Oxfam Briefing Paper 97
EMBARGOED UNTIL 09:00 HRS GMT Monday 12th February 2007
A Fragile Future
Why scaling down MONUC too soon could spell disaster for the Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and
opportunities of rebuilding a nation from the ground up. The
presence of United Nations peacekeepers (MONUC) has
significantly reduced fighting and organised violence, and must
be maintained with an appropriate troop strength and mandate
to guarantee peace and long-term stability.
MONUC should not scale down its activities until the Congolese
security forces – and in particular the army – stop posing a
threat to their own populations and instead begin providing
security and protection to the Congolese people.

Summary
In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early 2007,
despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the correct policy
choices are made in the next few months.
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) has supported the Congolese government in the political
transition process. It deserves the praise it has received for assisting DRC
with its successful elections and other recent achievements.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the crucial
role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC. Through its
military presence and operations MONUC has been able to restore stability
to large parts of the war-torn country, thereby reducing incidents of
organised violence against civilians and increasing humanitarian access and
economic activities.
There is little doubt that, without a substantial and effective MONUC
presence, this relative stabilisation of the security situation could quickly
unravel and threaten the wider region as well. MONUC officials,
humanitarian actors, and civilians who have been affected by violence are
warning the international community of the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences that a premature scaling back of MONUC presence could
induce. ‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain community leaders in Ituri, eastern
DRC. ‘It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us. Not yet.’
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of approximately
130,000) have already been integrated into a new national army, it has
become clear that the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo) is in no position to defend itself – or any civilian in
its care – against militia warlords, foreign rebels, local defence forces, or any
other armed actors. Attacks on government forces in North Kivu in
November 2006 have served as a timely reminder that, without full support
from MONUC, the Congolese army is completely incapable of preventing
attempts to seize major population centres such as Goma.
Underpaid, underfed, ill-equipped and badly led, FARDC soldiers in all of the
eastern provinces remain the single biggest cause of insecurity in DRC,
responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all human-rights abuses
against civilians. Similar accusations of abuse are also levelled against other
arms of the security forces (including police) and ‘demobilised’ excombatants
who continue to rely on violence as a means of survival.

In essence, most of the security forces that are meant to be protecting the
civilian populations from the numerous threats still present in DRC are
unable, or unwilling, to do so.

The new Congolese government has cited reform of the security sector as
one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a desire to support
the government in this process, particularly with co-ordination, training, and
advice. A strong MONUC commitment to the security-sector reform (SSR)
should be considered a vital element of any post-transition mandate, and
any exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be linked to progress
indicators on SSR processes, most importantly the military, police, and
judicial sectors.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by its
security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised combatants,
MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence to protect civilians
from immediate threats and creating a stable environment in which longerterm
reforms can take place.

The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and extraordinary
efforts of the Congolese citizens to lead their country into a new era are not
rewarded with a ‘cut and run’ attitude of immediate disengagement by the
international community. Instead, the Security Council must make it a priority
with the key member states, such as the USA, to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the protection of
the civilian population from appalling levels of insecurity and abuse.
Maintain the robust use of force to protect civilians but use the
mandate review to take measures to improve MONUC’s operational
effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to demonstrable
progress on security-sector reform, beginning with a clear reduction
in the levels of abuses committed by the security forces themselves,
and a basic ability of military, police, and judicial sectors to defend
the population from external and internal threats.
• Ensure that existing MONUC military presence prioritises the
protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a clearer
definition of protection, more operational guidance, and better tools
to translate the concept of protection into concrete action on the
ground.
• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full support to
the newly created democratic processes and institutions, and the
protection and promotion of human rights. Offer strategic and
operational support to the new sovereign government in combating
the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal arms trade.
The Congolese people deserve no less than a clear signal that their massive
sacrifices have been worth the effort, and that the international community
will work together with their new government to make a better future in DRC
possible.

1 Introduction

In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic
elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early
2007, despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the
correct policy choices are made in the next few months.
Over the past few years, DRC has transformed itself from a
completely divided country (where travel between the eastern and
western parts was impossible) to a nation united by a cautious but
fervent sense of hope.
Yet, despite the incredible progress that has been made on some
fronts, DRC faces a number of daunting challenges, most notably
dealing with regular outbreaks of violence in the east, and the
constant fear of renewed national instability.
Across many parts of the country – and especially in Ituri, the Kivus,
and Katanga – Congolese people are still confronted every day with
the threat of violence, extortion, rape, torture, or murder at the hands
of hundreds of thousands of armed combatants.
An estimated four million civilians have died as a result of conflict
since August 1998, the most devastating death toll in any armed
conflict since World War Two.1 There are clear indications that these
trends are reversible,2 but such progress will require strong political
and financial commitments from both the new DRC government and
the international community.

