Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Support Peace Keeping Forces in the Congo-Contract Ends April 15

APRIL 15 IS A CRITICAL DATE!!! IT IS THE DAY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES ON THE CONTRACT TO RENEW PEACEKEEPING TROUPS (MONUC) IN THE
CONGO. Please send letters IMMEDIATELY to support the extension of
the UN contract to retain peace keeping forces in the Congo for two more years. The women and children of the Congo need protection!!!!

Sending three letters only takes 10 minutes. Go to -- www.firstpresevanston.org -- click on the picture of the Congolese women and fax or email the letters found there.

PLEASE ENCOURAGE THE ORGANIZATIONS THAT YOU REPRESENT TO SEND LETTERS TOO.

(From Janet Sullivan, Congo Coalition)

Update from Southern Africa Resource Watch

The new government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has produced its plan of action for 2007-2011. It has also put out a short plan of action for this year which will run from March 2007 to December 2007. In this short plan of action which is called “Government Contract” the actions of government in the extractive Industries will focus on:

  • the implementation of the EITI (this has certainly reduced the doubt we had about the commitment of the new government to implement the initiative);

  • the publication of important documents and analysis of all contracts in the extractive industry;

  • the renegotiation of dubious contracts;

  • reform of all national extractive companies;

  • the elaboration and adoption of adequate and transparent procedures in dealing with new mining contracts (exploration or exploitation);

  • conclusion and publication of the judicial evaluation currently taking place on logging concessions with the view to cancelling the dubious ones.

  • building the capacity of the Congolese office in charge of the environment to be able to apply concrete actions to protect the environment.

This is certainly good news for the DRC. We need to monitor that government does respect its commitment.

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Global Witness Press Release - En Français

Date d’embargo : 21 février 2007, 00h01 GMT

Global Witness enjoint le gouvernement britannique de demander des comptes à la société Afrimex pour avoir alimenté le conflit

en République démocratique du Congo

Global Witness, une organisation non gouvernementale basée à Londres, a déposé une plainte contre la société britannique Afrimex auprès du Point de contact national, dans le cadre des nouvelles procédures renforcées mises en place par le gouvernement et portant sur l’examen des infractions aux Principes directeurs de l’OCDE à l’intention des entreprises multinationales.

Global Witness est convaincu que le commerce des minerais pratiqué par Afrimex a directement contribué au brutal conflit et aux violations massives des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo (RDC).

« La réaction du gouvernement britannique à cette plainte permettra de vérifier qu’il a réellement l’intention de demander des comptes aux sociétés britanniques », explique le directeur de Global Witness, Patrick Alley. « Les sociétés sont tenues de respecter les Principes directeurs de l’OCDE, mais la responsabilité finale du contrôle d’application des Principes revient au gouvernement. »

La plainte déposée par l’ONG affirme que la société Afrimex, qui s’est livrée au commerce du coltan et de la cassitérite (minerai d’étain) pendant toute la durée du conflit en RDC depuis 1996, a versé des impôts au Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), un groupe rebelle armé connu pour ses graves violations des droits de l’homme, responsable de massacres de civils, d’actes de torture et de violences sexuelles. Au cours du conflit, le RCD-Goma contrôlait de grandes parties des provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu, dans l’est de la RDC, où se trouvent des mines de coltan et de cassitérite.

La plainte dénonce également les risques mortels auxquels sont exposés les mineurs de cassitérite et le recours au travail forcé et à la main-d’œuvre enfantine. « L’ouverture d’une enquête qui révèlera si la société Afrimex s’est en partie approvisionnée auprès de ces mines est tout à fait justifiée », déclare Patrick Alley.

La société Afrimex a régulièrement refusé de reconnaître l’impact négatif de ses activités en RDC, malgré les enquêtes menées par les ONG, par un Groupe d’experts de l’ONU et par le Comité du développement international du Parlement britannique. Le directeur d’Afrimex a admis avoir versé des impôts au RCD-Goma et ignorer l’usage qui était fait de ces versements.

« L’argent versé par Afrimex au RCD-Goma a perpétué le conflit et, en accroissant la puissance des rebelles, leur a permis d’infliger des sévices extrêmes à la population civile », affirme Patrick Alley. « Il existe de nombreuses preuves des violations massives des droits de l’homme commises par le RCD-Goma, mais Afrimex a choisi de fermer les yeux sur celles-ci. »

Le texte complet de la plainte déposée par Global Witness peut être consulté sur http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/507/fr/plainte_contre_afrimex_uk_ltd_dans_le_cadre_de_la_.

Pour plus d’informations, veuillez contacter :

Carina Tertsakian (anglais, français) : + 44 207 561 6372

Remarque à l’attention des rédacteurs :

Global Witness est une organisation non gouvernementale indépendante dont la mission est d’enquêter et de faire campagne sur les liens entre l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, les conflits et la corruption.

Toutes les publications de Global Witness sont disponibles sur le site www.globalwitness.org

Global Witness Press Release - Afrimex

Global Witness calls upon the UK Government to hold British company Afrimex to account for fuelling conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The London-based non-governmental organisation Global Witness has submitted a complaint against British company Afrimex to the UK National Contact Point under the government’s new, strengthened procedures for considering breaches of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

Global Witness believes that Afrimex’s trade in minerals contributed directly to the brutal conflict and large-scale human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

“The UK Government’s response to this complaint will be a test of its seriousness in holding British companies to account,” said Global Witness Director Patrick Alley. “Companies have a duty to abide by the OECD Guidelines, but ultimately the responsibility for ensuring that they do so rests with the government.”

The complaint describes how Afrimex, which traded in the minerals coltan and cassiterite (tin ore) throughout the conflict in the DRC from 1996 onwards, made tax payments to the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), an armed rebel group with a well-documented record of carrying out grave human rights abuses, including massacres of civilians, torture and sexual violence. During the conflict, the RCD-Goma controlled large parts of the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, where coltan and cassiterite are mined.

The complaint also highlights the life-threatening conditions in cassiterite mines and the use of forced labour and child labour. “There are reasonable grounds to investigate whether Afrimex sourced some of its products from such mines,” said Patrick Alley.

Afrimex has persistently failed to recognise the negative impact of its activities in the DRC, despite scrutiny by non-governmental organisations, a UN Panel of Experts, and the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee. Afrimex’s director has admitted that the company made tax payments to the RCD-Goma and that it did not know how this money was used.

“Afrimex’s payments to the RCD-Goma perpetuated the conflict and strengthened the rebels’ capacity to inflict extreme suffering on the civilian population,” said Patrick Alley. “There was abundant evidence of widespread human rights abuses by the RCD-Goma, which Afrimex chose to ignore.”

The full text of Global Witness’s complaint is available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/507/en/complaint_against_afrimex_uk_ltd_under_the_specifi.

For more information, please contact:

Carina Tertsakian (English, French): +44 207 561 6372

Note to editors:

Global Witness is an independent non-governmental organisation which investigates and campaigns on the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption.

All Global Witness’s publications can be found at www.globalwitness.org

Security Sector Reform in the Congo - ICG report

Security sector reform in the Congo


Africa Report N°104

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

No issue is more important than security sector reform in determining the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s prospects for peace and development. Two particular challenges loom large: the security services must be able to maintain order during the national elections scheduled for April 2006 and reduce the country’s staggering mortality rate from the conflict – still well over 30,000 every month. On the military side, far more must be done to create an effective, unified army with a single chain of command, rather than simply demobilising militias and giving ex-combatants payout packages. International attention to police reform has been much less than that given to military restructuring: the limited efforts have had some important successes but suffer from a patchwork approach that largely neglects the countryside. Establishing a secure environment is not possible without a thorough security assessment that takes into account the country’s risks, needs, capabilities and financial means. A realistic plan is needed that defines the role of the security forces and reconciles their needs and means for a sustainable future.

