United Nations in Addressing the Use of Child Soldiers.”
Andrew Briggs - Artist

Moderator: Mark Koenig

Participants will probe the continuing use and abuse of child soldiers. Panelists with experience in Sierra Leone, DRCongo and Uganda will connect the dots, situating the reality of this child abuse in areas where exploitative extractive industries continue to flourish. Workshop participants will discuss creative ways people are moving forward, in Africa and the U.S, to offer hope and healing to these children. DRC youth driven efforts will be shared, along with initiatives of the newly establishedCongo Global Action Coalition, work at the UN and ways to advocate for important pending Congressional legislation. An exhibit of art done by child soldiers of Uganda will form part of this workshop, and recent viewers of the popular movie “Blood Diamonds” will be able to deepen their understanding of reality on the ground

Trade and Investment Policy Impacts on AIDS in Africa

Harrison Room

Moderator:
Kathy McNeely – Policy Analyst/Advocate for Church World Service

Speakers:
Asia Russell - Director of International Policy for Health GAP
George Ngolwe - Oblates of Mary Immaculate
Mhizha Edmund Chifamba - Washington Office on Africa

This workshop dissect a variety of US Trade & Investment policies which negatively impact access to affordable medicines responding to the AIDS pandemic in Africa . Participants will gain an understanding of patent issues currently at play in trade negotiations and legislation, as well as corporate responsibility issues around the availability of affordable pediatric drugs and formulations. The workshop will also explore investments in Africa and how they benefit or hinder the struggle against HIV/AIDS - especially looking at food security and nutrition investments. Participants will share examples of actions that can be taken in their congregations to raise awareness, educate and advocate.

Track Time 111 Plenary 2 2:45pm - 4:15pm

Bridging the Divide: U.S. Africa Policy and African Priorities/ Do U.S Priorities Answer Africa's Needs?”

Washington Room

Facilitator:
Marie Clarke Brill - Director of the Department of Public Education and Mobilization, Africa Action.

Speakers:
Emira Woods - Co-Director, Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies.

This will be an interactive plenary session that will explore the primary U.S. policy priorities regarding Africa and compare these with the priorities of African civil society and their governments. Experts in U.S. Africa policy and African guests will serve as resource people to help deepen the full group discussion. Together we will conclude by identifying ways that people of faith can engage in solidarity with Africans to bridge the divide between current U.S. policy and our common desire to build right relationships between the U.S. and Africa

Track Time 1V Workshops 4:30pm - 6:00pm

"And How are Africa's Children"

Wilson Room

Facilitator:
Kathy McNeely - Policy Analyst/Advocate for Church World Service

Moderator:
Brother Paul O'Keefe - worked with East and West African street children in crisis, is now at Maryknoll Office of Global Concern.

Speakers:
Emira Woods - Co-Director, Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies.
Neema Niani Laizer – Kenyan High-School Maasai Student, member of the Maryknoll Delegation to the 2007 Commission on the Status of Women.
Kolleen Bouchane – Campaign Manager, Global Education for All, RESULTS.

This workshop will explore the state of children living in Africa through the lens of child labor and access to education. Specifically, the workshop will delve into issues of exploitative labor practices and the fate of the girl child in Africa . The presenters will give a picture of conditions created by bad policy, business practices and other pressures that make being a child in Africa difficult. They will describe development and education programs targeted to reach these children, hopeful stories of how the children cope. Participants will be introduced to corporate and other campaigns and actions in which they can participate to respond to children's needs.

“Never Again? Darfur, Genocide and the International Response”

Washington Room

Coordinator:
Marie Clarke Brill - Director of the Department of Public Education and Mobilization, Africa Action.

Speakers:
Elnour Adam – Project Director, Darfur Rehabilitation Project, Founder and Executive Director African Peace Advocates Network (APAN)
Zeinab Eyega - Executive Director and founder of Sauti Yetu, an advocacy organization
Fr Michael Perry – Coordinator of the Africa Program at Franciscans International

Four years into the conflict in Darfur , western Sudan , almost half a million people have lost their lives and almost 3 million people have been displaced from their homes. Just over a decade ago, the international community refused to acknowledge that genocide was occurring in Rwanda . Today, though the U.S. has claimed “genocide” occurs in Darfur , the international community has failed to protect the people of Darfur . Join us for a workshop that will address the current situation in Darfur within the broader context of Sudan . We will explore the role of the U.S., the international community and concerned people of faith in achieving immediate protection for the people of Darfur and lasting peace and sustainable economic development in Sudan .

Sunday, March 11, 2007

Track Time V Workshops 2:00pm – 3:30pm

Mobilizing the Resources to End HIV/AIDS in Africa

Monroe Room

(Co-sponsor Jubilee/Economic Justice)

Facilitator:
Evelyn Sallah – Program Associate for Public Education and Mobilization, Africa Action.

Speakers:
Matthew Kavanagh – Executive Director, Global Justice
Rick Rowden - Senior Policy Analyst, Action Aid International, USA
Healy Thompson – Senior Associate for Advocacy and Outreach,Center for Health and Gender Equity (CHANGE)

“It was surreal: Here you had a country with huge human capacity problems that wanted desperately to retain its professionals in health and education, and increase their numbers, but the IMF wouldn’t allow them to do so. We are talking about a sovereign government, fighting the worst plague in history with but a handful of professionals.” (Steven Lewis, speaking about Malawi in 2002) Join us for an interactive session that explores the intersection of international debt and HIV/AIDS. We will address policy prescriptions that fuel the pandemic, hear a personal account of the reality of working in Africa in the context of HIV/AIDS and spotlight a few critical campaigns that will make a difference in the work to end HIV/AIDS in Africa.

“Debt 101: Africa Case Study”

Washington Room

(Co-Sponsor: Jubilee/Economic Justice)

Facilitator:
Jessica Walker Beaumont - Trade and Debt Specialist, AFSC

Speakers:
Debra Calhoun - Akron, OH field office organizer, AFSC
Jessica Walker Beaumont - Trade and Debt Specialist, AFSC
Debayani Kar - Communications and Advocacy Coordinator, Jubilee
USA Network
Lori Reed - Program Director for International Affairs, AFSC St. Louis MO

This interactive workshop will use case studies and concrete examples to demonstrate why Africa ’s debt should be cancelled and what could be done with the resources.

“Shall we let Africa's children die of curable or preventable disease; prevent them from going to school; destroy their opportunities for meaningful work - to pay off odious loans made to their forefathers?”
-Archbishop Desmond Tutu

Track Time V1 Workshops 3:45pm – 5:15pm

“Preparing to Visit The Hill and Taking the Message Home”

Washington Room

Facilitator:
Father Rocco Puopolo, s.x.