2 MONUC’s impact to date

In 1999 – when the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) first arrived in DRC – even
optimists would have been hard pressed to predict the recent success
of the Congolese elections.
MONUC deserves the praise it has received for the assistance it has
offered the Congolese government in the political transition process.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the
crucial role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC.
Having evolved significantly over the years, MONUC’s current
mandate (defined in 37 separate UN Security Council resolutions) has
often been described as a patchwork of wide-ranging – and
sometimes competing – political, military, and humanitarian
objectives. While humanitarian actors feel that MONUC’s
responsibility to protect civilians from violence3 has not always been
prioritised as highly as other elements of the mandate, and MONUC
has failed to perform in some areas (including an initial failure to
prevent incidents of abuse by a small number of its own
peacekeepers4), there is no doubt that MONUC has been able to
restore stability to large parts of the war-torn country.
In all of DRC’s provinces, MONUC has gained control over and
secured major towns and cities. In addition, MONUC’s military
presence and logistical capacity has significantly increased
humanitarian access (and also economic opportunities) to previously
insecure or remote rural areas (for example along the Rwindi–
Rutshuru road in North Kivu, the Bunia–Kasenyi road in Ituri and
the main Bunia–Beni and Bunia–Mahagi commercial routes).
The presence of MONUC troops has reduced incidents of organised
violence against the civilian populations. Especially in Ituri,
MONUC’s operations against militia groups (for example around
Mahagi)5 have succeeded in disarming the majority of combatants6
and allowing large parts of the population to return to their normal
lives. ‘When MONUC arrived, the militias left’, explained displaced
people in Djugu.7 Though MONUC’s performance has been criticised
in some parts of the country (see Section 5), the Ituri example has
shown that a consistent application of MONUC’s robust mandate can
contribute to improvements in the security situation.
The fact that people today walk along the street without fear in towns
like Bunia, which in 2003 witnessed several violent massacres of
civilians, is a simple but powerful indicator of the impact of
MONUC’s presence.
In areas where the security situation has stabilised, MONUC has
begun playing a role in helping displaced people return to their
villages of origin. MONUC patrols in places such as Malumbi or
Tshushubo (North Kivu) have given the population enough
confidence to leave their temporary camps and begin rebuilding their
lives in the villages.
On the whole, MONUC’s presence has been effective in improving
security in those areas where troops have been deployed. Proactive
efforts to protect civilians from violence have at times been
inconsistent or patchy, but there have also been a number of
successes (see Section 5).

3 ‘Not yet’ – the price of scaling down

One of the easiest ways of measuring MONUC’s impact is perhaps to
ask what would happen if it were not present in DRC.
‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain village chiefs and displaced
people in the lakeside villages of Tchomia and Kasenyi. ‘We would
leave tomorrow. It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us without
MONUC. Not yet.
Unfortunately, the sentiment is echoed not just in areas that are still
dominated by rebel or militia groups. It is also heard regularly in
those parts of the country that are under the control of the Congolese
army.
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of
approximately 130,000) have already undergone the ‘brassage’
process of being integrated into a new national army, it has become
clear that FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du
Congo) are in no position to defend themselves – or any civilian in
their care – against any kind of external threat or attack. ‘Brassage is
just a word. It means nothing when translated into reality’, admits a
FARDC commander in Beni.
It is well-known that FARDC soldiers in all of the eastern provinces
flee from the enemy when attacked, regularly discarding their
uniforms and hiding among the civilian populations. Command and
control functions are in some cases non-existent, with commanders
unaware of their troops’ movements or operations. ‘Some of these
guys can’t even shoot a gun’, explained a MONUC peacekeeper that
regularly carries out joint patrols with FARDC soldiers.