Reform of the army is far behind schedule. Eighteen integrated brigades were supposed to be created before elections but only six have been deployed, some of which are as much a security hazard as a source of stability, since they are often unpaid and prey on the local population. The police are supposed to be responsible for election security but are no match for local militias in many parts of the country.

Security sector reform continues to be a neglected stepchild both financially and in terms of strategic planning. While donors have already contributed more than $2 billion to the Congo, including generous amounts for demobilisation of ex-combatants, only a small fraction has been dedicated to improving the status and management of the armed forces and the police. While it is understandable that many donors are reluctant to engage with what have often been unsavoury elements, these forces are critical for stability. The current incentive structure to encourage reform is seriously distorted. Fighters are offered allowances totalling $410 to leave the military but a salary of only $10 a month if they choose army service, and even this too often never gets to them. Coordination of international efforts is also inadequate, though the European Union’s police (EUPOL) and military (EUSEC) missions have begun to stimulate improvements.

The army remains weak and could again collapse quickly if faced with a serious threat. Although most former belligerents now form the transitional government and formally support the new army, they and their ex-soldiers sometimes ignore orders from the military hierarchy that they consider to be in conflict with the interests of their respective factions. Indeed, the reluctance to move forward with reform in many security structures is a deliberate strategy on the part of the leaders who fought the 1998-2002 war to preserve their ability to respond with force if the elections do not turn out to their satisfaction.

This report gives special attention to the European Union and its member states’ contributions on security sector reform as part of an ongoing examination of the EU’s growing global role in conflict prevention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On police training and reform

To Donors and the United Nations:

1. Agree on a long-term common training program and use the new police reflection group (groupe de réflexion) to:

(a) improve liaison between donors and Congolese institutions, notably the National Police, immediately and harmonise training programs;

(b) conduct a systematic review of the police before elections to evaluate the most important threats to human security; and

(c) match needs with resources in a comprehensive long-term strategy, including creation of a national gendarmerie.

2. Accompany training on human rights codes and conduct with greater emphasis on the practical operational details of policing so that trainees receive a strong grounding in such basics as investigation, forensic evidence collection, interviewing and protecting witnesses and children (especially in sexual violence cases), handling crime scenes, and helping prosecutors build cases.

3. Make completion of a proper accounting of available police manpower a priority.

4. Condition further donor aid on an increase in police salaries and separation of payment of those salaries from the chain of command along the lines of the model now being used for the army as a means to combat corruption and promote loyalty to the force.

To the Congolese Authorities:

5. Establish specially trained and equipped squads to combat the high prevalence of violent sex crimes and create safe rooms for children and survivors of sexual violence in police stations.

6. Recruit proactively and promote women with the ultimate aim of establishing much greater parity in the police service.

On army training and reform

To the Congolese Authorities:

7. Integrate and simplify, in consultation with donors, the national command and decision-making structures so as to improve coordination between the various reform programs and reduce opportunities to stall the process.

8. Conduct, in consultation with donors, a systematic review of the army that evaluates security threats and seeks to match needs and resources in a comprehensive long-term strategy.

9. Reduce the army’s target size from 100,000-125,000 to a more realistic and sustainable 60,000-70,000.

10. Reduce the Presidential Guard dramatically from 12,000-15,000 to 600-800 troops and integrate the remainder into the regular army structure.

11. Move as quickly as possible in the parliament after the April 2006 elections to establish an appropriate defence oversight committee and require the government to detail fully its proposed defence spending in the annual budget.

To Donors and the United Nations:

12. Expand the EU plan to separate salary payment from the chain of command with salary increases and improved living conditions for rank and file soldiers, conditioning further aid to the military on prompt implementation.

13. Establish an International Military Assistance and Training Team (IMATT), including the European Union’s military mission (EUSEC) and participation from such major donors as the EU, Angola and South Africa, as a means of coordinating security sector reform and advisory programs and to:

(a) take a hands-on approach by having technical advisers oversee the payroll and accompany training and subsequent operations of deployed units;

(b) help establish standards and train Congolese trainers; and

(c) oversee rehabilitation of the army’s training camps and enhance its logistical capabilities.

14. Increase donor investment in army integration to match support for the demobilisation process, using funds in particular for equipment, housing, health care and school fees for soldiers’ children, starting with the integrated brigades.

To the European Union:

15. Consult immediately with the Congolese authorities and the UN and deploy additional forces, for example the new EU gendarmerie, to secure Lubumbashi and pacify northern and central Katanga.

16. Continue to adopt a constructive and flexible approach toward the need to increase investment in reform of the military sector, consistent with ODA eligibility under OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines, as the Commission did recently in justifying its financing of the refurbishment of army integration centres.

To the UN Security Council:

17. Follow-up more aggressively in the Congo Sanctions Committee cases where the panel of experts has identified regional violators of the arms embargo and implement targeted sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans to help the elected government acquire a monopoly of force in the country.

To the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC):

18. Review the conditions and guidelines of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility in the DAC to satisfy any concerns donors may have about the propriety of engaging more proactively in security sector reform.

Nairobi/Brussels, 13 February 2006

Full_Report (pdf* format - 154.7 Kbytes)

If the link above does not work, please try:

Friday, February 16, 2007

UNHCR seeks $62 Million for Congolese refugees, internally displaced

UNHCR seeks $62 million for Congolese refugees, internally displaced


GENEVA - The UN refugee agency announced today that it is seeking a total of $62 million for programmes aimed at helping hundreds of thousands of people displaced within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well as Congolese refugees in neighbouring countries.

UNHCR is seeking $47 million to support the return and reintegration this year of some 98,500 Congolese refugees to their homeland. It is also asking donors for a further $15 million to provide protection and assistance during the same period for an estimated 1.1 million internally displaced people (IDP) in the African nation.

The agency hopes for a prompt and adequate response to its appeals from the donor community. The two supplementary appeals * one for IDPs and one for refugees -- cite important developments in the DRC last year, including the inauguration of President Joseph Kabila in December after the country's first democratic elections in four decades. This has raised hopes that Congolese living in exile and those displaced internally will soon be able to return to their homes.

Since October 2004, some 89,000 Congolese refugees have repatriated * mostly to Equateur, South Kivu and Katanga provinces. In addition, nearly half a million IDPs went back to their places of origin last year.

"We have to seize the chance and build on the positive developments, stability and number of returns achieved last year," said UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres. "The international community has a unique opportunity here -- if we can maintain the momentum and show Congolese that they are not alone. Timely funding is crucial for the successful repatriation and reintegration of Congolese refugees, as well as to anchor those who have already come home."

More than 400,000 Congolese still live in exile, virtually all of them in nine neighbouring countries. They live in camps or designated areas and most have no resources to return on their own. Some have spent decades in exile, waiting for lasting peace to return.

The $47 million that UNHCR is seeking, in addition to the regular annual budget, will cover voluntary repatriation programmes for Congolese refugees from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Republic of Congo and Zambia.

UNHCR's main objectives are to ensure the voluntary nature of returns and to organise these movements in a safe and dignified manner. The refugee agency will also support the reintegration of returnees and facilitate their access to shelter as well as basic services such as health and education.

The number of IDPs in DRC fell by about a third last year, but there are still an estimated 1.1 million people displaced within the country. UNHCR's appeal for $15 million for IDPs is aimed at helping these people, most of whom live with relatives or host families.

In the appeal, UNHCR projects that as many as 950,000 of the IDPs could return to their homes in 2007. However, hundreds of thousands of Congolese were newly displaced last year due to localised outbreaks of fighting and this remains a major concern for UNHCR. There is still an environment of widespread impunity in parts of the country, and the human rights of the displaced are often violated.

The extra funds will allow UNHCR to establish protection-monitoring mechanisms in the areas of displacement and return, and to conduct early warning and prevention activities. Security permitting, UNHCR will support the establishment of mechanisms to settle land and property disputes, providing humanitarian assistance to IDP returnees and promoting inter-ethnic coexistence.