Water for All

Jackson Room

(Sponsored by theJubilee/Economic Justice Track, co-sponsored by Africa Track)

Moderator:
Marty Shupack, Church World Service

Speakers:
Paul Maina – Senior Consultant, Center for Development Studies, Kenya
Carlos Correa - Minister for Environmental Justice, United Church of Christ

This workshop will explore the issues of commodification and privatization of water in the context of Africa and Latin America, with a view to how best to ensure safe, accessible, affordable and sustainable water and sanitation services in poor communities.

Announcement for Film Screening about Child Soldiers

2007-03-07T09:34:00.000-05:00

Citizens for Global Solutions Proudly Presents:

“From Conscription to Justice and Reintegration: Child Soldiers in Africa”

Monday, March 12, 2007 from 3pm to 5:30pm
Stewart R. Mott House, 122 Maryland Ave. NE, Washington, D.C. 20002

Please join us, Bukeni T. Waruzi Beck, Executive Director of AJEDI-Ka/Projet Enfants Soldats, and Madeleine, a former girl soldier from the DRC, for a discussion and screening on child soldiers and the work of Mr. Beck’s organization.

A light reception will follow.

Space is limited so please RSVP no later than Thursday, March 8 to gkheiltash@globalsolutions.org.

Created to provide justice and accountability to victims of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has
commenced its first landmark case against a Congolese warlord accused of forcibly
recruiting and conscripting tens of thousands of child soldiers in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC).

The systematic and widespread use of children—the most vulnerable members of the population—in armed conflict is not new. The plight of these children continues to shock the conscience and demands immediate and urgent action.

In a recent visit to the ICC, Citizens for Global Solutions Legal Analyst, Golzar Kheiltash, met with a remarkable man fighting on the frontlines on behalf of child soldiers in Africa. Mr. Bukeni T. Waruzi Beck is an activist and filmmaker who has dedicated his life to not only revealing the plight of child soldiers, but to giving these children a second chance. Mr. Beck documents the stories of hundreds of child soldiers on film, revealing a stark and systematic cycle of recruitment and conscription, narrated by the children and their families in their own words. His films powerfully demonstrate the difficulties of many children who want to
reintegrate into their communities after leaving the camps. This is especially true with girl soldiers who have suffered the added brutality of rape and sexual violence at the hands of their commanders.

Through his NGO, AJEDI-Ka/Projet Enfants Soldats, Mr. Beck combines the power of film with thepower of hope: a dedicated staff of eight works tirelessly to demobilize and reintegrate girl and boy soldiers and maintain long term follow up on the welfare of these children. In the words of Mr. Beck, “we at AJEDIKa/Projet Enfants Soldats devote our efforts to protecting the rights of children and the promotion of justice in their cause.”

Citizens for Global Solutions is proud to highlight Mr. Beck’s extraordinary work and provide our friends and colleagues with the opportunity to engage him on this critical issue.

For more information on AJEDI Ka/Projet Enfants Soldats, please visit:
http://www.ajedika.org/index.html

Support Peace Keeping Forces in the Congo-Contract Ends April 15

2007-02-28T10:00:00.000-05:00

APRIL 15 IS A CRITICAL DATE!!! IT IS THE DAY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES ON THE CONTRACT TO RENEW PEACEKEEPING TROUPS (MONUC) IN THE
CONGO. Please send letters IMMEDIATELY to support the extension of
the UN contract to retain peace keeping forces in the Congo for two more years. The women and children of the Congo need protection!!!!

Sending three letters only takes 10 minutes. Go to -- www.firstpresevanston.org -- click on the picture of the Congolese women and fax or email the letters found there.

PLEASE ENCOURAGE THE ORGANIZATIONS THAT YOU REPRESENT TO SEND LETTERS TOO.

(From Janet Sullivan, Congo Coalition)

Update from Southern Africa Resource Watch

2007-02-28T09:54:00.000-05:00

The new government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has produced its plan of action for 2007-2011. It has also put out a short plan of action for this year which will run from March 2007 to December 2007. In this short plan of action which is called “Government Contract” the actions of government in the extractive Industries will focus on:

the implementation of the EITI (this has certainly reduced the doubt we had about the commitment of the new government to implement the initiative);

the publication of important documents and analysis of all contracts in the extractive industry;

the renegotiation of dubious contracts;

reform of all national extractive companies;

the elaboration and adoption of adequate and transparent procedures in dealing with new mining contracts (exploration or exploitation);

conclusion and publication of the judicial evaluation currently taking place on logging concessions with the view to cancelling the dubious ones.

building the capacity of the Congolese office in charge of the environment to be able to apply concrete actions to protect the environment.

This is certainly good news for the DRC. We need to monitor that government does respect its commitment.

Global Witness Press Release - En Français

2007-02-21T10:20:00.001-05:00

Date d’embargo : 21 février 2007, 00h01 GMT

Global Witness enjoint le gouvernement britannique de demander des comptes à la société Afrimex pour avoir alimenté le conflit

en République démocratique du Congo

Global Witness, une organisation non gouvernementale basée à Londres, a déposé une plainte contre la société britannique Afrimex auprès du Point de contact national, dans le cadre des nouvelles procédures renforcées mises en place par le gouvernement et portant sur l’examen des infractions aux Principes directeurs de l’OCDE à l’intention des entreprises multinationales.

Global Witness est convaincu que le commerce des minerais pratiqué par Afrimex a directement contribué au brutal conflit et aux violations massives des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo (RDC).

« La réaction du gouvernement britannique à cette plainte permettra de vérifier qu’il a réellement l’intention de demander des comptes aux sociétés britanniques », explique le directeur de Global Witness, Patrick Alley. « Les sociétés sont tenues de respecter les Principes directeurs de l’OCDE, mais la responsabilité finale du contrôle d’application des Principes revient au gouvernement. »

La plainte déposée par l’ONG affirme que la société Afrimex, qui s’est livrée au commerce du coltan et de la cassitérite (minerai d’étain) pendant toute la durée du conflit en RDC depuis 1996, a versé des impôts au Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), un groupe rebelle armé connu pour ses graves violations des droits de l’homme, responsable de massacres de civils, d’actes de torture et de violences sexuelles. Au cours du conflit, le RCD-Goma contrôlait de grandes parties des provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu, dans l’est de la RDC, où se trouvent des mines de coltan et de cassitérite.