In the absence of a capable FARDC, it has often fallen to MONUC
soldiers to defend strategic areas. The recent example of dissident
general Laurent Nkunda’s attempted attack on the eastern city of
Goma illustrated the army’s reliance on MONUC. ‘MONUC’s Indian
Battalion was the only thing standing between Nkunda and Goma.
Without MONUC, Goma would have fallen’, concluded one UN
official in Goma.
Military experts (both foreign and Congolese) agree that FARDC
troops offer little protection against foreign or Congolese insurgent
groups who continue to harass and terrorise civilians. Such groups
include warlord militias, the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de
Libération du Rwanda) - presumed to be the remnants of the
Interahamwe or the Mai Mai – the name for Local Defence Forces.
In addition to their failure to protect civilians against external threats,
FARDC troops are themselves considered to be the major cause of
insecurity in DRC. MONUC’s human-rights monitors hold FARDC
soldiers responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all
human-rights abuses against civilians. FARDC soldiers regularly
extort or loot from the civilian populations, and commit violent
crimes such as arbitrary killings and rape. Similar accusations of
abuse are also levelled against non-organised armed actors, including
‘demobilised’ ex-combatants who continue to rely on violence as a
means of survival. The high incidence of crimes and abuses against
the civilian population in DRC has been made possible due to a
general climate of impunity and a complete lack of law and order.
Civilians are looking to MONUC to support their new government in
combating these problems, and ensuring that a relatively stable
environment will continue to allow humanitarian assistance to flow
to those in need. One of the ways in which MONUC has been doing –
and should continue to do – this is by supporting the new Congolese
government with its efforts to reform the security sector, especially
with regard to military, police, and judicial sectors.

4 No security without reform

In 2005, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made it clear that
‘the establishment of an integrated and professional army and police
force is a key element of the exit strategy for MONUC’. In other
words, UN member states should not withdraw MONUC – whose
deployment has been an expression of their responsibility to protect
civilians in DRC, until the new government establishes a functional
and accountable national army and police force.

The examples above illustrate the army’s current lack of capacity to
provide even the most basic physical security. Reasons for this
appear to be well-known, yet at the same time hard to tackle.
International advisers report extremely low rates of formal military
education among all brigades, and troops in the field are
notoriously ill-equipped to perform in any kind of battle. One of the
newly integrated brigades, for example, has been given just 24 handheld
radios (and no spare batteries) to share between approximately
3,500 people for communications during combat. Bullets are in
similarly short supply.
Troops also lack motivation (and – not fearing any prosecution from
a weak judicial system – begin to prey on local populations) because
they are underpaid and underfed, and living with their families in
conditions of extreme poverty and hardship.
Current monthly salaries consist of a miserly $25, and the complete
lack of soldiers’ welfare and health care routinely results in 15–20
deaths in each brigade per month. The abject state of neglect in
which soldiers and their families find themselves was aptly
illustrated by the 4th Integrated Brigade who arrived in Ituri in 2005
spreading infectious diseases such as cholera and fever to the local
populations in its path.
Other military actors are even less functional than the ground forces.
The Congolese Air Force is considered ‘structurally obsolete and in a
state of life-threatening dilapidation […], air or land combat capacity
is zero’. Little training has been carried out for air crew, technical, or
command elements since the Mobutu period.
The remaining branches of the security sector, including police,
judicial, and civilian agencies are as ill-equipped as the army to carry
out their work properly.
Courts and magistrates are in short supply. Only one prison (out of
a total of 145) in DRC actually has a budget for feeding its inmates.
And even though DRC has 258 registered airstrips, only 50 of them
are monitored by air-traffic controllers. There is no radar
surveillance system or navigational guidance system for aircraft in
DRC, and air-force communication systems do not function to any
satisfactory level.
The new Congolese government has cited security sector reform
(SSR) as one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a
desire to support the government in this process, particularly with
co-ordination, training, and advice. MONUC’s recently established
SSR cell acknowledges that any exit strategy for UN peacekeepers
8 A Fragile Future, Oxfam Briefing Paper, February 2007
will need to be closely linked to the progress on reform, most
importantly the military, police, and judicial sectors.
One of the challenges in this domain has been the fragmentation of
processes and initiatives. While the active involvement of several
bilateral donors in SSR processes is laudable, it is unlikely that small
or ad hoc projects (most of them limited to certain geographical areas
or specific units – ‘a few jeeps for two brigades in Ituri, a few pots of
paint for three new courthouses in Kinshasa’) will add up to an
impact that is equal to or greater than the sum of its parts.
The ultimate responsibility for the SSR process naturally rests with
the newly elected Congolese government, and external SSR actors are
currently looking to President Kabila to clearly signal his country’s
strategic and operational needs in this area. Donors and other actors
will need to ensure that their co-operation with the new government
does not suffer from the same fragmented approach as past
initiatives. A single actor (such as the European Union or MONUC)
should be appointed to take a clear lead on the co-ordination of
donor support to the SSR process. MONUC’s current involvement in
SSR processes (which includes hosting weekly SSR co-ordination
meetings) indicate that there is capacity to lead on day-to-day coordination
processes. It should be recognised, however, that the
temporary nature of MONUC’s mandate in DRC is unlikely to allow
for the kind of strategic and long-term co-ordination that can oversee
the entire lifespan of the SSR process (an undertaking military experts
estimate to take at least 15–20 years).
On the issue of building national capacity, donors should
acknowledge that MONUC’s presence in the field and its existing cooperation
with security forces make it a logical choice for initial
training schemes. For example, the proposed curriculum for a
MONUC-led basic military training programme (to be carried out in
all of FARDC’s integrated brigades) accurately reflects some of the
most pressing needs and priorities on the ground – both in terms of
basic military skills and the social welfare of soldiers and their
dependants. It should be noted, however, that MONUC’s proposed
45-day trainings are little more than initial steps in the training
process, and in themselves highly unlikely to allow FARDC to reach
operational capability immediately.
In addition to supporting co-ordination and training initiatives,
MONUC should increase its capacity to offer expert operational
advice to government actors leading SSR processes, in particular
regarding urgent but sensitive issues such as vetting of corrupt or
abusive officials in the army, police, and judicial systems.