There are considerable challenges for UNHCR and its humanitarian and development partners in achieving these objectives. Parts of the DRC, particularly in the east, remain volatile. The country is among the poorest in the world. Life expectancy is low, the rule of law is very weak and social and economic conditions are extremely difficult.

In addition, HIV/AIDS is a big problem and is exacerbated by the widespread lack of basic health and education services. Meanwhile, the poor communications and transportation networks in such a huge country make the work of UNHCR and its partners even more difficult.

Oxfam Briefing Paper 97
EMBARGOED UNTIL 09:00 HRS GMT Monday 12th February 2007
A Fragile Future
Why scaling down MONUC too soon could spell disaster for the Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and
opportunities of rebuilding a nation from the ground up. The
presence of United Nations peacekeepers (MONUC) has
significantly reduced fighting and organised violence, and must
be maintained with an appropriate troop strength and mandate
to guarantee peace and long-term stability.
MONUC should not scale down its activities until the Congolese
security forces – and in particular the army – stop posing a
threat to their own populations and instead begin providing
security and protection to the Congolese people.

Summary
In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early 2007,
despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the correct policy
choices are made in the next few months.
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) has supported the Congolese government in the political
transition process. It deserves the praise it has received for assisting DRC
with its successful elections and other recent achievements.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the crucial
role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC. Through its
military presence and operations MONUC has been able to restore stability
to large parts of the war-torn country, thereby reducing incidents of
organised violence against civilians and increasing humanitarian access and
economic activities.
There is little doubt that, without a substantial and effective MONUC
presence, this relative stabilisation of the security situation could quickly
unravel and threaten the wider region as well. MONUC officials,
humanitarian actors, and civilians who have been affected by violence are
warning the international community of the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences that a premature scaling back of MONUC presence could
induce. ‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain community leaders in Ituri, eastern
DRC. ‘It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us. Not yet.’
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of approximately
130,000) have already been integrated into a new national army, it has
become clear that the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo) is in no position to defend itself – or any civilian in
its care – against militia warlords, foreign rebels, local defence forces, or any
other armed actors. Attacks on government forces in North Kivu in
November 2006 have served as a timely reminder that, without full support
from MONUC, the Congolese army is completely incapable of preventing
attempts to seize major population centres such as Goma.
Underpaid, underfed, ill-equipped and badly led, FARDC soldiers in all of the
eastern provinces remain the single biggest cause of insecurity in DRC,
responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all human-rights abuses
against civilians. Similar accusations of abuse are also levelled against other
arms of the security forces (including police) and ‘demobilised’ excombatants
who continue to rely on violence as a means of survival.

In essence, most of the security forces that are meant to be protecting the
civilian populations from the numerous threats still present in DRC are
unable, or unwilling, to do so.

The new Congolese government has cited reform of the security sector as
one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a desire to support
the government in this process, particularly with co-ordination, training, and
advice. A strong MONUC commitment to the security-sector reform (SSR)
should be considered a vital element of any post-transition mandate, and
any exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be linked to progress
indicators on SSR processes, most importantly the military, police, and
judicial sectors.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by its
security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised combatants,
MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence to protect civilians
from immediate threats and creating a stable environment in which longerterm
reforms can take place.

The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and extraordinary
efforts of the Congolese citizens to lead their country into a new era are not
rewarded with a ‘cut and run’ attitude of immediate disengagement by the
international community. Instead, the Security Council must make it a priority
with the key member states, such as the USA, to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the protection of
the civilian population from appalling levels of insecurity and abuse.
Maintain the robust use of force to protect civilians but use the
mandate review to take measures to improve MONUC’s operational
effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to demonstrable
progress on security-sector reform, beginning with a clear reduction
in the levels of abuses committed by the security forces themselves,
and a basic ability of military, police, and judicial sectors to defend
the population from external and internal threats.
• Ensure that existing MONUC military presence prioritises the
protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a clearer
definition of protection, more operational guidance, and better tools
to translate the concept of protection into concrete action on the
ground.
• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full support to
the newly created democratic processes and institutions, and the
protection and promotion of human rights. Offer strategic and
operational support to the new sovereign government in combating
the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal arms trade.
The Congolese people deserve no less than a clear signal that their massive
sacrifices have been worth the effort, and that the international community
will work together with their new government to make a better future in DRC
possible.

1 Introduction

In 2006 the Congolese people defied widespread and deeply rooted
scepticism to cast their ballots in one of Africa’s most historic
elections.
Their vote ended more than 40 years of misrule and civil war. In early
2007, despite continued threats to stability, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) faces a period of unprecedented opportunity – if the
correct policy choices are made in the next few months.
Over the past few years, DRC has transformed itself from a
completely divided country (where travel between the eastern and
western parts was impossible) to a nation united by a cautious but
fervent sense of hope.
Yet, despite the incredible progress that has been made on some
fronts, DRC faces a number of daunting challenges, most notably
dealing with regular outbreaks of violence in the east, and the
constant fear of renewed national instability.
Across many parts of the country – and especially in Ituri, the Kivus,
and Katanga – Congolese people are still confronted every day with
the threat of violence, extortion, rape, torture, or murder at the hands
of hundreds of thousands of armed combatants.
An estimated four million civilians have died as a result of conflict
since August 1998, the most devastating death toll in any armed
conflict since World War Two.1 There are clear indications that these
trends are reversible,2 but such progress will require strong political
and financial commitments from both the new DRC government and
the international community.

2 MONUC’s impact to date

In 1999 – when the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) first arrived in DRC – even
optimists would have been hard pressed to predict the recent success
of the Congolese elections.
MONUC deserves the praise it has received for the assistance it has
offered the Congolese government in the political transition process.
The importance of the electoral process should not overshadow the
crucial role that MONUC has played in providing security in DRC.
Having evolved significantly over the years, MONUC’s current
mandate (defined in 37 separate UN Security Council resolutions) has
often been described as a patchwork of wide-ranging – and
sometimes competing – political, military, and humanitarian
objectives. While humanitarian actors feel that MONUC’s
responsibility to protect civilians from violence3 has not always been
prioritised as highly as other elements of the mandate, and MONUC
has failed to perform in some areas (including an initial failure to
prevent incidents of abuse by a small number of its own
peacekeepers4), there is no doubt that MONUC has been able to
restore stability to large parts of the war-torn country.
In all of DRC’s provinces, MONUC has gained control over and
secured major towns and cities. In addition, MONUC’s military
presence and logistical capacity has significantly increased
humanitarian access (and also economic opportunities) to previously
insecure or remote rural areas (for example along the Rwindi–
Rutshuru road in North Kivu, the Bunia–Kasenyi road in Ituri and
the main Bunia–Beni and Bunia–Mahagi commercial routes).
The presence of MONUC troops has reduced incidents of organised
violence against the civilian populations. Especially in Ituri,
MONUC’s operations against militia groups (for example around
Mahagi)5 have succeeded in disarming the majority of combatants6
and allowing large parts of the population to return to their normal
lives. ‘When MONUC arrived, the militias left’, explained displaced
people in Djugu.7 Though MONUC’s performance has been criticised
in some parts of the country (see Section 5), the Ituri example has
shown that a consistent application of MONUC’s robust mandate can
contribute to improvements in the security situation.
The fact that people today walk along the street without fear in towns
like Bunia, which in 2003 witnessed several violent massacres of
civilians, is a simple but powerful indicator of the impact of
MONUC’s presence.
In areas where the security situation has stabilised, MONUC has
begun playing a role in helping displaced people return to their
villages of origin. MONUC patrols in places such as Malumbi or
Tshushubo (North Kivu) have given the population enough
confidence to leave their temporary camps and begin rebuilding their
lives in the villages.
On the whole, MONUC’s presence has been effective in improving
security in those areas where troops have been deployed. Proactive
efforts to protect civilians from violence have at times been
inconsistent or patchy, but there have also been a number of
successes (see Section 5).