La plainte dénonce également les risques mortels auxquels sont exposés les mineurs de cassitérite et le recours au travail forcé et à la main-d’œuvre enfantine. « L’ouverture d’une enquête qui révèlera si la société Afrimex s’est en partie approvisionnée auprès de ces mines est tout à fait justifiée », déclare Patrick Alley.

La société Afrimex a régulièrement refusé de reconnaître l’impact négatif de ses activités en RDC, malgré les enquêtes menées par les ONG, par un Groupe d’experts de l’ONU et par le Comité du développement international du Parlement britannique. Le directeur d’Afrimex a admis avoir versé des impôts au RCD-Goma et ignorer l’usage qui était fait de ces versements.

« L’argent versé par Afrimex au RCD-Goma a perpétué le conflit et, en accroissant la puissance des rebelles, leur a permis d’infliger des sévices extrêmes à la population civile », affirme Patrick Alley. « Il existe de nombreuses preuves des violations massives des droits de l’homme commises par le RCD-Goma, mais Afrimex a choisi de fermer les yeux sur celles-ci. »

Le texte complet de la plainte déposée par Global Witness peut être consulté sur http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/507/fr/plainte_contre_afrimex_uk_ltd_dans_le_cadre_de_la_.

Pour plus d’informations, veuillez contacter :

Carina Tertsakian (anglais, français) : + 44 207 561 6372

Remarque à l’attention des rédacteurs :

Global Witness est une organisation non gouvernementale indépendante dont la mission est d’enquêter et de faire campagne sur les liens entre l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, les conflits et la corruption.

Toutes les publications de Global Witness sont disponibles sur le site www.globalwitness.org

Global Witness Press Release - Afrimex

2007-02-21T10:17:00.000-05:00

Global Witness calls upon the UK Government to hold British company Afrimex to account for fuelling conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The London-based non-governmental organisation Global Witness has submitted a complaint against British company Afrimex to the UK National Contact Point under the government’s new, strengthened procedures for considering breaches of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

Global Witness believes that Afrimex’s trade in minerals contributed directly to the brutal conflict and large-scale human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

“The UK Government’s response to this complaint will be a test of its seriousness in holding British companies to account,” said Global Witness Director Patrick Alley. “Companies have a duty to abide by the OECD Guidelines, but ultimately the responsibility for ensuring that they do so rests with the government.”

The complaint describes how Afrimex, which traded in the minerals coltan and cassiterite (tin ore) throughout the conflict in the DRC from 1996 onwards, made tax payments to the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), an armed rebel group with a well-documented record of carrying out grave human rights abuses, including massacres of civilians, torture and sexual violence. During the conflict, the RCD-Goma controlled large parts of the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, where coltan and cassiterite are mined.

The complaint also highlights the life-threatening conditions in cassiterite mines and the use of forced labour and child labour. “There are reasonable grounds to investigate whether Afrimex sourced some of its products from such mines,” said Patrick Alley.

Afrimex has persistently failed to recognise the negative impact of its activities in the DRC, despite scrutiny by non-governmental organisations, a UN Panel of Experts, and the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee. Afrimex’s director has admitted that the company made tax payments to the RCD-Goma and that it did not know how this money was used.

“Afrimex’s payments to the RCD-Goma perpetuated the conflict and strengthened the rebels’ capacity to inflict extreme suffering on the civilian population,” said Patrick Alley. “There was abundant evidence of widespread human rights abuses by the RCD-Goma, which Afrimex chose to ignore.”

The full text of Global Witness’s complaint is available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/507/en/complaint_against_afrimex_uk_ltd_under_the_specifi.

For more information, please contact:

Carina Tertsakian (English, French): +44 207 561 6372

Note to editors:

Global Witness is an independent non-governmental organisation which investigates and campaigns on the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption.

All Global Witness’s publications can be found at www.globalwitness.org

Security Sector Reform in the Congo - ICG report

2007-02-21T10:16:00.000-05:00

Source: International Crisis Group (ICG)

Date: 13 Feb 2007

Security sector reform in the Congo

Africa Report N°104

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

No issue is more important than security sector reform in determining the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s prospects for peace and development. Two particular challenges loom large: the security services must be able to maintain order during the national elections scheduled for April 2006 and reduce the country’s staggering mortality rate from the conflict – still well over 30,000 every month. On the military side, far more must be done to create an effective, unified army with a single chain of command, rather than simply demobilising militias and giving ex-combatants payout packages. International attention to police reform has been much less than that given to military restructuring: the limited efforts have had some important successes but suffer from a patchwork approach that largely neglects the countryside. Establishing a secure environment is not possible without a thorough security assessment that takes into account the country’s risks, needs, capabilities and financial means. A realistic plan is needed that defines the role of the security forces and reconciles their needs and means for a sustainable future.

Reform of the army is far behind schedule. Eighteen integrated brigades were supposed to be created before elections but only six have been deployed, some of which are as much a security hazard as a source of stability, since they are often unpaid and prey on the local population. The police are supposed to be responsible for election security but are no match for local militias in many parts of the country.

Security sector reform continues to be a neglected stepchild both financially and in terms of strategic planning. While donors have already contributed more than $2 billion to the Congo, including generous amounts for demobilisation of ex-combatants, only a small fraction has been dedicated to improving the status and management of the armed forces and the police. While it is understandable that many donors are reluctant to engage with what have often been unsavoury elements, these forces are critical for stability. The current incentive structure to encourage reform is seriously distorted. Fighters are offered allowances totalling $410 to leave the military but a salary of only $10 a month if they choose army service, and even this too often never gets to them. Coordination of international efforts is also inadequate, though the European Union’s police (EUPOL) and military (EUSEC) missions have begun to stimulate improvements.

The army remains weak and could again collapse quickly if faced with a serious threat. Although most former belligerents now form the transitional government and formally support the new army, they and their ex-soldiers sometimes ignore orders from the military hierarchy that they consider to be in conflict with the interests of their respective factions. Indeed, the reluctance to move forward with reform in many security structures is a deliberate strategy on the part of the leaders who fought the 1998-2002 war to preserve their ability to respond with force if the elections do not turn out to their satisfaction.

This report gives special attention to the European Union and its member states’ contributions on security sector reform as part of an ongoing examination of the EU’s growing global role in conflict prevention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On police training and reform

To Donors and the United Nations:

1. Agree on a long-term common training program and use the new police reflection group (groupe de réflexion) to:

(a) improve liaison between donors and Congolese institutions, notably the National Police, immediately and harmonise training programs;

(b) conduct a systematic review of the police before elections to evaluate the most important threats to human security; and

2. Accompany training on human rights codes and conduct with greater emphasis on the practical operational details of policing so that trainees receive a strong grounding in such basics as investigation, forensic evidence collection, interviewing and protecting witnesses and children (especially in sexual violence cases), handling crime scenes, and helping prosecutors build cases.