Any realistic exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be
linked to progress indicators on SSR processes.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by
its security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised
combatants, MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence
to protect civilians from immediate threats and ensuring a stable
environment in which reforms can take place.

5 More effective protection of civilians

In March 2005, the UN Security Council reiterated its call to MONUC
to use ‘all necessary means within its capabilities and in the areas
where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of
force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, from any armed
group, foreign or Congolese’.
Experts have described MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate as ‘the most
assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians’.
Despite this, MONUC has sometimes been accused of behaving more
like a Chapter VI observer mission, using force only in self-defence
and doing little to physically protect civilians. ‘I don’t think they’re
allowed to open fire’, claims a Congolese NGO worker in Goma.
‘They did nothing to stop women getting raped in Bukavu and
Rutshuru. I’m scared they wouldn’t protect my daughters either if
there is more fighting here’. Reasons for such inaction are numerous
and often include a lack of resources and capacity, as well as the
prioritisation of more political aspects of the mandate over protection
objectives.
In addition, the concept of ‘civilian protection’ has often remained
vague and ill-defined, and peacekeepers are given very little
guidance on how they are expected to translate their mandate into
concrete tasks.
For MONUC to adequately carry out its ambitious mandate, forces
would benefit from a clearer understanding of the concept of
protection, more operational guidance, and better tools.
On a conceptual level, MONUC should consistently prioritise the
protection of civilians when considering how to counter ongoing and
well-known threats, for example the problem of dealing with
dissidents like Laurent Nkunda. MONUC’s inaction in the face of
Nkunda’s violent attacks on Bukavu in 2004, Rutshuru in 2005 or
Sake in 2006 is regularly cited by civilians in North and South Kivu as
an example of the international community failing to protect them
from violence. These incidents stand in marked contrast to MONUC
successes, such as the robust display of force MONUC battalions
launched when Nkunda attempted to seize the (perhaps strategically
more important) town of Goma in November 2006, or the way in
which MONUC has dealt with the threat of militia in Ituri.
In instances where MONUC has failed to deal with urgent protection
threats, populations have often expressed confusion and
resentment. A more consistent application of MONUC’s protection
mandate would do much to build confidence among these
populations.
Operationally – and more concretely – MONUC would also do well
to include clearer guidance on appropriate protection activities in
their military rules of engagement, for example troops’
responsibilities in preventing other actors (including the state’s own
security forces) from committing abuses against civilians.
Perhaps the single most important tool that MONUC can use to
protect civilians from threats is its sheer military presence. ‘When
MONUC is not around, when they are not doing patrols or going to
work as usual, people often don’t leave their houses. You have to
understand we still live in fear’, villagers around Lake Albert
explained. Specific steps that MONUC could take in this area are
outlined in the final recommendations in this paper.
It should be emphasised here that MONUC’s existing resources in
DRC are already overstretched. Any cut to current troop strength or
resources would therefore spell disaster for communities currently
benefiting from MONUC protection.