3 ‘Not yet’ – the price of scaling down

One of the easiest ways of measuring MONUC’s impact is perhaps to
ask what would happen if it were not present in DRC.
‘If MONUC were to close its base and stop patrols, we would get in
our boats and go to Uganda’, explain village chiefs and displaced
people in the lakeside villages of Tchomia and Kasenyi. ‘We would
leave tomorrow. It simply wouldn’t be safe here for us without
MONUC. Not yet.
Unfortunately, the sentiment is echoed not just in areas that are still
dominated by rebel or militia groups. It is also heard regularly in
those parts of the country that are under the control of the Congolese
army.
Despite the fact that 46,000 combatants (out of a total of
approximately 130,000) have already undergone the ‘brassage’
process of being integrated into a new national army, it has become
clear that FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du
Congo) are in no position to defend themselves – or any civilian in
their care – against any kind of external threat or attack. ‘Brassage is
just a word. It means nothing when translated into reality’, admits a
FARDC commander in Beni.
It is well-known that FARDC soldiers in all of the eastern provinces
flee from the enemy when attacked, regularly discarding their
uniforms and hiding among the civilian populations. Command and
control functions are in some cases non-existent, with commanders
unaware of their troops’ movements or operations. ‘Some of these
guys can’t even shoot a gun’, explained a MONUC peacekeeper that
regularly carries out joint patrols with FARDC soldiers.

In the absence of a capable FARDC, it has often fallen to MONUC
soldiers to defend strategic areas. The recent example of dissident
general Laurent Nkunda’s attempted attack on the eastern city of
Goma illustrated the army’s reliance on MONUC. ‘MONUC’s Indian
Battalion was the only thing standing between Nkunda and Goma.
Without MONUC, Goma would have fallen’, concluded one UN
official in Goma.
Military experts (both foreign and Congolese) agree that FARDC
troops offer little protection against foreign or Congolese insurgent
groups who continue to harass and terrorise civilians. Such groups
include warlord militias, the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de
Libération du Rwanda) - presumed to be the remnants of the
Interahamwe or the Mai Mai – the name for Local Defence Forces.
In addition to their failure to protect civilians against external threats,
FARDC troops are themselves considered to be the major cause of
insecurity in DRC. MONUC’s human-rights monitors hold FARDC
soldiers responsible for committing more than 80 per cent of all
human-rights abuses against civilians. FARDC soldiers regularly
extort or loot from the civilian populations, and commit violent
crimes such as arbitrary killings and rape. Similar accusations of
abuse are also levelled against non-organised armed actors, including
‘demobilised’ ex-combatants who continue to rely on violence as a
means of survival. The high incidence of crimes and abuses against
the civilian population in DRC has been made possible due to a
general climate of impunity and a complete lack of law and order.
Civilians are looking to MONUC to support their new government in
combating these problems, and ensuring that a relatively stable
environment will continue to allow humanitarian assistance to flow
to those in need. One of the ways in which MONUC has been doing –
and should continue to do – this is by supporting the new Congolese
government with its efforts to reform the security sector, especially
with regard to military, police, and judicial sectors.

4 No security without reform

In 2005, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made it clear that
‘the establishment of an integrated and professional army and police
force is a key element of the exit strategy for MONUC’. In other
words, UN member states should not withdraw MONUC – whose
deployment has been an expression of their responsibility to protect
civilians in DRC, until the new government establishes a functional
and accountable national army and police force.

The examples above illustrate the army’s current lack of capacity to
provide even the most basic physical security. Reasons for this
appear to be well-known, yet at the same time hard to tackle.
International advisers report extremely low rates of formal military
education among all brigades, and troops in the field are
notoriously ill-equipped to perform in any kind of battle. One of the
newly integrated brigades, for example, has been given just 24 handheld
radios (and no spare batteries) to share between approximately
3,500 people for communications during combat. Bullets are in
similarly short supply.
Troops also lack motivation (and – not fearing any prosecution from
a weak judicial system – begin to prey on local populations) because
they are underpaid and underfed, and living with their families in
conditions of extreme poverty and hardship.
Current monthly salaries consist of a miserly $25, and the complete
lack of soldiers’ welfare and health care routinely results in 15–20
deaths in each brigade per month. The abject state of neglect in
which soldiers and their families find themselves was aptly
illustrated by the 4th Integrated Brigade who arrived in Ituri in 2005
spreading infectious diseases such as cholera and fever to the local
populations in its path.
Other military actors are even less functional than the ground forces.
The Congolese Air Force is considered ‘structurally obsolete and in a
state of life-threatening dilapidation […], air or land combat capacity
is zero’. Little training has been carried out for air crew, technical, or
command elements since the Mobutu period.
The remaining branches of the security sector, including police,
judicial, and civilian agencies are as ill-equipped as the army to carry
out their work properly.
Courts and magistrates are in short supply. Only one prison (out of
a total of 145) in DRC actually has a budget for feeding its inmates.
And even though DRC has 258 registered airstrips, only 50 of them
are monitored by air-traffic controllers. There is no radar
surveillance system or navigational guidance system for aircraft in
DRC, and air-force communication systems do not function to any
satisfactory level.
The new Congolese government has cited security sector reform
(SSR) as one of its highest priorities and MONUC has expressed a
desire to support the government in this process, particularly with
co-ordination, training, and advice. MONUC’s recently established
SSR cell acknowledges that any exit strategy for UN peacekeepers
8 A Fragile Future, Oxfam Briefing Paper, February 2007
will need to be closely linked to the progress on reform, most
importantly the military, police, and judicial sectors.
One of the challenges in this domain has been the fragmentation of
processes and initiatives. While the active involvement of several
bilateral donors in SSR processes is laudable, it is unlikely that small
or ad hoc projects (most of them limited to certain geographical areas
or specific units – ‘a few jeeps for two brigades in Ituri, a few pots of
paint for three new courthouses in Kinshasa’) will add up to an
impact that is equal to or greater than the sum of its parts.
The ultimate responsibility for the SSR process naturally rests with
the newly elected Congolese government, and external SSR actors are
currently looking to President Kabila to clearly signal his country’s
strategic and operational needs in this area. Donors and other actors
will need to ensure that their co-operation with the new government
does not suffer from the same fragmented approach as past
initiatives. A single actor (such as the European Union or MONUC)
should be appointed to take a clear lead on the co-ordination of
donor support to the SSR process. MONUC’s current involvement in
SSR processes (which includes hosting weekly SSR co-ordination
meetings) indicate that there is capacity to lead on day-to-day coordination
processes. It should be recognised, however, that the
temporary nature of MONUC’s mandate in DRC is unlikely to allow
for the kind of strategic and long-term co-ordination that can oversee
the entire lifespan of the SSR process (an undertaking military experts
estimate to take at least 15–20 years).
On the issue of building national capacity, donors should
acknowledge that MONUC’s presence in the field and its existing cooperation
with security forces make it a logical choice for initial
training schemes. For example, the proposed curriculum for a
MONUC-led basic military training programme (to be carried out in
all of FARDC’s integrated brigades) accurately reflects some of the
most pressing needs and priorities on the ground – both in terms of
basic military skills and the social welfare of soldiers and their
dependants. It should be noted, however, that MONUC’s proposed
45-day trainings are little more than initial steps in the training
process, and in themselves highly unlikely to allow FARDC to reach
operational capability immediately.
In addition to supporting co-ordination and training initiatives,
MONUC should increase its capacity to offer expert operational
advice to government actors leading SSR processes, in particular
regarding urgent but sensitive issues such as vetting of corrupt or
abusive officials in the army, police, and judicial systems.

Any realistic exit strategy for MONUC will inevitably need to be
linked to progress indicators on SSR processes.
Until the Congolese government can eliminate the threats posed by
its security forces, other armed groups, and recently demobilised
combatants, MONUC will need to remain in DRC, using its presence
to protect civilians from immediate threats and ensuring a stable
environment in which reforms can take place.