3. Make completion of a proper accounting of available police manpower a priority.

4. Condition further donor aid on an increase in police salaries and separation of payment of those salaries from the chain of command along the lines of the model now being used for the army as a means to combat corruption and promote loyalty to the force.

To the Congolese Authorities:

5. Establish specially trained and equipped squads to combat the high prevalence of violent sex crimes and create safe rooms for children and survivors of sexual violence in police stations.

6. Recruit proactively and promote women with the ultimate aim of establishing much greater parity in the police service.

On army training and reform

To the Congolese Authorities:

7. Integrate and simplify, in consultation with donors, the national command and decision-making structures so as to improve coordination between the various reform programs and reduce opportunities to stall the process.

8. Conduct, in consultation with donors, a systematic review of the army that evaluates security threats and seeks to match needs and resources in a comprehensive long-term strategy.

9. Reduce the army’s target size from 100,000-125,000 to a more realistic and sustainable 60,000-70,000.

10. Reduce the Presidential Guard dramatically from 12,000-15,000 to 600-800 troops and integrate the remainder into the regular army structure.

11. Move as quickly as possible in the parliament after the April 2006 elections to establish an appropriate defence oversight committee and require the government to detail fully its proposed defence spending in the annual budget.

To Donors and the United Nations:

12. Expand the EU plan to separate salary payment from the chain of command with salary increases and improved living conditions for rank and file soldiers, conditioning further aid to the military on prompt implementation.

13. Establish an International Military Assistance and Training Team (IMATT), including the European Union’s military mission (EUSEC) and participation from such major donors as the EU, Angola and South Africa, as a means of coordinating security sector reform and advisory programs and to:

(a) take a hands-on approach by having technical advisers oversee the payroll and accompany training and subsequent operations of deployed units;

(b) help establish standards and train Congolese trainers; and

14. Increase donor investment in army integration to match support for the demobilisation process, using funds in particular for equipment, housing, health care and school fees for soldiers’ children, starting with the integrated brigades.

To the European Union:

15. Consult immediately with the Congolese authorities and the UN and deploy additional forces, for example the new EU gendarmerie, to secure Lubumbashi and pacify northern and central Katanga.

16. Continue to adopt a constructive and flexible approach toward the need to increase investment in reform of the military sector, consistent with ODA eligibility under OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines, as the Commission did recently in justifying its financing of the refurbishment of army integration centres.

To the UN Security Council:

17. Follow-up more aggressively in the Congo Sanctions Committee cases where the panel of experts has identified regional violators of the arms embargo and implement targeted sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans to help the elected government acquire a monopoly of force in the country.

To the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC):

18. Review the conditions and guidelines of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility in the DAC to satisfy any concerns donors may have about the propriety of engaging more proactively in security sector reform.

Nairobi/Brussels, 13 February 2006

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UNHCR seeks $62 Million for Congolese refugees, internally displaced

2007-02-16T11:35:00.000-05:00

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Date: 13 Feb 2007

UNHCR seeks $62 million for Congolese refugees, internally displaced

GENEVA - The UN refugee agency announced today that it is seeking a total of $62 million for programmes aimed at helping hundreds of thousands of people displaced within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well as Congolese refugees in neighbouring countries.

UNHCR is seeking $47 million to support the return and reintegration this year of some 98,500 Congolese refugees to their homeland. It is also asking donors for a further $15 million to provide protection and assistance during the same period for an estimated 1.1 million internally displaced people (IDP) in the African nation.

The agency hopes for a prompt and adequate response to its appeals from the donor community. The two supplementary appeals * one for IDPs and one for refugees -- cite important developments in the DRC last year, including the inauguration of President Joseph Kabila in December after the country's first democratic elections in four decades. This has raised hopes that Congolese living in exile and those displaced internally will soon be able to return to their homes.

Since October 2004, some 89,000 Congolese refugees have repatriated * mostly to Equateur, South Kivu and Katanga provinces. In addition, nearly half a million IDPs went back to their places of origin last year.

"We have to seize the chance and build on the positive developments, stability and number of returns achieved last year," said UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres. "The international community has a unique opportunity here -- if we can maintain the momentum and show Congolese that they are not alone. Timely funding is crucial for the successful repatriation and reintegration of Congolese refugees, as well as to anchor those who have already come home."

More than 400,000 Congolese still live in exile, virtually all of them in nine neighbouring countries. They live in camps or designated areas and most have no resources to return on their own. Some have spent decades in exile, waiting for lasting peace to return.

The $47 million that UNHCR is seeking, in addition to the regular annual budget, will cover voluntary repatriation programmes for Congolese refugees from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Republic of Congo and Zambia.

UNHCR's main objectives are to ensure the voluntary nature of returns and to organise these movements in a safe and dignified manner. The refugee agency will also support the reintegration of returnees and facilitate their access to shelter as well as basic services such as health and education.

The number of IDPs in DRC fell by about a third last year, but there are still an estimated 1.1 million people displaced within the country. UNHCR's appeal for $15 million for IDPs is aimed at helping these people, most of whom live with relatives or host families.

In the appeal, UNHCR projects that as many as 950,000 of the IDPs could return to their homes in 2007. However, hundreds of thousands of Congolese were newly displaced last year due to localised outbreaks of fighting and this remains a major concern for UNHCR. There is still an environment of widespread impunity in parts of the country, and the human rights of the displaced are often violated.

The extra funds will allow UNHCR to establish protection-monitoring mechanisms in the areas of displacement and return, and to conduct early warning and prevention activities. Security permitting, UNHCR will support the establishment of mechanisms to settle land and property disputes, providing humanitarian assistance to IDP returnees and promoting inter-ethnic coexistence.

There are considerable challenges for UNHCR and its humanitarian and development partners in achieving these objectives. Parts of the DRC, particularly in the east, remain volatile. The country is among the poorest in the world. Life expectancy is low, the rule of law is very weak and social and economic conditions are extremely difficult.

In addition, HIV/AIDS is a big problem and is exacerbated by the widespread lack of basic health and education services. Meanwhile, the poor communications and transportation networks in such a huge country make the work of UNHCR and its partners even more difficult.

2007-02-16T09:30:00.000-05:00

Oxfam Briefing Paper 97
EMBARGOED UNTIL 09:00 HRS GMT Monday 12th February 2007
A Fragile Future
Why scaling down MONUC too soon could spell disaster for the Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and
opportunities of rebuilding a nation from the ground up. The
presence of United Nations peacekeepers (MONUC) has
significantly reduced fighting and organised violence, and must
be maintained with an appropriate troop strength and mandate
to guarantee peace and long-term stability.
MONUC should not scale down its activities until the Congolese
security forces – and in particular the army – stop posing a
threat to their own populations and instead begin providing
security and protection to the Congolese people.