6 Beyond immediate security – a lasting peace?

Oxfam believes that by supporting the Congolese government in
reforming the security sector and consistently prioritising the
protection of civilians in military operations, MONUC could greatly
increase its impact on security in DRC. At the same time, it would be
naïve to assume that either measure will guarantee the Congo’s longterm
stability – a job that clearly rests with the DRC government
itself.
Following his success in the recent national elections that ended
DRC’s transitional period, President Joseph Kabila has assumed the
unique rights and responsibilities that are assigned to any leader of a
sovereign nation.
To achieve a lasting peace, the new Congolese government will need
to begin addressing long-standing problems of weak governance and
political and economic marginalisation, especially among young
people, who make up more than half of the Congo’s population.
Until the government is able to offer current or ex-combatants a true
alternative to militia life, their disgruntled citizens remain at high risk
of resorting to the rule of the gun.
In order to encourage long-term stability, MONUC will need to
support the Congolese government with the development of its new
democratic institutions and processes, and protect and promote
human rights. It should also assist the new Congolese government
with political processes such as searching for creative and sustainable
solutions to the threat posed by ‘foreign’ armed groups such as the
FDLR and ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces - National Army
for the Liberation of Uganda). Sensitive issues, including the presence
of Congolese fighters and the question of Congolese citizenship for
some of the foreign elements in these groups, should be discussed
without delay.
In addition, more resources will need to be made available by DRC
donors for civilian agencies (UN, government, and NGO) to
eventually replace national DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
Reintegration) programmes with long-term and broad-based
community-recovery programmes.
In order to tackle the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal
arms trade – both of which are likely to sustain conflict in DRC –
MONUC should continue, where appropriate, to offer strong support
to the government, in particular through providing analysis and
logistical support to monitoring activities. The existing mandate that
MONUC has been given in these areas must be matched with
appropriate resources and capacity if MONUC is to make any
progress in assisting the new government with tackling such difficult
problems.
The election of a new government should not be seen by the
international community as an excuse to extract itself from any of
these processes when it is clear that a limited or superficial response
to these problems will merely allow them to fester beneath the
surface and breed potential for future instability.

7 Conclusions and recommendations

The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and opportunities
of rebuilding a nation from the ground up.
In recent years, DRC has exceeded all expectations: in record time, it
has established basic democratic institutions (including a constitution
and democratic elections at both national and provincial levels). The
country’s macro-economic framework has recovered at least
partially, and economists expect investment expansion, particularly
in the country’s lucrative mining sector.
Yet, Congo’s impressive developments and even the successful
elections will mean nothing if a scaling down of efforts allows the
country to lapse back into full-blown violence. It is imperative that
the international community recognise that investing in stability will
also be more cost-effective than responding to the fall-out.

The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and
extraordinary efforts of the Congolese people to lead their country
into a new era are not blocked by an immediate disengagement and
withdrawal of interest from the international community. Instead, the
Security Council must make it a priority to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the
protection of the civilian population from appalling levels of
insecurity and abuse. Maintain the robust use of force to
protect civilians but use the mandate review to take measures
to improve MONUC’s operational effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to
demonstrable progress on security-sector reform, beginning
with a clear reduction in the levels of abuses committed by the
security forces themselves, and a basic ability of military,
police, and judicial sectors to defend the population from
external and internal threats.
• Ensure that the existing MONUC military presence prioritises
the protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a
clearer definition of protection, more operational guidance,
and better tools to translate the concept of protection into
concrete action on the ground. Oxfam believes that, in order
to maximise the limited resources at their disposal, MONUC’s
troops on the ground should focus especially on:

o Establishing overall security and humanitarian access
in areas where displaced populations are returning to
their villages of origin. It is imperative that MONUC
maintain close contact with humanitarian actors in
planning for such operations in order to avoid
instances of forced, politicised, or uninformed
returns.

o Carefully assessing the humanitarian impact of
planned joint MONUC–FARDC offensives and
refraining from carrying out operations that achieve
political objectives but have a disproportionately
negative impact on civilians (for example, clear risk of
militia reprisal killings against local populations or
unduly high levels of displacement).

o Instructing troops to apply the protection mandate in a
more consistent way. This includes the robust use of
force in line with the Chapter VII mandate, when the
protection needs require it, and proactive attempts to
prevent abuses such as looting and extortion. This
should involve encouraging the reporting of abuses
and where possible supporting their prosecution
through military justice mechanisms.

o Transmitting information about protection threats to
local humanitarian actors or the protection clusters
(which MONUC civilian staff co-chair) so that
appropriate solutions can be discussed. Protection
clusters have often been able to co-ordinate effective
humanitarian responses and mount joint advocacy
initiatives to address identified threats.

o Increasing humanitarian space for independent aid
agencies by putting a stop to self-promotional (and
sometimes inappropriate) ‘quick impact projects’ and
‘winning hearts and minds activities’, except where
these are directly linked to military co-operation (for
example, the rehabilitation of latrines or water sources
in military barracks or prisons).

• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full
support to the newly created democratic processes and
institutions, and the protection and promotion of human
rights. Offer strategic and operational support to the new
sovereign government in combating the illicit exploitation of
minerals and the illegal arms trade.