5 More effective protection of civilians

In March 2005, the UN Security Council reiterated its call to MONUC
to use ‘all necessary means within its capabilities and in the areas
where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of
force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, from any armed
group, foreign or Congolese’.
Experts have described MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate as ‘the most
assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians’.
Despite this, MONUC has sometimes been accused of behaving more
like a Chapter VI observer mission, using force only in self-defence
and doing little to physically protect civilians. ‘I don’t think they’re
allowed to open fire’, claims a Congolese NGO worker in Goma.
‘They did nothing to stop women getting raped in Bukavu and
Rutshuru. I’m scared they wouldn’t protect my daughters either if
there is more fighting here’. Reasons for such inaction are numerous
and often include a lack of resources and capacity, as well as the
prioritisation of more political aspects of the mandate over protection
objectives.
In addition, the concept of ‘civilian protection’ has often remained
vague and ill-defined, and peacekeepers are given very little
guidance on how they are expected to translate their mandate into
concrete tasks.
For MONUC to adequately carry out its ambitious mandate, forces
would benefit from a clearer understanding of the concept of
protection, more operational guidance, and better tools.
On a conceptual level, MONUC should consistently prioritise the
protection of civilians when considering how to counter ongoing and
well-known threats, for example the problem of dealing with
dissidents like Laurent Nkunda. MONUC’s inaction in the face of
Nkunda’s violent attacks on Bukavu in 2004, Rutshuru in 2005 or
Sake in 2006 is regularly cited by civilians in North and South Kivu as
an example of the international community failing to protect them
from violence. These incidents stand in marked contrast to MONUC
successes, such as the robust display of force MONUC battalions
launched when Nkunda attempted to seize the (perhaps strategically
more important) town of Goma in November 2006, or the way in
which MONUC has dealt with the threat of militia in Ituri.
In instances where MONUC has failed to deal with urgent protection
threats, populations have often expressed confusion and
resentment. A more consistent application of MONUC’s protection
mandate would do much to build confidence among these
populations.
Operationally – and more concretely – MONUC would also do well
to include clearer guidance on appropriate protection activities in
their military rules of engagement, for example troops’
responsibilities in preventing other actors (including the state’s own
security forces) from committing abuses against civilians.
Perhaps the single most important tool that MONUC can use to
protect civilians from threats is its sheer military presence. ‘When
MONUC is not around, when they are not doing patrols or going to
work as usual, people often don’t leave their houses. You have to
understand we still live in fear’, villagers around Lake Albert
explained. Specific steps that MONUC could take in this area are
outlined in the final recommendations in this paper.
It should be emphasised here that MONUC’s existing resources in
DRC are already overstretched. Any cut to current troop strength or
resources would therefore spell disaster for communities currently
benefiting from MONUC protection.

6 Beyond immediate security – a lasting peace?

Oxfam believes that by supporting the Congolese government in
reforming the security sector and consistently prioritising the
protection of civilians in military operations, MONUC could greatly
increase its impact on security in DRC. At the same time, it would be
naïve to assume that either measure will guarantee the Congo’s longterm
stability – a job that clearly rests with the DRC government
itself.
Following his success in the recent national elections that ended
DRC’s transitional period, President Joseph Kabila has assumed the
unique rights and responsibilities that are assigned to any leader of a
sovereign nation.
To achieve a lasting peace, the new Congolese government will need
to begin addressing long-standing problems of weak governance and
political and economic marginalisation, especially among young
people, who make up more than half of the Congo’s population.
Until the government is able to offer current or ex-combatants a true
alternative to militia life, their disgruntled citizens remain at high risk
of resorting to the rule of the gun.
In order to encourage long-term stability, MONUC will need to
support the Congolese government with the development of its new
democratic institutions and processes, and protect and promote
human rights. It should also assist the new Congolese government
with political processes such as searching for creative and sustainable
solutions to the threat posed by ‘foreign’ armed groups such as the
FDLR and ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces - National Army
for the Liberation of Uganda). Sensitive issues, including the presence
of Congolese fighters and the question of Congolese citizenship for
some of the foreign elements in these groups, should be discussed
without delay.
In addition, more resources will need to be made available by DRC
donors for civilian agencies (UN, government, and NGO) to
eventually replace national DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
Reintegration) programmes with long-term and broad-based
community-recovery programmes.
In order to tackle the illicit exploitation of minerals and the illegal
arms trade – both of which are likely to sustain conflict in DRC –
MONUC should continue, where appropriate, to offer strong support
to the government, in particular through providing analysis and
logistical support to monitoring activities. The existing mandate that
MONUC has been given in these areas must be matched with
appropriate resources and capacity if MONUC is to make any
progress in assisting the new government with tackling such difficult
problems.
The election of a new government should not be seen by the
international community as an excuse to extract itself from any of
these processes when it is clear that a limited or superficial response
to these problems will merely allow them to fester beneath the
surface and breed potential for future instability.

7 Conclusions and recommendations

The Democratic Republic of Congo today finds itself at a critical
turning point, confronted with both the challenges and opportunities
of rebuilding a nation from the ground up.
In recent years, DRC has exceeded all expectations: in record time, it
has established basic democratic institutions (including a constitution
and democratic elections at both national and provincial levels). The
country’s macro-economic framework has recovered at least
partially, and economists expect investment expansion, particularly
in the country’s lucrative mining sector.
Yet, Congo’s impressive developments and even the successful
elections will mean nothing if a scaling down of efforts allows the
country to lapse back into full-blown violence. It is imperative that
the international community recognise that investing in stability will
also be more cost-effective than responding to the fall-out.

The UN Security Council must ensure that the concerted and
extraordinary efforts of the Congolese people to lead their country
into a new era are not blocked by an immediate disengagement and
withdrawal of interest from the international community. Instead, the
Security Council must make it a priority to:
• Maintain the current strength of MONUC to support the
protection of the civilian population from appalling levels of
insecurity and abuse. Maintain the robust use of force to
protect civilians but use the mandate review to take measures
to improve MONUC’s operational effectiveness.
• Explicitly link MONUC’s longer-term exit strategy to
demonstrable progress on security-sector reform, beginning
with a clear reduction in the levels of abuses committed by the
security forces themselves, and a basic ability of military,
police, and judicial sectors to defend the population from
external and internal threats.
• Ensure that the existing MONUC military presence prioritises
the protection of civilians, and provides peacekeepers with a
clearer definition of protection, more operational guidance,
and better tools to translate the concept of protection into
concrete action on the ground. Oxfam believes that, in order
to maximise the limited resources at their disposal, MONUC’s
troops on the ground should focus especially on:

o Establishing overall security and humanitarian access
in areas where displaced populations are returning to
their villages of origin. It is imperative that MONUC
maintain close contact with humanitarian actors in
planning for such operations in order to avoid
instances of forced, politicised, or uninformed
returns.

o Carefully assessing the humanitarian impact of
planned joint MONUC–FARDC offensives and
refraining from carrying out operations that achieve
political objectives but have a disproportionately
negative impact on civilians (for example, clear risk of
militia reprisal killings against local populations or
unduly high levels of displacement).

o Instructing troops to apply the protection mandate in a
more consistent way. This includes the robust use of
force in line with the Chapter VII mandate, when the
protection needs require it, and proactive attempts to
prevent abuses such as looting and extortion. This
should involve encouraging the reporting of abuses
and where possible supporting their prosecution
through military justice mechanisms.

o Transmitting information about protection threats to
local humanitarian actors or the protection clusters
(which MONUC civilian staff co-chair) so that
appropriate solutions can be discussed. Protection
clusters have often been able to co-ordinate effective
humanitarian responses and mount joint advocacy
initiatives to address identified threats.

o Increasing humanitarian space for independent aid
agencies by putting a stop to self-promotional (and
sometimes inappropriate) ‘quick impact projects’ and
‘winning hearts and minds activities’, except where
these are directly linked to military co-operation (for
example, the rehabilitation of latrines or water sources
in military barracks or prisons).