Summary
In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early 2007,
despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the correct policy
choices are made in the next few months.
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) has supported the Congolese government in the political
transition process. It deserves the praise it has received for assisting DRC
with its successful elections and other recent achievements.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the crucial
role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC. Through its
military presence and operations MONUC has been able to restore stability
to large parts of the war-torn country, thereby reducing incidents of
organised violence against civilians and increasing humanitarian access and
economic activities.
There is little doubt that, without a substantial and effective MONUC
presence, this relative stabilisation of the security situation could quickly
unravel and threaten the wider region as well. MONUC officials,
humanitarian actors, and civilians who have been affected by violence are
warning the international community of the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences that a premature scaling back of MONUC presence could
induce. ‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain community leaders in Ituri, eastern
DRC. ‘It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us. Not yet.’
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of approximately
130,000) have already been integrated into a new national army, it has
become clear that the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo) is in no position to defend itself – or any civilian in
its care – against militia warlords, foreign rebels, local defence forces, or any
other armed actors. Attacks on government forces in North Kivu in
November 2006 have served as a timely reminder that, without full support
from MONUC, the Congolese army is completely incapable of preventing
attempts to seize major population centres such as Goma.
Underpaid, underfed, ill-equipped and badly led, FARDC soldiers in all of the
eastern provinces remain the single biggest cause of insecurity in DRC,
responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all human-rights abuses
against civilians. Similar accusations of abuse are also levelled against other
arms of the security forces (including police) and ‘demobilised’ excombatants
who continue to rely on violence as a means of survival.

In essence, most of the security forces that are meant to be protecting the
civilian populations from the numerous threats still present in DRC are
unable, or unwilling, to do so.

The new Congolese government has cited reform of the security sector as
one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a desire to support
the government in this process, particularly with co-ordination, training, and
advice. A strong MONUC commitment to the security-sector reform (SSR)
should be considered a vital element of any post-transition mandate, and
any exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be linked to progress
indicators on SSR processes, most importantly the military, police, and
judicial sectors.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by its
security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised combatants,
MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence to protect civilians
from immediate threats and creating a stable environment in which longerterm
reforms can take place.

The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and extraordinary
efforts of the Congolese citizens to lead their country into a new era are not
rewarded with a ‘cut and run’ attitude of immediate disengagement by the
international community. Instead, the Security Council must make it a priority
with the key member states, such as the USA, to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the protection of
the civilian population from appalling levels of insecurity and abuse.
Maintain the robust use of force to protect civilians but use the
mandate review to take measures to improve MONUC’s operational
effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to demonstrable
progress on security-sector reform, beginning with a clear reduction
in the levels of abuses committed by the security forces themselves,
and a basic ability of military, police, and judicial sectors to defend
the population from external and internal threats.
• Ensure that existing MONUC military presence prioritises the
protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a clearer
definition of protection, more operational guidance, and better tools
to translate the concept of protection into concrete action on the
ground.
• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full support to
the newly created democratic processes and institutions, and the
protection and promotion of human rights. Offer strategic and
operational support to the new sovereign government in combating
the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal arms trade.
The Congolese people deserve no less than a clear signal that their massive
sacrifices have been worth the effort, and that the international community
will work together with their new government to make a better future in DRC
possible.

1 Introduction

In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic
elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early
2007, despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the
correct policy choices are made in the next few months.
Over the past few years, DRC has transformed itself from a
completely divided country (where travel between the eastern and
western parts was impossible) to a nation united by a cautious but
fervent sense of hope.
Yet, despite the incredible progress that has been made on some
fronts, DRC faces a number of daunting challenges, most notably
dealing with regular outbreaks of violence in the east, and the
constant fear of renewed national instability.
Across many parts of the country – and especially in Ituri, the Kivus,
and Katanga – Congolese people are still confronted every day with
the threat of violence, extortion, rape, torture, or murder at the hands
of hundreds of thousands of armed combatants.
An estimated four million civilians have died as a result of conflict
since August 1998, the most devastating death toll in any armed
conflict since World War Two.1 There are clear indications that these
trends are reversible,2 but such progress will require strong political
and financial commitments from both the new DRC government and
the international community.

2 MONUC’s impact to date

In 1999 – when the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) first arrived in DRC – even
optimists would have been hard pressed to predict the recent success
of the Congolese elections.
MONUC deserves the praise it has received for the assistance it has
offered the Congolese government in the political transition process.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the
crucial role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC.
Having evolved significantly over the years, MONUC’s current
mandate (defined in 37 separate UN Security Council resolutions) has
often been described as a patchwork of wide-ranging – and
sometimes competing – political, military, and humanitarian
objectives. While humanitarian actors feel that MONUC’s
responsibility to protect civilians from violence3 has not always been
prioritised as highly as other elements of the mandate, and MONUC
has failed to perform in some areas (including an initial failure to
prevent incidents of abuse by a small number of its own
peacekeepers4), there is no doubt that MONUC has been able to
restore stability to large parts of the war-torn country.
In all of DRC’s provinces, MONUC has gained control over and
secured major towns and cities. In addition, MONUC’s military
presence and logistical capacity has significantly increased
humanitarian access (and also economic opportunities) to previously
insecure or remote rural areas (for example along the Rwindi–
Rutshuru road in North Kivu, the Bunia–Kasenyi road in Ituri and
the main Bunia–Beni and Bunia–Mahagi commercial routes).
The presence of MONUC troops has reduced incidents of organised
violence against the civilian populations. Especially in Ituri,
MONUC’s operations against militia groups (for example around
Mahagi)5 have succeeded in disarming the majority of combatants6
and allowing large parts of the population to return to their normal
lives. ‘When MONUC arrived, the militias left’, explained displaced
people in Djugu.7 Though MONUC’s performance has been criticised
in some parts of the country (see Section 5), the Ituri example has
shown that a consistent application of MONUC’s robust mandate can
contribute to improvements in the security situation.
The fact that people today walk along the street without fear in towns
like Bunia, which in 2003 witnessed several violent massacres of
civilians, is a simple but powerful indicator of the impact of
MONUC’s presence.
In areas where the security situation has stabilised, MONUC has
begun playing a role in helping displaced people return to their
villages of origin. MONUC patrols in places such as Malumbi or
Tshushubo (North Kivu) have given the population enough
confidence to leave their temporary camps and begin rebuilding their
lives in the villages.
On the whole, MONUC’s presence has been effective in improving
security in those areas where troops have been deployed. Proactive
efforts to protect civilians from violence have at times been
inconsistent or patchy, but there have also been a number of
successes (see Section 5).