• Assure the new Congolese government of MONUC’s full
support to the newly created democratic processes and
institutions, and the protection and promotion of human
rights. Offer strategic and operational support to the new
sovereign government in combating the illicit exploitation of
minerals and the illegal arms trade.

UN Press release - MONUC's mandate extended to April 15

As Security Council extends DR Congo mission, Ban Ki-moon focuses on mining reform

15 February 2007 – Highlighting that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to pose “a threat to international peace and security in the region,” the Security Council today extended the UN mission in the impoverished African country for another two months.

The extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was due to expire today, came as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on Congolese authorities to focus on security sector reform and tighten up legislation covering business practices relating to diamond and other mining because too much of the profits of these industries are going to fund armed conflict.

In its unanimously adopted resolution, the Council, citing the fact that DRC continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region, extended the mandate until 15 April.

Separately, Mr. Ban makes his remarks in his latest report at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2007/68 on the DRC looking at whether or not sanctions should be imposed on the country as a way of cleaning up the mining industry. However, given the uncertainty of whether sanctions would work against such practices, as well as that in December the country swore in its first democratically elected President, the Secretary-General recommends against imposing them.

“While sanctions may inconvenience their targets, the general effect will be to diminish only marginally the general practices they are designed to curtail. In most of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, they will do little to reduce the use of force in extracting minerals, diminish fraud and encourage responsible corporate behaviour,” Mr. Ban writes.

He also points to a more general concern about possible UN sanctions against the DRC. “Imposing United Nations sanctions now may be perceived as punitive, whether they target State actors or not and whether they are intended to reflect on the capacity of the State to manage its affairs or not,” he says. “This might be another reason why United Nations sanctions may not be advisable at the present time.”

Instead, Mr. Ban urges the Government to reform the security sector and fight corruption, but particularly to tighten up on investors in the natural resource sector by making sure they adhere to regulations. He calls for the private sector to set better business standards itself, while also recommending setting up a cross-border commission to prevent corruption at the frontier.

“The question remains: what is likely to bring more order to the production and marketing of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources in a way that will allow greater security for the artisanal miners, less exposure to extortion by armed groups and the assurance of more revenues for the State and its public services?” he writes.

The Government must first and foremost institute security sector reform and improve trust and transparency by monitoring and fighting corrupt practices and taking effective action against violators, the report stresses.

The Secretary-General’s report was itself based on recommendations made by the so-called Group of Experts who visited the DRC late last year to look at the whole issue of sanctions, during which they found that while linkages still remain between armed groups and the exploitation of natural resources, the situation has become ever more complex.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/sc8955.doc.htm

Security Council

5630th Meeting (AM)

Security Council extends mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 15 April,

Unanimously adopting resolution 1742 (2007)

Requests Secretary-General’s Recommendations

On Possible Adjustments to Mandate, Capacities

The Security Council this morning extended the mandate and personnel strength of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which was to expire today, until 15 April.

Unanimously adopting resolution 1742 (2007) and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, as soon as possible and not later than 15 March, on his consultations with the Congolese authorities and to submit recommendations on adjustments the Council might consider making to the mandate and capacities of MONUC.

The meeting started at 11:30 a.m. and adjourned at 11:35 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1742 (2002) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

“Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

“Recalling the support it provided, in particular through the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), for the process of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition, signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, and for the elections that represented the culmination of that process,

“Reaffirming its commitment to continue to contribute to the consolidation of peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the post-transition period,

“Underlining its attachment to the continuation of a regular political dialogue with the Congolese authorities, and recalling the importance it attaches to the consultations undertaken with them by the Secretary-General on possible adjustments to be made to the mandate and capacities of MONUC during this period,

“Taking note of the letter addressed to its President on 15 January 2007 by the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2007/17),

“Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Decides to extend the mandate and personnel strength of MONUC, as set out in its resolutions 1565 (2004), 1592 (2005), 1596 (2005), 1621 (2005), 1635 (2005) and 1736 (2006), until 15 April 2007;

“2. Requests the Secretary-General to report, as soon as possible and not later than 15 March 2007, on his consultations with the Congolese authorities and to submit recommendations on adjustments the Council may consider making to the mandate and capacities of MONUC;

“3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Thursday, February 08, 2007

COMPTE – RENDU (RESUME) DE LA REUNION DES ONG MEMBRES/COALITION POUR METTRE FIN A L’UTILISATION D’ENFANTS SOLDATS AU NORD-KIVU, 13 JANVIER 2007.

COMPTE – RENDU (RESUME) DE LA REUNION DES ONG MEMBRES/COALITION POUR METTRE FIN A L’UTILISATION D’ENFANTS SOLDATS AU NORD-KIVU, 13 JANVIER 2007.

1. La réunion a été ouverte par Mme Domitile RUSIMBUKA, Chef de DIVAS Nord-Kivu, se réjouissant que ce soit la première réunion 2007 des ONG de protection des droits de l’enfant. Elle a, à cette occasion, rappelé aux ONG l’adage selon lequel «l’union fait la force » (donc l’avantage de la Coalition) et a invité les ONG au sérieux dans leur travail ainsi qu’au changement des mentalités vis-à-vis du changement politique en cours dans le pays afin de mieux participer aux initiatives de prévention contre le recrutement d’enfants et au DDR enfants dans le Nord-Kivu à problèmes,

2. Les participants ont succinctement présenté leurs ONG respectives (Dénomination, Responsable et ses coordonnées téléphoniques et E-mail, principaux domaines d’intervention en matière de prévention et de DDR enfants, zones d’intervention, partenaires d’appui financier), après rappel du rôle de réseautage de la Coalition et de l’importance de la cartographie des interventions des ONG membres de la Coalition. 13 Associations (tableau des participants en annexe) y ont participé. Elles sont toutes du Petit Nord-Kivu (excluant le Grand Nord-Kivu : Béni, Butembo, Lubero, …). Selon le Point Focal de la Coalition du Nord-Kivu, 25 Associations ont été invitées, mais la réunion a coïncidé avec une autre tenue par SC-UK sur la réunification familiale des ESFGA en collaboration avec UNICEF. SC (UK), UNICEF et MONUC/CP se sont bien excusées à cause de cela,

3. La restitution, sur base du Rapport final Coalition, de la réunion internationale de Bujumbura du 28 novembre 2006 a été faite, en insistant sur ce qui concerne directement la RDC. Après, il y a eu une série des questions dont le but était de mieux en savoir plus. Les participants ont apprécié toutes les recommandations formulées en rapport avec la RDC et solliciter un suivi effectif pour leur mise en application de la part de la Coordination Nationale. Ils ont émis le souhait de voir photocopier ce rapport et le distribuer à chaque ONG membre. Les participants ont, enfin, réagi négativement à la déclaration des Délégués du Rwanda à Bujumbura selon laquelle seuls les Groupes rebelles rwandais en RDC utilisent des enfants soldats (il y en a encore au Rwanda),

4. Les participants ont discuté de l’exécution prioritaire des activités de la Coalition financée par le Secrétariat à Londres, à savoir la formation des sensibilisateurs des officiers FARDC, la construction des panneaux avec message de sensibilisation publique sur le DDR enfants et la lutte contre l’impunité à ce sujet et la formation des officiers FARDC à travers les Centres de brassage de Rumangabo à Rutshuru. Le Coordonnateur National a promis l’appui en livrets sur les droits de l’enfant pour la sensibilisation et la formation des Officiers FARDC. Elle a également invité le Point Focal à travailler dès le début de la semaine prochaine pour l’exécution effective de ces activités,

5. Une évaluation d’ensemble de la situation de recrutement (et de re-recrutement) et d’utilisation d’enfants soldats dans le Nord-Kivu a eu lieu : la situation est mauvaise dans l’ensemble comme à l’époque de la rébellion RCD/Goma :

· Territoire de Masisi

Un groupe armé maï – maï commandé par le Lieutenant Colonel CHOMA CHOMA (en arrestation actuelle au sein de la 8ème Région Militaire ?) continue le recrutement d’enfants soldats. Dans les localités de Kichanga, Mushaki, Karuba et Ngungu dénommées « Ceinture de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE », celui-ci continue le recrutement d’enfants et leur utilisation comme soldats (aux fronts) sous toutes les formes. Dans les localités de Nyabiondo et Masisi Centre, le Commandant Claude du Groupe Laurent NKUNDABATWARE pratique également le re-recrutement d’enfants soldats démobilisés.