3 ‘Not yet’ – the price of scaling down

One of the easiest ways of measuring MONUC’s impact is perhaps to
ask what would happen if it were not present in DRC.
‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain village chiefs and displaced
people in the lakeside villages of Tchomia and Kasenyi. ‘We would
leave tomorrow. It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us without
MONUC. Not yet.
Unfortunately, the sentiment is echoed not just in areas that are still
dominated by rebel or militia groups. It is also heard regularly in
those parts of the country that are under the control of the Congolese
army.
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of
approximately 130,000) have already undergone the ‘brassage’
process of being integrated into a new national army, it has become
clear that FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du
Congo) are in no position to defend themselves – or any civilian in
their care – against any kind of external threat or attack. ‘Brassage is
just a word. It means nothing when translated into reality’, admits a
FARDC commander in Beni.
It is well-known that FARDC soldiers in all of the eastern provinces
flee from the enemy when attacked, regularly discarding their
uniforms and hiding among the civilian populations. Command and
control functions are in some cases non-existent, with commanders
unaware of their troops’ movements or operations. ‘Some of these
guys can’t even shoot a gun’, explained a MONUC peacekeeper that
regularly carries out joint patrols with FARDC soldiers.

In the absence of a capable FARDC, it has often fallen to MONUC
soldiers to defend strategic areas. The recent example of dissident
general Laurent Nkunda’s attempted attack on the eastern city of
Goma illustrated the army’s reliance on MONUC. ‘MONUC’s Indian
Battalion was the only thing standing between Nkunda and Goma.
Without MONUC, Goma would have fallen’, concluded one UN
official in Goma.
Military experts (both foreign and Congolese) agree that FARDC
troops offer little protection against foreign or Congolese insurgent
groups who continue to harass and terrorise civilians. Such groups
include warlord militias, the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de
Libération du Rwanda) - presumed to be the remnants of the
Interahamwe or the Mai Mai – the name for Local Defence Forces.
In addition to their failure to protect civilians against external threats,
FARDC troops are themselves considered to be the major cause of
insecurity in DRC. MONUC’s human-rights monitors hold FARDC
soldiers responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all
human-rights abuses against civilians. FARDC soldiers regularly
extort or loot from the civilian populations, and commit violent
crimes such as arbitrary killings and rape. Similar accusations of
abuse are also levelled against non-organised armed actors, including
‘demobilised’ ex-combatants who continue to rely on violence as a
means of survival. The high incidence of crimes and abuses against
the civilian population in DRC has been made possible due to a
general climate of impunity and a complete lack of law and order.
Civilians are looking to MONUC to support their new government in
combating these problems, and ensuring that a relatively stable
environment will continue to allow humanitarian assistance to flow
to those in need. One of the ways in which MONUC has been doing –
and should continue to do – this is by supporting the new Congolese
government with its efforts to reform the security sector, especially
with regard to military, police, and judicial sectors.

4 No security without reform

In 2005, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made it clear that
‘the establishment of an integrated and professional army and police
force is a key element of the exit strategy for MONUC’. In other
words, UN member states should not withdraw MONUC – whose
deployment has been an expression of their responsibility to protect
civilians in DRC, until the new government establishes a functional
and accountable national army and police force.

The examples above illustrate the army’s current lack of capacity to
provide even the most basic physical security. Reasons for this
appear to be well-known, yet at the same time hard to tackle.
International advisers report extremely low rates of formal military
education among all brigades, and troops in the field are
notoriously ill-equipped to perform in any kind of battle. One of the
newly integrated brigades, for example, has been given just 24 handheld
radios (and no spare batteries) to share between approximately
3,500 people for communications during combat. Bullets are in
similarly short supply.
Troops also lack motivation (and – not fearing any prosecution from
a weak judicial system – begin to prey on local populations) because
they are underpaid and underfed, and living with their families in
conditions of extreme poverty and hardship.
Current monthly salaries consist of a miserly $25, and the complete
lack of soldiers’ welfare and health care routinely results in 15–20
deaths in each brigade per month. The abject state of neglect in
which soldiers and their families find themselves was aptly
illustrated by the 4th Integrated Brigade who arrived in Ituri in 2005
spreading infectious diseases such as cholera and fever to the local
populations in its path.
Other military actors are even less functional than the ground forces.
The Congolese Air Force is considered ‘structurally obsolete and in a
state of life-threatening dilapidation […], air or land combat capacity
is zero’. Little training has been carried out for air crew, technical, or
command elements since the Mobutu period.
The remaining branches of the security sector, including police,
judicial, and civilian agencies are as ill-equipped as the army to carry
out their work properly.
Courts and magistrates are in short supply. Only one prison (out of
a total of 145) in DRC actually has a budget for feeding its inmates.
And even though DRC has 258 registered airstrips, only 50 of them
are monitored by air-traffic controllers. There is no radar
surveillance system or navigational guidance system for aircraft in
DRC, and air-force communication systems do not function to any
satisfactory level.
The new Congolese government has cited security sector reform
(SSR) as one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a
desire to support the government in this process, particularly with
co-ordination, training, and advice. MONUC’s recently established
SSR cell acknowledges that any exit strategy for UN peacekeepers
8 A Fragile Future, Oxfam Briefing Paper, February 2007
will need to be closely linked to the progress on reform, most
importantly the military, police, and judicial sectors.
One of the challenges in this domain has been the fragmentation of
processes and initiatives. While the active involvement of several
bilateral donors in SSR processes is laudable, it is unlikely that small
or ad hoc projects (most of them limited to certain geographical areas
or specific units – ‘a few jeeps for two brigades in Ituri, a few pots of
paint for three new courthouses in Kinshasa’) will add up to an
impact that is equal to or greater than the sum of its parts.
The ultimate responsibility for the SSR process naturally rests with
the newly elected Congolese government, and external SSR actors are
currently looking to President Kabila to clearly signal his country’s
strategic and operational needs in this area. Donors and other actors
will need to ensure that their co-operation with the new government
does not suffer from the same fragmented approach as past
initiatives. A single actor (such as the European Union or MONUC)
should be appointed to take a clear lead on the co-ordination of
donor support to the SSR process. MONUC’s current involvement in
SSR processes (which includes hosting weekly SSR co-ordination
meetings) indicate that there is capacity to lead on day-to-day coordination
processes. It should be recognised, however, that the
temporary nature of MONUC’s mandate in DRC is unlikely to allow
for the kind of strategic and long-term co-ordination that can oversee
the entire lifespan of the SSR process (an undertaking military experts
estimate to take at least 15–20 years).
On the issue of building national capacity, donors should
acknowledge that MONUC’s presence in the field and its existing cooperation
with security forces make it a logical choice for initial
training schemes. For example, the proposed curriculum for a
MONUC-led basic military training programme (to be carried out in
all of FARDC’s integrated brigades) accurately reflects some of the
most pressing needs and priorities on the ground – both in terms of
basic military skills and the social welfare of soldiers and their
dependants. It should be noted, however, that MONUC’s proposed
45-day trainings are little more than initial steps in the training
process, and in themselves highly unlikely to allow FARDC to reach
operational capability immediately.
In addition to supporting co-ordination and training initiatives,
MONUC should increase its capacity to offer expert operational
advice to government actors leading SSR processes, in particular
regarding urgent but sensitive issues such as vetting of corrupt or
abusive officials in the army, police, and judicial systems.

Any realistic exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be
linked to progress indicators on SSR processes.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by
its security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised
combatants, MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence
to protect civilians from immediate threats and ensuring a stable
environment in which reforms can take place.

5 More effective protection of civilians

In March 2005, the UN Security Council reiterated its call to MONUC
to use ‘all necessary means within its capabilities and in the areas
where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of
force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, from any armed
group, foreign or Congolese’.
Experts have described MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate as ‘the most
assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians’.
Despite this, MONUC has sometimes been accused of behaving more
like a Chapter VI observer mission, using force only in self-defence
and doing little to physically protect civilians. ‘I don’t think they’re
allowed to open fire’, claims a Congolese NGO worker in Goma.
‘They did nothing to stop women getting raped in Bukavu and
Rutshuru. I’m scared they wouldn’t protect my daughters either if
there is more fighting here’. Reasons for such inaction are numerous
and often include a lack of resources and capacity, as well as the
prioritisation of more political aspects of the mandate over protection
objectives.
In addition, the concept of ‘civilian protection’ has often remained
vague and ill-defined, and peacekeepers are given very little
guidance on how they are expected to translate their mandate into
concrete tasks.
For MONUC to adequately carry out its ambitious mandate, forces
would benefit from a clearer understanding of the concept of
protection, more operational guidance, and better tools.
On a conceptual level, MONUC should consistently prioritise the
protection of civilians when considering how to counter ongoing and
well-known threats, for example the problem of dealing with
dissidents like Laurent Nkunda. MONUC’s inaction in the face of
Nkunda’s violent attacks on Bukavu in 2004, Rutshuru in 2005 or
Sake in 2006 is regularly cited by civilians in North and South Kivu as
an example of the international community failing to protect them
from violence. These incidents stand in marked contrast to MONUC
successes, such as the robust display of force MONUC battalions
launched when Nkunda attempted to seize the (perhaps strategically
more important) town of Goma in November 2006, or the way in
which MONUC has dealt with the threat of militia in Ituri.
In instances where MONUC has failed to deal with urgent protection
threats, populations have often expressed confusion and
resentment. A more consistent application of MONUC’s protection
mandate would do much to build confidence among these
populations.
Operationally – and more concretely – MONUC would also do well
to include clearer guidance on appropriate protection activities in
their military rules of engagement, for example troops’
responsibilities in preventing other actors (including the state’s own
security forces) from committing abuses against civilians.
Perhaps the single most important tool that MONUC can use to
protect civilians from threats is its sheer military presence. ‘When
MONUC is not around, when they are not doing patrols or going to
work as usual, people often don’t leave their houses. You have to
understand we still live in fear’, villagers around Lake Albert
explained. Specific steps that MONUC could take in this area are
outlined in the final recommendations in this paper.
It should be emphasised here that MONUC’s existing resources in
DRC are already overstretched. Any cut to current troop strength or
resources would therefore spell disaster for communities currently
benefiting from MONUC protection.

6 Beyond immediate security – a lasting peace?

Oxfam believes that by supporting the Congolese government in
reforming the security sector and consistently prioritising the
protection of civilians in military operations, MONUC could greatly
increase its impact on security in DRC. At the same time, it would be
naïve to assume that either measure will guarantee the Congo’s longterm
stability – a job that clearly rests with the DRC government
itself.
Following his success in the recent national elections that ended
DRC’s transitional period, President Joseph Kabila has assumed the
unique rights and responsibilities that are assigned to any leader of a
sovereign nation.
To achieve a lasting peace, the new Congolese government will need
to begin addressing long-standing problems of weak governance and
political and economic marginalisation, especially among young
people, who make up more than half of the Congo’s population.
Until the government is able to offer current or ex-combatants a true
alternative to militia life, their disgruntled citizens remain at high risk
of resorting to the rule of the gun.
In order to encourage long-term stability, MONUC will need to
support the Congolese government with the development of its new
democratic institutions and processes, and protect and promote
human rights. It should also assist the new Congolese government
with political processes such as searching for creative and sustainable
solutions to the threat posed by ‘foreign’ armed groups such as the
FDLR and ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces - National Army
for the Liberation of Uganda). Sensitive issues, including the presence
of Congolese fighters and the question of Congolese citizenship for
some of the foreign elements in these groups, should be discussed
without delay.
In addition, more resources will need to be made available by DRC
donors for civilian agencies (UN, government, and NGO) to
eventually replace national DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
Reintegration) programmes with long-term and broad-based
community-recovery programmes.
In order to tackle the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal
arms trade – both of which are likely to sustain conflict in DRC –
MONUC should continue, where appropriate, to offer strong support
to the government, in particular through providing analysis and
logistical support to monitoring activities. The existing mandate that
MONUC has been given in these areas must be matched with
appropriate resources and capacity if MONUC is to make any
progress in assisting the new government with tackling such difficult
problems.
The election of a new government should not be seen by the
international community as an excuse to extract itself from any of
these processes when it is clear that a limited or superficial response
to these problems will merely allow them to fester beneath the
surface and breed potential for future instability.

7 Conclusions and recommendations

The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and opportunities
of rebuilding a nation from the ground up.
In recent years, DRC has exceeded all expectations: in record time, it
has established basic democratic institutions (including a constitution
and democratic elections at both national and provincial levels). The
country’s macro-economic framework has recovered at least
partially, and economists expect investment expansion, particularly
in the country’s lucrative mining sector.
Yet, Congo’s impressive developments and even the successful
elections will mean nothing if a scaling down of efforts allows the
country to lapse back into full-blown violence. It is imperative that
the international community recognise that investing in stability will
also be more cost-effective than responding to the fall-out.