· Territoire de Rutshuru

Chaque fois que Laurent NKUNDABATWARE attaque un village, il le fait avec la présence d’enfants soldats dans ses rangs et les groupes maï – maï opposés trouvent également les arguments pour convaincre les familles et les enfants à se faire recruter pour résister contre l’invasion de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE. Et le recrutement d’enfants dans ce territoire se fait à base de tribus d’où appartiennent tel ou tel groupe armé opposé dans le conflit et prend la forme d’auto – défense communautaire (ADC).

Le commandant maï – maï du Groupe Jacqueson (en arrestation actuellement à Beni ?) au nom de Nyamirima pratique actuellement le recrutement des enfants.

· Territoire de Walikale

Aucune Association/ONG y intervenant n’était présente mais le recrutement d’enfants est signalé, pratiqué par le Colonel maï – maï Samy.

· Territoire de Kalehe - Nord

Le 4ème Bataillon de la 14ème Brigade FARDC du Colonel RUGAYI, remplaçant du Major Mulomba (celui-ci a fait défection et rejoint le Groupe Laurent NKUNDABATWARE avec enfants soldats contre les FARDC) pratique également le re-recrutement des ESFGA dans les localités de Numbi, Shanje et Nyabibwe.

· Ville de Goma

Le Groupe Armé Laurent NKUNDABATWARE pratique le recrutement et le re-recrutement d’enfants, comme soldats, en utilisant d’autres enfants dans la ville de Goma. Des ESFGA déjà réunifiés en familles sont repris et envoyés aux côtés des nouveaux enfants recrutés (en tenue civile) pour venir sensibiliser des enfants (ESFGA ou non) à rejoindre les rangs de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE (avec une promesse de $US 50 par mois !). Ainsi certains Centres de formation professionnelle des ESFGA se retrouvent progressivement vidés de ces derniers. Par ailleurs, le suivi social des ESFGA en familles révèlent l’absence de plusieurs ESFGA, partis rejoindre les rangs de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE en Territoires.

Par ailleurs, il a été signalé un mouvement de recrutement d’enfants par Laurent NKUNDABATWARE à travers le Rwanda voisin. Au Sud de Lubero, dans le Grand Nord, il a été signalé également le recrutement d’enfants par le groupe maï-maï de Jacqueson.

Malgré cette situation de recrutement, la démobilisation de certains enfants soldats a continué en la fin d’année 2006 : 65 EAFGA ont été libérés dans le Centre de brassage FARDC de Rumangabo (depuis le 21 novembre 2006) alors que dans le Camp de Nyaleke (Centre de brassage), 216 EAFGA ont bénéficié de la démobilisation (le 04 décembre 2006).

Les ONG du Nord-Kivu pensent que les difficultés d’appui à la réinsertion scolaire ou socio-professionnelle individuelle, des ESFGA, à leur suivi familial et communautaire, à la sensibilisation communautaire contre le recrutement et sur le DDR enfants ainsi (et surtout) la survenue de nouveaux conflits armés de Laurent NKUNDABATWARE, seraient à l’origine de la recrudescence du recrutement d’enfants. Un autre facteur non négligeable donné est le recrutement d’enfants pour augmenter les effectifs de combattants avant d’aller au Centre de brassage et obtenir le grade de Major ou Colonel, … sans oublier des intentions de certains ESFGA se faisant re-recruter pour tenter de bénéficier des avantages de la CONADER aux adultes combattants démobilisés en se faisant démobiliser par le Centre de brassage (25 $US par mois, après avoir touché chacun 110 $US). Les ONG du Nord-Kivu se sont également inquiétés des négociations en cours entre Rebelles Laurent NKUNDABATWARE et FARDC pour remplacer le processus de brassage par celui de mixage des armées (difficulté d’assurer le DDR enfants dans ce cas !).

Devant cette situation, les ONG du Nord-Kivu ont formulé certaines recommandations :

- Dénoncer publiquement la situation en utilisant les médias internationaux et locaux et les autres voies disponibles au niveau national et international,

- Renforcer le système de monitoring par la collecte des informations très précises à communiquer aux partenaires susceptibles d’exercer une pression aux échellons supérieurs (Secrétariat de la Coalition/Londres, MONUC/CP, UNICEF, Amnesty International, …),

- Observer des mesures de sécurité et de protection des Défenseurs des droits des enfants, car les Animateurs craignent de leur sécurité dans le contact avec tel ou tel groupe armé recruteur ou utilisateur d’enfants dans le Nord-Kivu.

6. Un Comité de renforcement du Point Focal de la Coalition pour le Petit Nord-Kivu a été mis en place par désignation et approbation de toutes les ONG représentées. Il s’agit de :

- SOS Grands-Lacs : Président

- PAMI, CAJED, CADERCO, SC-UK, CERAO, FESCO (Membres).

Ce comité de coordination a été chargé urgemment de :

- mettre en place et communiquer son mode de fonctionnement simple et souple sur base des lignes directrices de la Coalition,

- élaborer un calendrier de rencontres du Comité de coordination et des réunions mensuelles des ONG membres (il devra également compléter la cartographie de celles-ci),

- élaborer un plan d’action provincial de la Coalition Nord-Kivu (à compléter par celui du Grand-Nord),

- travailler, à partir du 15 janvier, pour l’exécution effective des activités déjà financées par le Secrétariat International de la Coalition (voir Point 4),

- maintenir une collaboration étroite avec les Partenaires (UNICEF, MONUC/CP, SC-UK, Amnesty International, …).

7. Dans les divers, le Coordinateur National de la Coalition RDC a donné les communications suivantes aux ONG :

- Une réunion nationale pour élaborer ou adopter le plan national de la Coalition RDC et élire un nouveau Coordinateur National (a annoncé sa mise en retraite) autour du 12 février 2007 (et en faire une campagne de sensibilisation contre le recrutement),

- Un poste de Permanent pour la Coalition RDC sera annoncé et appuyé financièrement par le Secrétariat International de la Coalition en 2007 et la Coalition RDC devra être enregistré officiellement en RDC,

- Des conseils ont été prodigués sur le travail en réseau, la gestion institutionnelle, la communication à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur du Réseau, la collaboration Sud-Sud, etc.

- Des opportunités d’appui financier à exploiter en 2007 pour les programmes des ONG ou de la Coalition auprès de UNICEF, MONUC/CP, Fonds pour les Droits Humains Mondiaux (FDHM), Amnesty International, Secrétariat International Coalition, CICR, etc.

- Un rappel des explications et des adresses utiles de la Coalition, son mandat et les lignes directrices afin de mieux la connaître et participer à la diffusion de son travail, etc.

8. La réunion a également recommandé à la Coordination Nationale de la Coalition de :

- organiser une réunion dans le Grand-Nord (Beni – Butembo) avec les ONG, d’où une mission conjointe DIVAS, Coordinateur National, Coordinateur Provincial à effectuer en sollicitant l’appui logistique (transport) de la MONUC,

- renforcer les ONG du Nord-Kivu en documentation (nécessité de photocopier certains rapports sur les enfants soldats, Amnesty International, Coalition, …).