The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and
extraordinary efforts of the Congolese people to lead their country
into a new era are not blocked by an immediate disengagement and
withdrawal of interest from the international community. Instead, the
Security Council must make it a priority to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the
protection of the civilian population from appalling levels of
insecurity and abuse. Maintain the robust use of force to
protect civilians but use the mandate review to take measures
to improve MONUC’s operational effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to
demonstrable progress on security-sector reform, beginning
with a clear reduction in the levels of abuses committed by the
security forces themselves, and a basic ability of military,
police, and judicial sectors to defend the population from
external and internal threats.
• Ensure that the existing MONUC military presence prioritises
the protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a
clearer definition of protection, more operational guidance,
and better tools to translate the concept of protection into
concrete action on the ground. Oxfam believes that, in order
to maximise the limited resources at their disposal, MONUC’s
troops on the ground should focus especially on:

o Establishing overall security and humanitarian access
in areas where displaced populations are returning to
their villages of origin. It is imperative that MONUC
maintain close contact with humanitarian actors in
planning for such operations in order to avoid
instances of forced, politicised, or uninformed
returns.

o Carefully assessing the humanitarian impact of
planned joint MONUC–FARDC offensives and
refraining from carrying out operations that achieve
political objectives but have a disproportionately
negative impact on civilians (for example, clear risk of
militia reprisal killings against local populations or
unduly high levels of displacement).

o Instructing troops to apply the protection mandate in a
more consistent way. This includes the robust use of
force in line with the Chapter VII mandate, when the
protection needs require it, and proactive attempts to
prevent abuses such as looting and extortion. This
should involve encouraging the reporting of abuses
and where possible supporting their prosecution
through military justice mechanisms.

o Transmitting information about protection threats to
local humanitarian actors or the protection clusters
(which MONUC civilian staff co-chair) so that
appropriate solutions can be discussed. Protection
clusters have often been able to co-ordinate effective
humanitarian responses and mount joint advocacy
initiatives to address identified threats.

o Increasing humanitarian space for independent aid
agencies by putting a stop to self-promotional (and
sometimes inappropriate) ‘quick impact projects’ and
‘winning hearts and minds activities’, except where
these are directly linked to military co-operation (for
example, the rehabilitation of latrines or water sources
in military barracks or prisons).

• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full
support to the newly created democratic processes and
institutions, and the protection and promotion of human
rights. Offer strategic and operational support to the new
sovereign government in combating the illicit exploitation of
minerals and the illegal arms trade.

UN Press release - MONUC's mandate extended to April 15

2007-02-16T09:22:00.000-05:00

As Security Council extends DR Congo mission, Ban Ki-moon focuses on mining reform

15 February 2007 – Highlighting that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to pose “a threat to international peace and security in the region,” the Security Council today extended the UN mission in the impoverished African country for another two months.

The extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was due to expire today, came as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on Congolese authorities to focus on security sector reform and tighten up legislation covering business practices relating to diamond and other mining because too much of the profits of these industries are going to fund armed conflict.

In its unanimously adopted resolution, the Council, citing the fact that DRC continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region, extended the mandate until 15 April.

Separately, Mr. Ban makes his remarks in his latest report at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2007/68 on the DRC looking at whether or not sanctions should be imposed on the country as a way of cleaning up the mining industry. However, given the uncertainty of whether sanctions would work against such practices, as well as that in December the country swore in its first democratically elected President, the Secretary-General recommends against imposing them.

“While sanctions may inconvenience their targets, the general effect will be to diminish only marginally the general practices they are designed to curtail. In most of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, they will do little to reduce the use of force in extracting minerals, diminish fraud and encourage responsible corporate behaviour,” Mr. Ban writes.

He also points to a more general concern about possible UN sanctions against the DRC. “Imposing United Nations sanctions now may be perceived as punitive, whether they target State actors or not and whether they are intended to reflect on the capacity of the State to manage its affairs or not,” he says. “This might be another reason why United Nations sanctions may not be advisable at the present time.”

Instead, Mr. Ban urges the Government to reform the security sector and fight corruption, but particularly to tighten up on investors in the natural resource sector by making sure they adhere to regulations. He calls for the private sector to set better business standards itself, while also recommending setting up a cross-border commission to prevent corruption at the frontier.

“The question remains: what is likely to bring more order to the production and marketing of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources in a way that will allow greater security for the artisanal miners, less exposure to extortion by armed groups and the assurance of more revenues for the State and its public services?” he writes.

The Government must first and foremost institute security sector reform and improve trust and transparency by monitoring and fighting corrupt practices and taking effective action against violators, the report stresses.

The Secretary-General’s report was itself based on recommendations made by the so-called Group of Experts who visited the DRC late last year to look at the whole issue of sanctions, during which they found that while linkages still remain between armed groups and the exploitation of natural resources, the situation has become ever more complex.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/sc8955.doc.htm

Security Council

5630th Meeting (AM)

Security Council extends mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 15 April,

Unanimously adopting resolution 1742 (2007)

Requests Secretary-General’s Recommendations

On Possible Adjustments to Mandate, Capacities

The Security Council this morning extended the mandate and personnel strength of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which was to expire today, until 15 April.

Unanimously adopting resolution 1742 (2007) and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, as soon as possible and not later than 15 March, on his consultations with the Congolese authorities and to submit recommendations on adjustments the Council might consider making to the mandate and capacities of MONUC.

The meeting started at 11:30 a.m. and adjourned at 11:35 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1742 (2002) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

“Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

“Recalling the support it provided, in particular through the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), for the process of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition, signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, and for the elections that represented the culmination of that process,

“Reaffirming its commitment to continue to contribute to the consolidation of peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the post-transition period,

“Underlining its attachment to the continuation of a regular political dialogue with the Congolese authorities, and recalling the importance it attaches to the consultations undertaken with them by the Secretary-General on possible adjustments to be made to the mandate and capacities of MONUC during this period,

“Taking note of the letter addressed to its President on 15 January 2007 by the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2007/17),

“Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Decides to extend the mandate and personnel strength of MONUC, as set out in its resolutions 1565 (2004), 1592 (2005), 1596 (2005), 1621 (2005), 1635 (2005) and 1736 (2006), until 15 April 2007;

“2. Requests the Secretary-General to report, as soon as possible and not later than 15 March 2007, on his consultations with the Congolese authorities and to submit recommendations on adjustments the Council may consider making to the mandate and capacities of MONUC;

“3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”