App. MURHABAZI NAMEGABE

Coordinateur National Coalition

pour mettre fin à l’utilisation d’enfants soldats en RDC.-


COORDINATION DE LA COALITION POUR METTRE FIN A L’UTILISATION D’ENFANTS SOLDATS EN R.D.CONGO

PRESENTATION DES ONG DU PETIT NORD-KIVU (REUNION DU 13 JANVIER 2007).

Dénomination / Association

Responsable / Association

Coordonnées de contact (n° téléphone, E-mail)

Principal domaine d’intervention

Zone d’intervention (Territoire, ville)

Partenaire financier

01

RODO, Réseau des unions pour le développement des opprimés

Nicole KASONGO MESU

0997740449 modeskajm@yaho.fr 0998600075

* Réinsertion socio-économique par professionnalisation,

* Plaidoyer et sensibilisation des autorités et population sur les EAFGAs

Ville du Nord-Kivu

Organisation des Nations Unies, UNICEF, PNUD et autres locales

02

Programme de lutte contre l’extrême pauvreté et la misère : PAMI,asbl

Mr Joachim FIKIRI

0816904013 ; 0808488533 ongdpami@yahoo.fr

-Plaidoyer et sensibilisation

-RDTR

-Réinsertion socio- économique et communautaire des ex-EAFGA

*Ville de Goma

*Territoire de Nyiragongo : Rusayo, Mudja, Mongi, Buvira, Kibumba, Buhumba

Save the Children, UNICEF

03

Centre DORIKA (Centre d’encadrement pour l’autopromotion intégrale)

Innocent MUHINDO PENDAKAZI

0997702941 pendakazidorika@yahoo.fr

- Prévention de recrutement des enfants dans les groupes et forces armés

- Suivi de réinsertion socio-économique

- Sensibilisation par la Radio DORIKA FM

En territoire de Rutshuru

- Cité de Kiwanja

- Cité de Nyamilima

- Rutshuru centre

- Bunagana

- Ville de Goma

- Watchlist

- AJWS

- Constellation / France

- UNICEF

- MONUC et autres 2006

04

Centre d’Appui pour le Développement Rural et Communautaire « CADERCO », asbl

Mr Ir Phidias WETEMWAMI

Tél. 0997788820 ; 0997746931 ; 0811515416

E-mail : phidiascaderco@yahoo.fr

-Recherche et réunification des ESFGAs

- IDTR

- Plaidoyer et médiation et médiation des ESFGAs

- Sensibilisation de la communauté et des autorités politico – administratives, militaires et locales

- Réinsertion socio- économique et communautaires des ESFGAs

- Réinsertion scolaire des ESFGAs et OEV

- Suivi et prévention des re-recrutements

Territoire de Masisi :

Axe-bord du lac de Sake à Nyabibwe, Axe montagneux, Bitanga, Masisi centre, Bihambwe, Nyabiondo, Mahanga, Kandja, Katoyi.

Territoire de Kalehe :

Minova, Nyabibwe, Numbi, Mpumbi, Bwisha, Chebunda, Kaloba et Murambi. Territoire de Walikale :

Kashebere, Mpofi, Mutongo, ..,

UNICEF

05

Association des Guides du Congo « AGC »

Mme Séverine MUGHOLE

Tél. : 0997725231 ; 0997286144 ; 0997295113

E-mail : asguiden_k@yahoo.fr

- Sensibilisation dans les points d’écoute

- Réinsertion socio-économique des ex-EAFGA-Fille

Q. Kasika, Av. Géomètre, n° Goma

* Save the Children,

* UNICEF

06

FESCO/ASNK : Fédération des Scouts du Congo / Association des Scouts du Nord-Kivu

- Jean-le-Bon KASEREKA KIRERE

- Pour le projet Protection de l’Enfance-Joseph PALUKU MUNGOSSY

Tél. : 0997734529 ; 0997794770 ; E-mail : fescoutnordkivu@yahoo.fr

- Réinsertion socio-économique

- Plaidoyer et sensibilisation

- Ville de Goma

- Territoire de Rutshuru (Bwisha) et de Lubero

Save the Children

07

MIDEFEHOPOS (Mouvement International des Droits de l’Enfant, de la Femme, de l’Homme, veufs et de leur promotion sociale)

Isidore KALIMIRA

Tél. : 0997181996

- Encadrement des enfants de la rue, vulnérables dans un centre

- Sensibilisation des enfants de la rue pour la réunification ou la réinsertion familiale

- Réinsertion familiale des enfants de la rue, des enfants non-accompagnés

- Plaidoyer des enfants de la rue,

- Remise à niveau des enfants de la rue, vulnérables et en situation difficile

- Ville de Goma

- Territoire de Masisi (Nord-Kivu, Masisi centre

- Territoire de Kalehe / Kasheke/Sud-Kivu, Minova/ Sud-Kivu, Bueremana, Territoire de Masisi / Nord-Kivu

UNICEF

08

CICR / GOMA

Prosper SEBIHIRE, Responsable Agence

Tél. : 0813783413

- Tracing des parents

- Rétablissement des liens familiaux

- Réunification familial

- Entretien post RF

- Suivi des EAFGA dans les CTO de Goma

Toutes les provinces sauf le Nord-Kivu

09

CAJED (Concert d’Actions pour Jeunes et Enfants Défavorisés)

Gilbert MUNDA

Tél. : 0997748197

E-mail : cajed2002@yahoo.ca

DDR (CTO, Réinsertion socio-économique, professionnelle des ex-EAFGA, Accompagnement psycho-social des ESFGA)

Ville de Goma, Rutshuru (Bwisha)

Masisi (Basholi, Mokoto, Kitshanga, Mweso, Muheto)

UNICEF

10

UPADERI : Union Paysanne pour le Développement Rural Intégré

Faustin NTIBATEGERA

Tél. : 0997702700

E-mail : upaderi@yahoo.fr

- Plaidoyer et sensibilisation à la prévention au non recrutement,

- Recherche et réunification familiale,

- Suivi à la réinsertion socio-économique des ex-EAFGA et ENA,

- Accompagnement des clubs des filles et comités / Parlement des enfants

Territoire de Masisi :

Axes Karubangungu, Matanda, Kibabi, Katoyi, Bihambwe, Masisi centre, Kilorirwe, Nyakarida, Muheto, Ufamandu,

- Save the Children, octobre 2006

- CONCERN 2006

- PNUD/COMREC, novembre 2006

11

CFAJR « Centre de Formation Artisanale des Jeunes de la Rue »

Urbain BAHANI

Tél. : 09942009940

E-mail : baurbain@yahoo.fr

- Suivi à la réinsertion socio-économique des ESFGA,

- Formation professionnelle pour la prévention du recrutement,

- Education formelle pour les enfants non accompagnés, victimes des conflits, orphelins et vulnérables,

- AGR et agriculture

- Territoire de Masisi,

- Ville de Goma

- NCA/ETN,

- Save the Children,

- PNUD/UNOPS,

- PAM,

- UNICEF

12

SOS Grands – Lacs

Albert KASUMBA

Tél. : 0998399803

- Accompagnement transitoire des ESFGA

- Plaidoyer

- Réinsertion socio – économique des ESFGA et Enfants vulnérables

- Goma

- Masisi

- Rutshuru

- Kalehe

(Bord du lac)

- UNICEF

- Bureau Zone de Est PAM

13

CERAO

BALISI Martin

Tél. : 0811668584 ; 0813052188 ;

E-mail : ceraolukas@yahoo.fr

- Réinsertion socio-économique par professionnalisation

- DDR

- Ville de Goma

- Beni

- Nyabiondo

CRN

14

DIVAS : Gouvernement (Partenaire Etatique)

Rusimbuka Domitilla

Tél. : 0998600072 ; 0808501075

E-mail : rusimbukad@yahoo.fr

- DDR

- Plaidoyer

- Sensibilisation

- Encadrement des enfants en situation difficile

- Suivi de la réinsertion en générale

Toute la province

- UNICEF

- PNUD

- SC

- PAM

- CICR

- CICR et autres

15

A suivre (la cartographie)